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

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The Jacksonian Tradition

And American Foreign Policy

Walter Russell Mead

IN THE LAST five months of World War II, American bombing raids claimed the lives of more than 900,000 Japanese civilians—not counting the casualties from the atomic strikes against Hiroshima and Nagasaki.[1] This is more than twice the total number of combat deaths that the United States has suffered in all its foreign wars combined.[2]

On one night, that of March 9-10, 1945, 234 Superfortresses dropped 1,167 tons of incendiary bombs over downtown Tokyo; 83,793 Japanese bodies were found in the charred remains—a number greater than the 80,942 combat fatalities that the United States sustained in the Korean and Vietnam Wars combined.

Since the Second World War, the United States has continued to employ devastating force against both civilian and military targets. Out of a pre-war population of 9.49 million, an estimated 1 million North Korean civilians are believed to have died as a result of U.S. actions during the 1950-53 conflict.[3] During the same war, 33,870 American soldiers died in combat, meaning that U.S. forces killed approximately thirty North Korean civilians for every American soldier who died in action. The United States dropped almost three times as much explosive tonnage in the Vietnam War as was used in the Second World War, and something on the order of 365,000 Vietnamese civilians are believed to have been killed during the period of American involvement.[4]

Regardless of Clausewitz's admonition that "casualty reports . . . are never accurate, seldom truthful, and in most cases deliberately falsified", these numbers are too striking to ignore. They do not, of course, suggest a moral parallel between the behavior of, say, German and Japanese aggressors and American forces seeking to defeat those aggressors in the shortest possible time. German and Japanese forces used the indiscriminate murder of civilians as a routine police tool in occupied territory, and wholesale massacres of civilians often accompanied German and Japanese advances into new territory. The behav-

Walter Russell Mead is senior fellow for U.S. Foreign Policy at the Council on Foreign Relations. This article is published with permission from The Century Foundation, New York.

[1]David M. Kennedy, *Freedom from Fear: The American People in Depression and War 1929-45* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 847.

[2]That figure is 441,513. Michael Clodfelter, *Warfare and Armed Conflicts: A Statistical Reference, Volume II* (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Co., Inc., 1992).

[3]Ibid., p. 886.

[4]Stanley I. Kutler, ed., *Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1996), p. 103.

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ior of the German *Einsatzgruppen* and of the Japanese army during the Rape of Nanking has no significant parallel on the American side.

In the Cold War, too, the evils the Americans fought were far worse than those they inflicted. Tens of millions more innocent civilians in communist nations were murdered by their own governments in peacetime than ever died as the result of American attempts to halt communism's spread. War, even brutal war, was more merciful than communist rule.

Nevertheless, the American war record should make us think. An observer who thinks of American foreign policy only in terms of the commercial realism of the Hamiltonians, the crusading moralism of Wilsonian transcendentalists, and the supple pacifism of the principled but slippery Jeffersonians would be at a loss to account for American ruthlessness at war.

THOSE WHO prefer to believe that the present global hegemony of the United States emerged through a process of immaculate conception avert their eyes from many distressing moments in the American ascension. Yet students of American power cannot ignore one of the chief elements in American success. The United States over its history has consistently summoned the will and the means to compel its enemies to yield to its demands.

Through the long sweep of American history, there have been many occasions when public opinion, or at least an important part of it, got ahead of politicians in demanding war. Many of the Indian wars were caused less by Indian aggression than by movements of frontier populations willing to provoke and fight wars with Indian tribes that were nominally under Washington's protection—and contrary both to the policy and the wishes of the national government. The War of 1812 came about largely because of a popular movement in the South and Midwest. Abraham Lincoln barely succeeded in preventing a war with Britain over the Trent Affair during the Civil War; public opinion made it difficult for him to find an acceptable, face-saving solution to the problem. More recently, John Kennedy, Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon were all haunted by fears that a pullout from the Vietnam War would trigger a popular backlash.

Once wars begin, a significant element of American public opinion supports waging them at the highest possible level of intensity. The devastating tactics of the wars against the Indians, General Sherman's campaign of 1864-65, and the unprecedented aerial bombardments of World War II were all broadly popular in the United States. During both the Korean and Vietnam Wars, presidents came under intense pressure, not only from military leaders but also from public opinion, to hit the enemy with all available force in all available places. Throughout the Cold War the path of least resistance in American politics was generally the more hawkish stance. Politicians who advocated negotiated compromises with the Soviet enemy were labeled appeasers and paid a heavy political price. The Korean and Vietnam Wars lost public support in part because of political decisions not to risk the consequences of all-out war, not necessarily stopping short of the use of nuclear weapons. The most costly decision George Bush took in the Gulf War was not to send ground forces into Iraq, but to stop short of the occupation of Baghdad and the capture and trial of Saddam Hussein.

It is often remarked that the American people are more religious than their allies in Western Europe. But it is equally true

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that they are more military-minded. Currently, the American people support without complaint what is easily the highest military budget in the world. In 1998 the United States spent as much on defense as its NATO allies, South Korea, Japan, the Persian Gulf states, Russia and China *combined*.[5] In response to widespread public concern about a decline in military preparedness, the Clinton administration and the Republican Congress are planning substantial increases in military spending in the years to come.

Americans do not merely pay for these forces, they use them. Since the end of the Vietnam War, taken by some as opening a new era of reluctance in the exercise of American power, the United States has deployed combat forces in, or used deadly force over, Cambodia, Iran, Grenada, Panama, Lebanon, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq, Turkey, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Sudan, Afghanistan, the South China Sea, Liberia, Macedonia, Albania and Yugoslavia. This is a record that no other country comes close to matching.

It is also generally conceded that, with the exception of a handful of elite units in such forces as the British Army, American troops have a stronger "warrior culture" than do the armies of other wealthy countries. Indeed, of all the NATO countries other than Turkey and Greece, only Great Britain today has anything like the American "war lobby" that becomes active in times of national crisis—a political force that under certain circumstances demands war, supports the decisive use of force, and urges political leaders to stop wasting time with negotiations, sanctions and Security Council meetings in order to attack the enemy with all possible strength.

Why is it that U.S. public opinion is often so quick—though sometimes so slow—to support armed intervention abroad? What are the provocations that energize public opinion (at least some of it) for war—and how, if at all, is this "war lobby" related to the other elements of that opinion? The key to this warlike disposition, and to other important features of American foreign policy, is to be found in what I shall call its Jacksonian tradition, in honor of the sixth president of the United States.

The School of Andrew Jackson

IT IS a tribute to the general historical amnesia about American politics between the War of 1812 and the Civil War that Andrew Jackson is not more widely counted among the greatest of American presidents. Victor in the Battle of New Orleans—perhaps the most decisive battle in the shaping of the modern world between Trafalgar and Stalingrad—Andrew Jackson laid the foundation of American politics for most of the nineteenth century, and his influence is still felt today. With the ever ready help of the brilliant Martin Van Buren, he took American politics from the era of silk stockings into the smoke-filled room. Every political party since his presidency has drawn on the symbolism, the institutions and the instruments of power that Jackson pioneered.

More than that, he brought the American people into the political arena. Restricted state franchises with high property qualifications meant that in 1820 many American states had higher property qualifications for voters than did boroughs for the British House of Commons. With Jackson's presidency, universal male suffrage became the basis of American politics and political values.

[5]William S. Cohen, *Report on Allied Contributions to the Common Defense: A Report to the United States Congress by the Secretary of Defense* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, March 1999).

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His political movement—or, more accurately, the community of political feeling that he wielded into an instrument of power—remains in many ways the most important in American politics. Solidly Democratic through the Truman administration (a tradition commemorated in the annual Jefferson-Jackson Day dinners that are still the high points on Democratic Party calendars in many cities and states), Jacksonian America shifted toward the Republican Party under Richard Nixon—the most important political change in American life since the Second World War. The future of Jacksonian political allegiance will be one of the keys to the politics of the twenty-first century.

The Man Himself. Corbis/Bettmann

Suspicious of untrammeled federal power (Waco), skeptical about the prospects for domestic and foreign do-gooding (welfare at home, foreign aid abroad), opposed to federal taxes but obstinately fond of federal programs seen as primarily helping the middle class (Social Security and Medicare, mortgage interest subsidies), Jacksonians constitute a large political interest.

In some ways Jacksonians resemble the Jeffersonians, with whom their political fortunes were linked for so many decades. Like Jeffersonians, Jacksonians are profoundly suspicious of elites. They generally prefer a loose federal structure with as much power as possible retained by states and local governments. But the differences between the two movements run very deep—so deep that during the Cold War they were on dead opposite sides of most important foreign policy questions. To use the language of the Vietnam era, a time when Jeffersonians and Jacksonians were fighting in the streets over foreign policy, the former were the most dovish current in mainstream political thought during the Cold War, while the latter were the most consistently hawkish.

One way to grasp the difference between the two schools is to see that both Jeffersonians and Jacksonians are civil libertarians, passionately attached to the Constitution and especially to the Bill of Rights, and deeply concerned to preserve the liberties of ordinary Americans. But while the Jeffersonians are most profoundly devoted to the First Amendment, protecting the freedom of speech and prohibiting a federal establishment of religion, Jacksonians see the Second Amendment, the right to bear arms, as the citadel of liberty. Jeffersonians join the American Civil Liberties Union; Jacksonians join the National Rifle Association. In so doing, both are convinced that they are standing at the barricades of freedom.

For foreigners and for some Americans, the Jacksonian tradition is the least impressive in American politics. It is the most deplored abroad, the most denounced at home. Jacksonian chairs of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee

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are the despair of high-minded people everywhere, as they hold up adhesion to the Kyoto Protocol, starve the UN and the IMF, cut foreign aid, and ban the use of U.S. funds for population control programs abroad. When spokesmen for other schools of thought speak about the "problems" of American foreign policy, the persistence and power of the Jacksonian school are high on their list. While some of this fashionable despair may be overdone, and is perhaps a reflection of different class interests and values, it is true that Jacksonians often figure as the most obstructionist of the schools, as the least likely to support Wilsonian initiatives for a better world, to understand Jeffersonian calls for patient diplomacy in difficult situations, or to accept Hamiltonian trade strategies. Yet without Jacksonians, the United States would be a much weaker power.

A principal explanation of why Jacksonian politics are so poorly understood is that Jacksonianism is less an intellectual or political movement than an expression of the social, cultural and religious values of a large portion of the American public. And it is doubly obscure because it happens to be rooted in one of the portions of the public least represented in the media and the professoriat. Jacksonian America is a folk community with a strong sense of common values and common destiny; though periodically led by intellectually brilliant men—like Andrew Jackson himself—it is neither an ideology nor a self-conscious movement with a clear historical direction or political table of organization. Nevertheless, Jacksonian America has produced—and looks set to continue to produce—one political leader and movement after another, and it is likely to continue to enjoy major influence over both foreign and domestic policy in the United States for the foreseeable future.

The Evolution of a Community

IT IS NOT fashionable today to think of the American nation as a folk community bound together by deep cultural and ethnic ties. Believers in a multicultural America attack this idea from one direction, but conservatives too have a tendency to talk about the United States as a nation based on ideology rather than ethnicity. Former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, among others, has said that the United States is unlike other nations because it is based on an idea rather than on a community of national experience. The continuing and growing vitality of the Jacksonian tradition is, for better or worse, living proof that she is at least partly wrong.

If Jeffersonianism is the book-ideology of the United States, Jacksonian populism is its folk-ideology. Historically, American populism has been based less on the ideas of the Enlightenment than on the community values and sense of identity among the British colonizers who first settled this country. In particular, as David Hackett Fischer has shown, Jacksonian populism can be originally identified with a subgroup among these settlers, the so-called "Scots-Irish", who settled the back country regions of the Carolinas and Virginia, and who went on to settle much of the Old West—West Virginia, Kentucky, parts of Indiana and Illinois—and the southern and south central states of Tennessee, Missouri, Alabama, Mississippi and Texas. Jacksonian populism today has moved beyond its original ethnic and geographical limits. Like country music, another product of Jacksonian culture, Jacksonian politics and folk feeling has become a basic element in American consciousness that can be found from one end of the country to the other.

The Scots-Irish were a hardy and warlike people, with a culture and out-

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look formed by centuries of bitter warfare before they came to the United States. Fischer shows how, trapped on the frontiers between England and Scotland, or planted as Protestant colonies in the hostile soil of Ireland, this culture was shaped through centuries of constant, bloody war. The Revolutionary struggle and generations of savage frontier conflict in the United States reproduced these conditions in the New World; the Civil War—fought with particular ferocity in the border states—renewed the cultural heritage of war.

The role of what we are calling Jacksonian America in nineteenth-century America is clear, but many twentieth-century observers made what once seemed the reasonable assumption that Jacksonian values and politics were dying out. These observers were both surprised and discomfited when Ronald Reagan's political success showed that Jacksonian America had done more than survive; it was, and is, thriving.

What has happened is that Jacksonian culture, values and self-identification have spread beyond their original ethnic limits. In the 1920s and 1930s the highland, border tradition in American life was widely thought to be dying out, ethnically, culturally and politically. Part of this was the economic and demographic collapse of the traditional home of Jacksonian America: the family farm. At the same time, mass immigration from southern and Eastern Europe tilted the ethnic balance of the American population ever farther from its colonial mix. New England Yankees were a vanishing species, limited to the hills of New Hampshire and Vermont, while the cities and plains of Connecticut, Massachusetts and Rhode Island filled with Irishmen, Italians, Portuguese and Greeks. The great cities of the United States were increasingly filled with Catholics, members of the Orthodox churches and Jews—all professing in one way or another communitarian social values very much at odds with the individualism of traditional Anglo-Saxon and Anglo-Celtic culture.

As Hiram W. Evans, the surprisingly articulate Imperial Wizard of the Ku Klux Klan, wrote in 1926, the old stock American of his time had become

> a stranger in large parts of the land his fathers gave him. Moreover, he is a most unwelcome stranger, one much spit upon, and one to whom even the right to have his own opinions and to work for his own interests is now denied with jeers and revilings. 'We must Americanize the Americans,' a distinguished immigrant said recently.

Protestantism itself was losing its edge. The modernist critique of traditional Biblical readings found acceptance in one mainline denomination after another; Episcopal, Presbyterian, Methodist and Lutheran seminaries accepted critical, post-Darwinian readings of Scripture; self-described "fundamentalists" fought a slow, but apparently losing, rearguard action against the modernist forces. The new mainline Protestantism was a tolerant, even a namby-pamby, religion.

The old nativist spirit, anti-immigrant, anti-modern art and apparently anti-twentieth century, still had some bite—Ku Klux crosses flamed across the Midwest as well as the South during the 1920s—but it all looked like the death throes of an outdated idea. There weren't many mourners: much of H.L. Mencken's career was based on exposing the limitations and mocking the death of what we are calling Jacksonian America.

Most progressive, right thinking intellectuals in mid-century America believed that the future of American populism lay in a social democratic movement based on urban immigrants. Social activists like Woody Guthrie and Pete Seeger consciously sought to use cultural forms like

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folk songs to ease the transition from the old individualistic folk world to the collective new one that they believed was the wave of the future; they celebrated unions and other strange, European ideas in down home country twangs so that, in the bitter words of Hiram Evans, "There is a steady flood of alien ideas being spread over the country, always carefully disguised as American."

WHAT CAME next surprised almost everyone. The tables turned, and Evans' Americans "americanized" the immigrants rather than the other way around. In what is still a largely unheralded triumph of the melting pot, Northern immigrants gradually assimilated the values of Jacksonian individualism. Each generation of new Americans was less "social" and more individualistic than the preceding one. American Catholics, once among the world's most orthodox, remained Catholic in religious allegiance but were increasingly individualistic in terms of psychology and behavior ("I respect the Pope, but I have to follow my own conscience"). Ties to the countries of emigration steadily weakened, and the tendency to marry outside the group strengthened.

Outwardly, most immigrant groups completed an apparent assimilation to American material culture within a couple of generations of their arrival. A second type of assimilation—an inward assimilation to and adaptation of the core cultural and psychological structure of the native population—took longer, but as third, fourth and fifth-generation immigrant families were exposed to the economic and social realities of American life, they were increasingly "americanized" on the inside as well as without.

This immense and complex process was accelerated by social changes that took place after 1945. Physically, the old neighborhoods broke up, and the Northern industrial working class, along with the refugees from the dying American family farm, moved into the suburbs to form a new populist mix. As increasing numbers of the descendants of immigrants moved into the Jacksonian Sunbelt, the pace of assimilation grew. The suburban homeowner with his or her federally subsidized mortgage replaced the homesteading farmer (on free federal land) as the central pillar of American populism. Richard Nixon, with his two-pronged appeal to white Southerners and the "Joe Six-pack" voters of the North, was the first national politician to recognize the power of this newly energized current in American life.

Urban, immigrant America may have softened some of the rough edges of Jacksonian America, but the descendants of the great wave of European immigration sound more like Andrew Jackson from decade to decade. Rugged frontier individualism has proven to be contagious; each successive generation has been more Jacksonian than its predecessor. The social and economic solidarity rooted in European peasant communities has been overmastered by the individualism of the frontier. The descendants of European working-class Marxists now quote Adam Smith; Joe Six-pack thinks of the welfare state as an expensive burden, not part of the natural moral order. Intellectuals have made this transition as thoroughly as anyone else. The children and grandchildren of trade unionists and Trotskyites now talk about the importance of liberal society and free markets; in the intellectual pilgrimage of Irving Kristol, what is usually a multigenerational process has been compressed into a single, brilliant career.

The new Jacksonianism is no longer rural and exclusively nativist. Frontier Jacksonianism may have taken the homesteading farmer and the log cabin as its emblems, but today's Crabgrass

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Jacksonianism sees the homeowner on his modest suburban lawn as the hero of the American story. The Crabgrass Jacksonian may wear green on St. Patrick's Day; he or she might go to a Catholic Church and never listen to country music (though, increasingly, he or she probably does); but the Crabgrass Jacksonian doesn't just believe, she knows that she is as good an American as anybody else, that she is entitled to her rights from Church and State, that she pulls her own weight and expects others to do the same. That homeowner will be heard from: Ronald Reagan owed much of his popularity and success to his ability to connect with Jacksonian values. Ross Perot and Pat Buchanan in different ways have managed to tap into the power of the populist energy that Old Hickory rode into the White House. In both domestic and foreign policy, the twenty-first century will be profoundly influenced by the values and concerns of Jacksonian America.

The Jacksonian Code

TO UNDERSTAND how Crabgrass Jacksonianism is shaping and will continue to shape American foreign policy, we must begin with another unfashionable concept: Honor. Although few Americans today use this anachronistic word, honor remains a core value for tens of millions of middle-class Americans, women as well as men. The unacknowledged code of honor that shapes so much of American behavior and aspiration today is a recognizable descendent of the frontier codes of honor of early Jacksonian America. The appeal of this code is one of the reasons that Jacksonian values have spread to so many people outside the original ethnic and social nexus in which Jacksonian America was formed.

The first principle of this code is self-reliance. Real Americans, many Americans feel, are people who make their own way in the world. They may get a helping hand from friends and family, but they hold their places in the world through honest work. They don't slide by on welfare, and they don't rely on inherited wealth or connections. Those who won't work and are therefore poor, or those who don't need to work due to family money, are viewed with suspicion. Those who meet the economic and moral tests belong to the broad Middle Class, the folk community of working people that Jacksonians believe to be the heart, soul and spine of the American nation. Earning and keeping a place in this community on the basis of honest work is the first principle of Jacksonian honor, and it remains a serious insult even to imply that a member of the American middle class is not pulling his or her weight in the world.

Jacksonian honor must be acknowledged by the outside world. One is entitled to, and demands, the appropriate respect: recognition of rights and just claims, acknowledgment of one's personal dignity. Many Americans will still fight, sometimes with weapons, when they feel they have not been treated with the proper respect. But even among the less violent, Americans stand on their dignity and rights. Respect is also due age. Those who know Jacksonian America only through its very inexact representations in the media think of the United States as a youth-obsessed, age-neglecting society. In fact, Jacksonian America honors age. Andrew Jackson was sixty-one when he was elected president for the first time; Ronald Reagan was seventy. Most movie stars lose their appeal with age; those whose appeal stems from their ability to portray and embody Jacksonian values—like John Wayne—only become more revered.

The second principle of the code is equality. Among those members of the folk community who do pull their weight, there is an absolute equality of dignity and right. No one has a right to tell the

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self-reliant Jacksonian what to say, do or think. Any infringement on equality will be met with defiance and resistance. Male or female, the Jacksonian is, and insists on remaining, independent of church, state, social hierarchy, political parties and labor unions. Jacksonians may choose to accept the authority of a leader or movement or faith, but will never yield to an imposed authority. The young are independent of the old: "free, white and twenty-one" is an old Jacksonian expression; the color line has softened, but otherwise the sentiment is as true as it ever was.

Mrs. Fanny Trollope (mother of novelist Anthony Trollope) had the misfortune to leave her native Britain to spend two years in the United States. Next to her revulsion at the twin American habits of chewing tobacco in public places and missing spittoons with the finished product, she most despised the passion for equality she found everywhere she looked. "The theory of equality", Mrs. Trollope observed,

> may be very daintily discussed by English gentlemen in a London dining-room, when the servant, having placed a fresh bottle of cool wine on the table, respectfully shuts the door, and leaves them to their walnuts and their wisdom; but it will be found less palatable when it presents itself in the shape of a hard, greasy paw, and is claimed in accents that breathe less of freedom than of onions and whiskey. Strong, indeed, must be the love of equality in an English breast if it can survive a tour through the Union.[6]

The third principle is individualism. The Jacksonian does not just have the right to self-fulfillment—he or she has a duty to seek it. In Jacksonian America, everyone must find his or her way: each individual must choose a faith, or no faith, and code of conduct based on conscience and reason. The Jacksonian feels perfectly free to strike off in an entirely new religious direction. "I sincerely believe", wrote poor Mrs. Trollope, "that if a fire-worshiper, or an Indian Brahmin, were to come to the United States, prepared to preach and pray in English, he would not be long without a 'very respectable congregation.'" She didn't know the half of it.

Despite this individualism, the Jacksonian code also mandates acceptance of certain social mores and principles. Loyalty to family, raising children "right", sexual decency (heterosexual monogamy—which can be serial) and honesty within the community are virtues that commend themselves to the Jacksonian spirit. Children of both sexes can be wild, but both women and men must be strong. Corporal punishment is customary and common; Jacksonians find objections to this time-honored and (they feel) effective method of discipline outlandish and absurd. Although women should be more discreet, both sexes can sow wild oats before marriage. After it, to enjoy the esteem of their community a couple must be seen to put their children's welfare ahead of personal gratification.

The fourth pillar in the Jacksonian honor code struck Mrs. Trollope and others as more dishonorable than honorable, yet it persists nevertheless. Let us call it financial *esprit*. While the Jacksonian believes in hard work, he or she also believes that credit is a right and that money, especially borrowed money, is less a sacred trust than a means for self-discovery and expression. Although previous generations lacked the faculties for consumer credit that Americans enjoy at the end of the twentieth century, many Americans have always assumed that they have a right to spend money on their appearance, on purchases that affirm their status. The strict Jacksonian code of

[6]Frances Trollope, *Domestic Manners of the Americans: Volume I* (London: Whittaker, Treacher & Co., 1832).

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honor does not enjoin what others see as financial probity. What it demands, rather, is a daring and entrepreneurial spirit. Credit is seen less as an obligation than as an opportunity. Jacksonians have always supported loose monetary policy and looser bankruptcy laws.

Finally, courage is the crowning and indispensable part of the code. Jacksonians must be ready to defend their honor in great things and small. Americans ought to stick up for what they believe. In the nineteenth century, Jacksonian Americans fought duels long after aristocrats in Europe had given them up, and Americans today remain far more likely than Europeans to settle personal quarrels with extreme and even deadly violence.

Jacksonian America's love affair with weapons is, of course, the despair of the rest of the country. Jacksonian culture values firearms, and the freedom to own and use them. The right to bear arms is a mark of civic and social equality, and knowing how to care for firearms is an important part of life. Jacksonians are armed for defense: of the home and person against robbers; against usurpations of the federal government; and of the United States against its enemies. In one war after another, Jacksonians have flocked to the colors. Independent and difficult to discipline, they have nevertheless demonstrated magnificent fighting qualities in every corner of the world. Jacksonian America views military service as a sacred duty. When Hamiltonians, Wilsonians and Jeffersonians dodged the draft in Vietnam or purchased exemptions and substitutes in earlier wars, Jacksonians soldiered on, if sometimes bitterly and resentfully. An honorable person is ready to kill or to die for family and flag.

JACKSONIAN society draws an important distinction between those who belong to the folk community and those who do not. Within that community, among those bound by the code and capable of discharging their responsibilities under it, Jacksonians are united in a social compact. Outside that compact is chaos and darkness. The criminal who commits what, in the Jacksonian code, constitute unforgivable sins (cold-blooded murder, rape, the murder or sexual abuse of a child, murder or attempted murder of a peace officer) can justly be killed by the victims' families, colleagues or by society at large—with or without the formalities of law. In many parts of the United States, juries will not convict police on almost any charge, nor will they condemn revenge killers in particularly outrageous cases. The right of the citizen to defend family and property with deadly force is a sacred one as well, a legacy from colonial and frontier times.

The absolute and even brutal distinction drawn between the members of the community and outsiders has had massive implications in American life. Throughout most of American history the Jacksonian community was one from which many Americans were automatically and absolutely excluded: Indians, Mexicans, Asians, African Americans, obvious sexual deviants and recent immigrants of non-Protestant heritage have all felt the sting. Historically, the law has been helpless to protect such people against economic oppression, social discrimination and mob violence, including widespread lynchings. Legislators would not enact laws, and if they did, sheriffs would not arrest, prosecutors would not try, juries would not convict.

This tells us something very important: throughout most of American history and to a large extent even today, equal rights emerge from and depend on this popular culture of equality and honor rather than flow out of abstract principles or written documents. The many social and legal disabilities still suffered in practice by unpopular minorities demonstrate that the courts and the statute books still

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enjoy only a limited ability to protect equal rights in the teeth of popular feeling and culture.

Even so, Jacksonian values play a major role in African-American culture. If anything, that role has increased with the expanded presence of African Americans in all military ranks. The often blighted social landscape of the inner city has in some cases re-created the atmosphere and practices of American frontier life. In many ways the gang culture of some inner cities resembles the social atmosphere of the Jacksonian South, as well as the hard drinking, womanizing, violent male culture of the Mississippi in the days of Davy Crockett and Mark Twain. Bragging about one's physical and sexual prowess, the willingness to avenge disrespect with deadly force, a touchy insistence that one is as good as anybody else: once over his shock at the urban landscape and the racial issue, Billy the Kid would find himself surprisingly at home in such an environment.

The degree to which African-American society resembles Jacksonian culture remains one of the crucial and largely overlooked elements in American life. Despite historical experiences that would have completely alienated many ethnic minorities around the world, American black popular culture remains profoundly—and, in times of danger, fiercely—patriotic. From the Revolution onward, African Americans have sought more to participate in America's wars than to abstain from them, and the strength of personal and military honor codes in African-American culture today remains a critical factor in assuring the continued strength of American military forces into the twenty-first century.

The underlying cultural unity between African Americans and Anglo-Jacksonian America shaped the course and ensured the success of the modern civil rights movement. Martin Luther King and his followers exhibited exemplary personal courage, their rhetoric was deeply rooted in Protestant Christianity, and the rights they asked for were precisely those that Jacksonian America values most for itself. Further, they scrupulously avoided the violent tactics that would have triggered an unstoppable Jacksonian response.

Although cultures change slowly and many individuals lag behind, the bulk of American Jacksonian opinion has increasingly moved to recognize the right of code-honoring members of minority groups to receive the rights and protections due to members of the folk community. This new and, one hopes, growing feeling of respect and tolerance emphatically does not extend to those, minorities or not, who are not seen as code-honoring Americans. Those who violate or reject the code—criminals, irresponsible parents, drug addicts—have not benefited from the softening of the Jacksonian color line.

The Politics of the Culture

JACKSONIAN foreign policy is related to Jacksonian values and goals in domestic policy. For Jacksonians, the prime goal of the American people is not the commercial and industrial policy sought by Hamiltonians, nor the administrative excellence in support of moral values that Wilsonians seek, nor Jeffersonian liberty. Jacksonians believe that the government should do everything in its power to promote the well-being—political, moral, economic—of the folk community. Any means are permissible in the service of this end, as long as they do not violate the moral feelings or infringe on the freedoms that Jacksonians believe are essential in their daily lives.

Jacksonians are instinctively democratic and populist. Hamiltonians mistrust democracy; Wilsonians don't approve of

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the political rough and tumble. And while Jeffersonians support democracy in principle, they remain concerned that tyrannical majorities can overrule minority rights. Jacksonians believe that the political and moral instincts of the American people are sound and can be trusted, and that the simpler and more direct the process of government is, the better will be the results. In general, while the other schools welcome the representative character of our democracy, Jacksonians tend to see representative rather than direct institutions as necessary evils, and to believe that governments breed corruption and inefficiency the way picnics breed ants. Every administration will be corrupt; every Congress and legislature will be, to some extent, the plaything of lobbyists. Career politicians are inherently untrustworthy; if it spends its life buzzing around the outhouse, it's probably a fly. Jacksonians see corruption as human nature and, within certain ill-defined boundaries of reason and moderation, an inevitable by-product of government.

It is perversion rather than corruption that most troubles Jacksonians: the possibility that the powers of government will be turned from the natural and proper object of supporting the well-being of the majority toward oppressing the majority in the service of an economic or cultural elite—or, worse still, in the interests of powerful foreigners. Instead of trying, however ineptly, to serve the people, have the politicians turned the government against the people? Are they serving large commercial interests with malicious designs on the common good? Are they either by ineptitude or wickedness serving hostile foreign interests—giving all our industrial markets to the Japanese, or allowing communists to steal our secrets and hand them to the Chinese? Are they fecklessly frittering away huge sums of money on worthless foreign aid programs that transfer billions to corrupt foreign dictators?

Jacksonians tolerate a certain amount of government perversion, but when it becomes unbearable, they look to a popular hero to restore government to its proper functions. It was in this capacity that Andrew Jackson was elected to the presidency, and the role has since been reprised by any number of politicians on both the local and the national stages. Recent decades have seen Ronald Reagan master the role, and George Wallace, Ross Perot, Jesse Ventura and Pat Buchanan auditioning for it. The Jacksonian hero dares to say what the people feel and defies the entrenched elites. "I welcome their hatred", said the aristocratic Franklin Roosevelt, in his role of tribune of the people. The hero may make mistakes, but he will command the unswerving loyalty of Jacksonian America so long as his heart is perceived to be in the right place.

When it comes to Big Government, Jeffersonians worry more about the military than about anything else. But for Jacksonians, spending money on the military is one of the best things government can do. Yes, the Pentagon is inefficient and contractors are stealing the government blind. But by definition the work that the Defense Department does—defending the nation—is a service to the Jacksonian middle class. Yes, the Pentagon should spend its money more carefully, but let us not throw the baby out with the bath water. Stories about welfare abusers in limousines and foreign aid swindles generate more anger among Jacksonians than do stories of $600 hammers at the Pentagon.

The profoundly populist world-view of Jacksonian Americans contributes to one of the most important elements in their politics: the belief that while problems are complicated, solutions are simple. False idols are many; the True God is One. Jacksonians believe that Gordian Knots are there to be cut. In public con-

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troversies, the side that is always giving you reasons why something can't be done, and is endlessly telling you that the popular view isn't sufficiently "sophisticated" or "nuanced"—that is the side that doesn't want you to know what it is doing, and it is not to be trusted. If politicians have honest intentions, they will tell you straight up what they plan to do. If it's a good idea, you will like it as soon as they explain the whole package. For most of the other schools, "complex" is a positive term when applied either to policies or to situations; for Jacksonians it is a negative. Ronald Reagan brilliantly exploited this. As in the case of Andrew Jackson himself, Reagan's own intuitive approach to the world led him to beliefs and policies that appealed to Jacksonian opinion right from the start.

Instinct, Not Ideology

THOSE WHO LIKE to cast American foreign policy as an unhealthy mix of ignorance, isolationism and trigger-happy cowboy diplomacy are often thinking about the Jacksonian populist tradition. That tradition is stronger among the mass of ordinary people than it is among the elite. It is more strongly entrenched in the heartland than on either of the two coasts. It has been historically associated with white Protestant males of the lower and middle classes—today the least fashionable element in the American political mix.

Although there are many learned and thoughtful Jacksonians, including those who have made distinguished careers in public service, it is certainly true that the Jacksonian philosophy is embraced by many people who know very little about the wider world. With them it is an instinct rather than an ideology—a culturally shaped set of beliefs and emotions rather than a set of ideas. But ideas and policy proposals that resonate with Jacksonian core values and instincts enjoy wide support and can usually find influential supporters in the policy process.

So influential is Jacksonian opinion in the formation of American foreign policy that anyone lacking a feel for it will find much of American foreign policy baffling and opaque. Foreigners in particular have alternately overestimated and underestimated American determination because they failed to grasp the structure of Jacksonian opinion and influence. Yet Jacksonian views on foreign affairs are relatively straightforward, and once they are understood, American foreign policy becomes much less mysterious.

To begin with, although the other schools often congratulate themselves on their superior sophistication and appreciation for complexity, Jacksonianism provides the basis in American life for what many scholars and practitioners would consider the most sophisticated of all approaches to foreign affairs: realism. In this it stands with Jeffersonianism, while being deeply suspicious of the "global meliorist" elements found, in different forms, in both Wilsonian and Hamiltonian foreign policy ideas. Often, Jeffersonians and Jacksonians will stand together in opposition to humanitarian interventions, or interventions made in support of Wilsonian or Hamiltonian world order initiatives. However, while Jeffersonians espouse a minimalist realism under which the United States seeks to define its interests as narrowly as possible and to defend those interests with an absolute minimum of force, Jacksonians approach foreign policy in a very different spirit—one in which honor, concern for reputation, and faith in military institutions play a much greater role.

Jacksonian realism is based on the very sharp distinction in popular feeling between the inside of the folk community and the dark world without. Jacksonian patriotism is not a doctrine but an emo-

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tion, like love of one's family. The nation is an extension of the family. Members of the American folk are bound together by history, culture and a common morality. At a very basic level, a feeling of kinship exists among Americans: we have one set of rules for dealing with each other and a very different set for the outside world. Unlike Wilsonians, who hope ultimately to convert the Hobbesian world of international relations into a Lockean political community, Jacksonians believe that it is natural and inevitable that national politics and national life will work on different principles from international affairs. For Jacksonians, the world community Wilsonians want to build is not merely a moral impossibility but a monstrosity. An American foreign policy that, for example, takes tax money from middle-class Americans to give to a corrupt and incompetent dictatorship overseas is nonsense; it hurts Americans and does little for Borrioboola-Gha. Countries, like families, should take care of their own; if everybody did that we would all be better off. Charity, meanwhile, should be left to private initiatives and private funds; Jacksonian America is not ungenerous but it lacks all confidence in the government's ability to administer charity, either at home or abroad.

Given the moral gap between the folk community and the rest of the world—and given that other countries are believed to have patriotic and communal feelings of their own, feelings that similarly harden once the boundary of the folk community is reached—Jacksonians believe that international life is and will remain both anarchic and violent. The United States must be vigilant and strongly armed. Our diplomacy must be cunning, forceful and no more scrupulous than anybody else's. At times, we must fight pre-emptive wars. There is absolutely nothing wrong with subverting foreign governments or assassinating foreign leaders whose bad intentions are clear. Thus, Jacksonians are more likely to tax political leaders with a failure to employ vigorous measures than to worry about the niceties of international law.

Indeed, of all the major currents in American society, Jacksonians have the least regard for international law and international institutions. They prefer the rule of custom to the written law, and that is as true in the international sphere as it is in personal relations at home. Jacksonians believe that there is an honor code in international life—as there was in clan warfare in the borderlands of England—and those who live by the code will be treated under it. But those who violate the code—who commit terrorist acts in peacetime, for example—forfeit its protection and deserve no consideration.

Many students of American foreign policy, both here and abroad, dismiss Jacksonians as ignorant isolationists and vulgar patriots, but, again, the reality is more complex, and their approach to the world and to war is more closely grounded in classical realism than many recognize. Jacksonians do not believe that the United States must have an unambiguously moral reason for fighting. In fact, they tend to separate the issues of morality and war more clearly than many members of the foreign policy establishment.

The Gulf War was a popular war in Jacksonian circles because the defense of the nation's oil supply struck a chord with Jacksonian opinion. That opinion—which has not forgotten the oil shortages and price hikes of the 1970s—clearly considers stability of the oil supply a vital national interest and is prepared to fight to defend it. The atrocity propaganda about alleged Iraqi barbarisms in Kuwait did not inspire Jacksonians to war, and neither did legalistic arguments about U.S. obligations under the UN Charter to defend a member state from aggression. Those are useful arguments to screw

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Wilsonian courage to the sticking place, but they mean little for Jacksonians. Had there been no UN Charter and had Kuwait been even more corrupt and repressive that it is, Jacksonian opinion would still have supported the Gulf War. It would have supported a full-scale war with Iran over the 1980 hostage crisis, and it will take an equally hawkish stance toward any future threat to perceived U.S. interests in the Persian Gulf region.

In the absence of a clearly defined threat to the national interest, Jacksonian opinion is much less aggressive. It has not, for example, been enthusiastic about the U.S. intervention in the case of Bosnia. There the evidence of unspeakable atrocities was much greater than in Kuwait, and the legal case for intervention was as strong. Yet Jacksonian opinion saw no threat to the interests, as it understood them, of the United States, and Wilsonians were the only segment of the population that was actively eager for war.

In World War I it took the Zimmermann Telegram and the repeated sinking of American ships to convince Jacksonian opinion that war was necessary. In World War II, neither the Rape of Nanking nor the atrocities of Nazi rule in Europe drew the United States into the war. The attack on Pearl Harbor did.

To engage Jacksonians in support of the Cold War it was necessary to convince them that Moscow was engaged in a far-reaching and systematic campaign for world domination, and that this campaign would succeed unless the United States engaged in a long-term defensive effort with the help of allies around the world. That involved a certain overstatement of both Soviet intentions and capabilities, but that is beside the present point. Once Jacksonian opinion was convinced that the Soviet threat was real and that the Cold War was necessary, it stayed convinced. Populist American opinion accepted the burdens it imposed and worried only that the government would fail to prosecute the Cold War with the necessary vigor. No one should mistake the importance of this strong and constant support. Despite the frequent complaints by commentators and policymakers that the American people are "isolationist" and "uninterested in foreign affairs", they have made and will make enormous financial and personal sacrifices if convinced that these are in the nation's vital interests.

This mass popular patriotism, and the martial spirit behind it, gives the United States immense advantages in international affairs. After two world wars, no European nation has shown the same willingness to pay the price in blood and treasure for a global presence. Most of the "developed" nations find it difficult to maintain large, high-quality fighting forces. Not all of the martial patriotism in the United States comes out of the world of Jacksonian populism, but without that tradition, the United States would be hard pressed to maintain the kind of international military presence it now has.

Pessimism

WHILE in many respects Jacksonian Americans have an optimistic outlook, there is a large and important sense in which they are pessimistic. Whatever the theological views of individual Jacksonians may be, Jacksonian culture believes in Original Sin and does not accept the Enlightenment's belief in the perfectibility of human nature. As a corollary, Jacksonians are pre-millennialist: they do not believe that utopia is just around the corner. In fact, they tend to believe the reverse—the anti-Christ will get here before Jesus does, and human history will end in catastrophe and flames, followed by the Day of Judgment.

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This is no idle theological concept. Belief in the approach of the "End Times" and the "Great Tribulation"—concepts rooted in certain interpretations of Jewish and Christian prophetic texts—has been a powerful force in American life from colonial times. Jacksonians believe that neither Wilsonians nor Hamiltonians nor anybody else will ever succeed in building a peaceful world order, and that the only world order we are likely to get will be a bad one. No matter how much money we ship overseas, and no matter how cleverly the development bureaucrats spend it, it will not create peace on earth. Plans for universal disarmament and world courts of justice founder on the same rock of historical skepticism. Jacksonians just tend not to believe that any of these things will do much good.

In fact, they think they may do harm. Linked to the skepticism about man-made imitations of the Kingdom of God is a deep apprehension about the rise of an evil world order. In theological terms, this is a reference to the fear of the anti-Christ, who, many commentators affirm, is predicted in Scripture to come with the appearance of an angel of light—a charismatic political figure who offers what looks like a plan for world peace and order, but which is actually a Satanic snare intended to deceive.

For most of its history, Jacksonian America believed that the Roman Catholic Church was the chief emissary of Satan on earth, a belief that had accompanied the first Americans on their journey from Britain. Fear of Catholicism gradually subsided, but during the Cold War the Kremlin replaced the Vatican as the center for American popular fears about the forces of evil in the world. The international communist conspiracy captured the old stock American popular imagination because it fit cultural templates established in the days of the Long Parliament and the English Civil War. Descendants of immigrants from Eastern Europe had their own cultural dispositions toward conspiracy thinking, plus, in many cases, a deep hatred and fear of Russia.

The fear of a ruthless, formidable enemy abroad who enjoys a powerful fifth column in the United States—including high-ranking officials who serve it either for greed or out of misguided ideological zeal—is older than the Republic. During the Cold War, this "paranoid tradition" in American life stayed mostly focused on the Kremlin—though organizations like the John Birch Society saw ominous links between the Kremlin and the American Establishment. The paranoid streak was, if anything, helpful in sustaining popular support for Cold War strategy. After the Cold War, it is proving more difficult to integrate into effective American policy. To some degree, the chief object of popular concern in post-Cold War America is the Hamiltonian dream of a fully integrated global economy, combined with the Wilsonian dream of global political order that ends the nightmare of warring nation-states. George Bush's call for a "New World Order" had a distinctly Orwellian connotation to the Jacksonian ear. Christian Coalition founder Pat Robertson, in his book *The New World Order* (1991), traces the call for that Order to a Satanic conspiracy consciously implemented by the pillars of the American Establishment.

The fear that the Establishment, linked to its counterpart in Britain and, through Britain, to all the corrupt movements and elites of the Old World, is relentlessly plotting to destroy American liberty is an old but still potent one. The Trilateral Commission, the Council on Foreign Relations, the Bilderbergers, the Bavarian Illuminati, the Rothschilds, the Rockefellers: these names and others echo through a large and shadowy world of conspiracy theories and class resentment. Should seriously bad economic times come, there is always the potential that,

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with effective leadership, the paranoid element in the Jacksonian world could ride popular anger and panic into power.

Honor

ANOTHER aspect of Jacksonian foreign policy is the aforementioned deep sense of national honor and a corresponding need to live up to—in actuality and in the eyes of others—the demands of an honor code. The political importance of this code should not be underestimated; Americans are capable of going to war over issues of national honor. The War of 1812 is an example of Jacksonian sentiment forcing a war out of resentment over continual national humiliations at the hand of Britain. (Those who suffered directly from British interference with American shipping, the merchants, were totally against the war.) At the end of the twentieth century, it is national honor, more than any vital strategic interest, that would require the United States to fulfill its promises to protect Taiwan from invasion.

The perception of national honor as a vital interest has always been a wedge issue driving Jacksonians and Jeffersonians apart. The Jeffersonian peace policy in the Napoleonic Wars became impossible as the War Hawks grew stronger. The same pattern recurred in the Carter administration, during which gathering Jacksonian fury and impatience at Carter's Jeffersonian approaches to the Soviet Union, Panama, Iran and Nicaragua ignited a reaction that forced the President to reverse his basic policy orientation and ended by driving him from office. What Jeffersonian diplomacy welcomes as measures to head off war often look to Jacksonians like pusillanimous weakness.

Once the United States extends a security guarantee or makes a promise, we are required to honor that promise come what may. Jacksonian opinion, which in the nature of things had little faith that South Vietnam could build democracy or that there was anything concrete there of interest to the average American, was steadfast in support of the war—though not of the strategy—because we had given our word to defend South Vietnam. During this year's war in Kosovo, Jacksonian opinion was resolutely against it to begin with. However, once U.S. honor was engaged, Jacksonians began to urge a stronger warfighting strategy including the use of ground troops. It is a bad thing to fight an unnecessary war, but it is inexcusable and dishonorable to lose one once it has begun.

Reputation is as important in international life as it is to the individual honor of Jacksonians. Honor in the Jacksonian imagination is not simply what one feels oneself to be on the inside; it is also a question of the respect and dignity one commands in the world at large. Jacksonian opinion is sympathetic to the idea that our reputation—whether for fair dealing or cheating, toughness or weakness—will shape the way that others treat us. Therefore, at stake in a given crisis is not simply whether we satisfy our own ideas of what is due our honor. Our behavior and the resolution that we obtain must enhance our reputation—our prestige—in the world at large.

Warfighting

JACKSONIAN America has clear ideas about how wars should be fought, how enemies should be treated, and what should happen when the wars are over. It recognizes two kinds of enemies and two kinds of fighting: honorable enemies fight a clean fight and are entitled to be opposed in the same way; dishonorable enemies fight dirty wars and in that case all rules are off.

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An honorable enemy is one who declares war before beginning combat; fights according to recognized rules of war, honoring such traditions as the flag of truce; treats civilians in occupied territory with due consideration; and—a crucial point—refrains from the mistreatment of prisoners of war. Those who surrender should be treated with generosity. Adversaries who honor the code will benefit from its protections, while those who want a dirty fight will get one.

This pattern was very clearly illustrated in the Civil War. The Army of the Potomac and the Army of Northern Virginia faced one another throughout the war, and fought some of the bloodiest battles of the nineteenth century, including long bouts of trench warfare. Yet Robert E. Lee and his men were permitted an honorable surrender and returned unmolested to their homes with their horses and personal side arms. One Confederate, however, was executed after the war: Captain Henry Wirz, who was convicted of mistreating Union prisoners of war at Camp Sumter, Georgia.

Although American Indians often won respect for their extraordinary personal courage, Jacksonian opinion generally considered Indians to be dishonorable opponents. American-Indian warrior codes (also honor based) permitted surprise attacks on civilians and the torture of prisoners of war. This was all part of a complex system of limited warfare among the tribal nations, but Jacksonian frontier dwellers were not students of multicultural diversity. In their view, Indian war tactics were the sign of a dishonorable, unscrupulous and cowardly form of war. Anger at such tactics led Jacksonians to abandon the restraints imposed by their own war codes, and the ugly skirmishes along the frontier spiraled into a series of genocidal conflicts in which each side felt the other was violating every standard of humane conduct.

The Japanese, another people with a highly developed war code based on personal honor, had the misfortune to create the same kind of impression on American Jacksonians. The sneak attack on Pearl Harbor, the gross mistreatment of American POWs (the Bataan Death March), and Japanese fighting tactics all served to enrage American Jacksonians and led them to see the Pacific enemy as ruthless, dishonorable and inhuman. All contributed to the vitriolic intensity of combat in the Pacific theater. By the summer of 1945, American popular opinion was fully prepared to countenance invasion of the Japanese home islands, even if they were defended with the tenacity (and indifference to civilian lives) that marked the fighting on Okinawa.

Given this background, the Americans who decided to use the atomic bomb may have been correct that the use of the weapon saved lives, and not only of American soldiers. In any case, Jacksonians had no compunction about using the bomb. General Curtis LeMay (subsequently the 1968 running mate of Jacksonian populist third-party candidate George Wallace) succinctly summed up this attitude toward fighting a dishonorable opponent: "I'll tell you what war is about", said Lemay in an interview, "You've got to kill people, and when you've killed enough they stop fighting."[7]

By contrast, although the Germans committed bestial crimes against civilians and POWs (especially Soviet POWs), their behavior toward the armed forces of the United States was more in accordance with American ideas about military honor. Indeed, General Erwin Rommel is considered something of a military hero among American Jacksonians: an honorable enemy. Still, if the Germans avoided exposure to the utmost fury of an aroused

[7]Richard Rhodes, "The General and World War II", *The New Yorker*, June 19, 1995, pp. 47ff.

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American people at war, they were nevertheless subjected to the full, ferocious scope of the violence that a fully aroused American public opinion will sustain—and even insist upon.

For the first Jacksonian rule of war is that wars must be fought with all available force. The use of limited force is deeply repugnant. Jacksonians see war as a switch that is either "on" or "off." They do not like the idea of violence on a dimmer switch. Either the stakes are important enough to fight for—in which case you should fight with everything you have—or they are not, in which case you should mind your own business and stay home. To engage in a limited war is one of the costliest political decisions an American president can make—neither Truman nor Johnson survived it.

The second key concept in Jacksonian thought about war is that the strategic and tactical objective of American forces is to impose our will on the enemy with as few American casualties as possible. The Jacksonian code of military honor does not turn war into sport. It is a deadly and earnest business. This is not the chivalry of a medieval joust, or of the orderly battlefields of eighteenth-century Europe. One does not take risks with soldiers' lives to give a "fair fight." Some sectors of opinion in the United States and abroad were both shocked and appalled during the Gulf and Kosovo wars over the way in which American forces attacked the enemy from the air without engaging in much ground combat. The "turkey shoot" quality of the closing moments of the war against Iraq created a particularly painful impression. Jacksonians dismiss such thoughts out of hand. It is the obvious duty of American leaders to crush the forces arrayed against us as quickly, thoroughly and professionally as possible.

Jacksonian opinion takes a broad view of the permissible targets in war. Again reflecting a very old cultural heritage, Jacksonians believe that the enemy's will to fight is a legitimate target of war, even if this involves American forces in attacks on civilian lives, establishments and property. The colonial wars, the Revolution and the Indian wars all give ample evidence of this view, and General William Tecumseh Sherman's March to the Sea showed the degree to which the targeting of civilian morale through systematic violence and destruction could, to widespread popular applause, become an acknowledged warfighting strategy, even when fighting one's own rebellious kindred.

Probably as a result of frontier warfare, Jacksonian opinion came to believe that it was breaking the spirit of the enemy nation, rather than the fighting power of the enemy's armies, that was the chief object of warfare. It was not enough to defeat a tribe in battle; one had to "pacify" the tribe, to convince it utterly that resistance was and always would be futile and destructive. For this to happen, the war had to go to the enemy's home. The villages had to be burned, food supplies destroyed, civilians had to be killed. From the tiniest child to the most revered of the elderly sages, everyone in the enemy nation had to understand that further armed resistance to the will of the American people—whatever that might be—was simply not an option.

With the development of air power and, later, of nuclear weapons, this longstanding cultural acceptance of civilian targeting assumed new importance. Wilsonians and Jeffersonians protested even at the time against the deliberate terror bombing of civilian targets in the Second World War. Since 1945 there has been much agonized review of the American decision to use atomic bombs against Hiroshima and Nagasaki. None of this hand wringing has made the slightest impression on the Jacksonian view that

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the bombings were self-evidently justified and right. During both the Vietnam and Korean conflicts, there were serious proposals in Jacksonian quarters to use nuclear weapons—why else have them? The only reason Jacksonian opinion has ever accepted not to use nuclear weapons is the prospect of retaliation.

Jacksonians also have strong ideas about how wars should end. "There is no substitute for victory", as General MacArthur said, and the only sure sign of victory is the "unconditional surrender" of enemy forces. Just as Jacksonian opinion resents limits on American weapons and tactics, it also resents stopping short of victory. Unconditional surrender is not always a literal and absolute demand. The Confederate surrenders in 1865 included generous provisions for the losing armies. The Japanese were assured after the Potsdam Declaration that, while the United States insisted on unconditional surrender and acceptance of the terms, they could keep the "emperor system" after the war. However, there is only so much give in the idea: all resistance must cease; U.S. forces must make an unopposed entry into and occupation of the surrendering country; the political objectives of the war must be conceded *in toto*.

When in the later stages of World War II the Joint Chiefs of Staff discussed the prospect of an invasion of Kyushu, the southernmost of the major Japanese home islands, Admiral William Leahy projected 268,000 Americans would be killed or wounded out of an invasion force of 766,000.[8] The invasion of the chief island of Honshu, tentatively planned for the spring of 1946, would have been significantly worse. While projected casualty figures like these led a number of American officials to argue for modification of the unconditional surrender formula, Secretary of State James M. Byrnes told Truman that he would be "crucified" if he retreated from this formula—one that received a standing ovation when Truman repeated it to Congress in his first address as president. Truman agreed—wisely. His efforts to wage limited war in Korea cost him re-election in 1952. Similarly, Lyndon Johnson's inability to fight unlimited war for unconditional surrender in Vietnam cost him the presidency in 1968; Jimmy Carter's inability to resolve the Iranian hostage crisis with a clear-cut victory destroyed any hope he had of winning the 1980 election; and George Bush's refusal to insist on an unconditional surrender in Iraq may have contributed to his defeat in the 1992 presidential election. For American presidents, MacArthur is right: there is no substitute for victory.

In Victory, Magnanimity

ONCE THE enemy has made an unconditional surrender, the honor code demands that he be treated magnanimously. Grant fed Lee's men from his army supplies, while Sherman's initial agreement with General Johnston was so generous that it was overruled in Washington. American occupation troops in both Germany and Japan very quickly lost their rancor against the defeated foes. Not always disinterestedly, GIs in Europe were passing out chocolate bars, cigarettes and nylon stockings before the guns fell silent. The bitter racial antagonism that colored the Pacific War rapidly faded after it. Neither in Japan nor in Germany did American occupiers behave like the Soviet occupation forces in eastern Germany, where looting, rape and murder were still widespread months after the surrender.

[8]Douglas J. MacEachin, *The Final Months of the War With Japan: Signals Intelligence, U.S. Invasion Planning, and the A-Bomb Decision* (Langley, VA: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1998).

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In both Germany and Japan, the United States had originally envisioned a harsh occupation strategy with masses of war crimes trials and strict economic controls—somewhat akin to the original Radical Republican program in the post-Civil War South. But in all three cases, the victorious Americans quickly lost the appetite for vengeance against all but the most egregious offenders against the code. Whatever was said in the heat of battle, even the most Radical Reconstructionists envisioned the South's ultimate return to its old political status and rights. In the same way, soon after the shooting stopped in World War II, American public opinion simply assumed that the ultimate goal was for Germany and Japan to resume their places in the community of nations.

Not everybody qualifies for such lenient treatment under the code. In particular, repeat offenders will suffer increasingly severe penalties. Although many Americans were revolted by the harsh and greedy peace forced on Mexico (Grant felt that the Civil War was in part God's punishment for American crimes against Mexico), Santa Anna's long record of perfidy and cruelty built popular support both for the Mexican War and the peace. The pattern of frontier warfare, in which factions in a particular tribe might renew hostilities in violation of an agreement, helped solidify the Jacksonian belief that there was no point in making or keeping treaties with "savages."

In the international conflicts of the twentieth century, it is noteworthy that there have been no major populist backlashes calling for harsher treatment of defeated enemies. But when foreign enemies lack the good taste to surrender, Jacksonian opinion carries grudges that last for decades. Some of the roots of anti-China feeling in the United States today date back to mistreatment of American prisoners during the Korean War. U.S. food and energy aid to North Korea, indeed any engagement at all with that defiant regime, remains profoundly unpopular for the same reason. The mullahs of Iran, the assassins of Libya and Fidel Castro have never been forgiven by Jacksonian opinion for their crimes against and defiance of the United States. Neither will they be, until they acknowledge their sins.

In the case of the Cold War, the failure of the Soviet Union to make a formal surrender, or for the conflict to end in any way that could be marked as V-USSR Day, has greatly complicated American policy toward post-Cold War Russia. The Soviet Union lost the Cold War absolutely and unconditionally, and Russia has suffered economic and social devastation comparable to that sustained by any losing power in the great wars of the century. But because it never surrendered, Jacksonian opinion never quite shifted into magnanimity mode. Wilsonians, Hamiltonians and Jeffersonians all favored reconstruction support and aid; but without Jacksonian concurrence the American effort was sharply limited. Advice was doled out with a free and generous hand, but aid was extended more grudgingly.

This is far from a complete account of Jacksonian values and beliefs as they affect the United States. In economic as well as defense policy, for example, Jacksonian ideas are both influential and unique. Convinced that the prime purpose of government is to defend the living standards of the middle class, Jacksonian opinion is instinctively protectionist, seeking trade privileges for U.S. goods abroad and hoping to withhold those privileges from foreign exports. Jacksonians were once farmers; today they tend to be service and industrial workers. They see the preservation of American jobs, even at the cost of

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some unspecified degree of "economic efficiency", as the natural and obvious task of the federal government's trade policy. Jacksonians can be convinced that a particular trade agreement operates to the benefit of American workers, but they need to be convinced over and over again. They are also skeptical, on both cultural and economic grounds, of the benefits of immigration, which is seen as endangering the cohesion of the folk community and introducing new, low-wage competition for jobs. Neither result strikes Jacksonian opinion as a suitable outcome for a desirable government policy.

The Indispensable Element

JACKSONIAN influence in American history has been—and remains—enormous. The United States cannot wage a major international war without Jacksonian support; once engaged, politicians cannot safely end the war except on Jacksonian terms. From the perspective of members of other schools and many foreign observers, when Jacksonian sentiment favors a given course of action, the United States will move too far, too fast and too unilaterally in pursuit of its goals. When Jacksonian sentiment is strongly opposed, the United States will be seen to move too slowly or not at all. For anyone wishing to anticipate the course of American policy, an understanding of the structure of Jacksonian beliefs and values is essential.

It would be an understatement to say that the Jacksonian approach to foreign policy is controversial. It is an approach that has certainly contributed its share to the headaches of American policymakers throughout history. It has also played a role in creating a constituency abroad for the idea that the United States is addicted to a crude cowboy diplomacy—an idea that, by reducing international faith in the judgment and predictability of the United States, represents a real liability for American foreign policy.

Despite its undoubted limitations and liabilities, however, Jacksonian policy and politics are indispensable elements of American strength. Although Wilsonians, Jeffersonians and the more delicately constructed Hamiltonians do not like to admit it, every American school needs Jacksonians to get what it wants. If the American people had exhibited the fighting qualities of, say, the French in World War II, neither Hamiltonians, nor Jeffersonians nor Wilsonians would have had the opportunity to have much to do with shaping the postwar international order.

Moreover, as folk cultures go, Jacksonian America is actually open and liberal. Non-Jacksonians at home and abroad are fond of sneering at what must be acknowledged to be the deeply regrettable Jacksonian record of racism, or its commitment to forms of Christian belief that strike many as both unorthodox and bigoted. Certainly, Jacksonian America has not been in the forefront of the fight for minority rights, nor is it necessarily the place to go searching for *avant garde* artistic styles or cutting-edge philosophical reflections on the death of God.

But folk cultural change is measured in decades and generations, not electoral cycles, and on this clock, Jacksonian America is moving very rapidly. The military institutions have moved from strict segregation to a concerted attack on racism in fifty years. In civilian life, the belief that color is no bar to membership in the Jacksonian community of honor is rapidly replacing earlier beliefs. Just as Southerners whose grandfathers burned crosses against the Catholic Church now work very well with Catholics on all kinds of social, cultural and even religious endeavors, so we are seeing a steady erosion of the racial barriers. Even on issues of modernist art, Jacksonian

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America is moving. The Vietnam Memorial in Washington, once widely denounced by Jacksonians for its failure to include figurative sculptures, has now become one of the most visited and revered sites in the capital. On Memorial Day, thousands of leather-clad representatives of the Jacksonian culture visit it on their Harley-Davidsons, many of them accompanied by their wives riding pillion.

Jacksonian America performs an additional service: it makes a major, if unheralded, contribution to America's vaunted "soft power." It is not simply the Jeffersonian commitment to liberty and equality, the Wilsonian record of benevolence, anti-colonialism and support for democracy, or even the commercial success resulting from Hamiltonian policies that attracts people to the United States. Perhaps beyond all these it is the spectacle of a country that is good for average people to live in: where ordinary people can and do express themselves culturally, economically and spiritually without any inhibition. The consumer lifestyle of the United States—and the consequences of federal policy to enrich the middle class and make it a class of homeowners and automobile drivers—wins the country many admirers abroad. For the first time in human history, millions of ordinary people have enough money in their pockets and time on their hands to support a popular culture that has more resources than the high culture of the aristocracy and elite. This culture is what hundreds of millions of foreigners love most about the United States, and its dissemination makes scores of millions of foreigners feel somehow connected to or even part of the United States. The cultural, social and religious vibrancy and unorthodoxy of Jacksonian America—not excluding such pastimes as professional wrestling—are among the country's most important foreign policy assets.

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Memorial Day, on the way to the Vietnam Wall.

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It may also be worth noting that the images of American propensities to violence, and of the capabilities of American military forces and intelligence operatives, are so widely distributed in the media that they may actually heighten international respect for American strength and discourage attempts to test it.

THIS BASICALLY positive assessment would be incomplete without a description of the two most serious problems that the Jacksonian school perennially poses for American policymakers. Both of them spring from the wide ideological and cultural differences that divide the Jacksonian outlook from the other schools.

The first problem is the gap between Hamiltonian and Wilsonian promises and Jacksonian performance. The globally oriented, order-building schools of thought see American power as a resource to be expended in pursuit of their far-reaching goals. Many of the commitments they wish to make, the institutions they wish to build, and the social and economic policies they wish to promote do not enjoy Jacksonian support; in some cases, they elicit violent Jacksonian disagreement. This puts Hamiltonians and Wilsonians over and over again in an awkward position. At best they are trying to push treaties, laws and appropriations through a sulky and reluctant Congress. At worst they find themselves committed to military confrontations without Jacksonian support. More often than not, the military activities they wish to pursue are multilateral, limited warfare or peacekeeping operations. These are often unpopular both inside the military and in the country at large. Caught between their commitments (and the well-organized Hamiltonian or Wilsonian lobbies and pressure groups whose political clout is often at least partially responsible for these commitments) and the manifest unpopularity of the actions required to fulfill them, American policymakers dither, tack from side to side, and generally make an unimpressive show. This is one of the structural problems of American foreign policy, and it is exacerbated by the divided structure of the American government and Senate customs and rules that give a determined opposition many opportunities to block action of which it disapproves.

The second problem has a similar origin, but a different structure. Jacksonian opinion is slow to focus on a particular foreign policy issue, and slower still to make a commitment to pursue an end vigorously and for the long term. Once that commitment has been made, it is even harder to build Jacksonian sentiment for a change. This is particularly true when change involves overcoming one of the ingrained preferences in Jacksonian culture; it is, for example, much harder to shift a settled hawkish consensus in a dovish direction than vice versa. The hardest task of all is to maintain support for a policy that eschews oversimplification in favor of complexity. Having gotten Jacksonian opinion into a war in Vietnam or the Persian Gulf, it was very hard to get it out again without achieving total victory. Once China or Vietnam has been established as an enemy nation, it is very difficult to build support for normalizing relations or, worse still, extending foreign aid.

These problems, which are responsible for many of the recurring system crashes and unhappy stalemates in American foreign policy, can never be fully solved. They reflect profound differences in outlook and interest in American society, and it is the job of our institutions to adjudicate these disputes and force compromise rather than to eliminate them.

Efforts by policymakers to finesse these disputes often exacerbate the basic problem, which is the cultural, political and class distance between Jacksonian

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America and the representatives of the other schools. Attempts to mask Hamiltonian or Wilsonian policies in Jacksonian rhetoric, or to otherwise misrepresent or hide unpopular policies, may succeed in the short run, but ultimately they can lead to a collapse of popular confidence and the stiffening of resistance to any and all policies deemed suspect. When misguided political advisers persuaded the distinctively unmilitary Massachusetts Governor Michael Dukakis to put on a helmet and get in a tank for a television commercial, they only advertised how far out of touch with Jacksonian America they were. □

More Veterans, Fewer Wars

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—Bradley Graham, *Washington Post*, October 18, 1999

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Robust Nationalism

Samuel P. Huntington

IS THERE SUCH a thing as a conservative foreign policy? There was during the Cold War, but now the answer appears to be "no." People who consider themselves conservative and are so considered by others hold widely different views on the general role of the United States in world affairs and on specific foreign policy issues. These differences are rooted in the two strands of conservative thought that exist in America, classic conservatism and doctrinal conservatism. Yet some key assumptions and values are common to most conservatives and much less common among liberals and other non-conservatives. These could be the basis for a robust nationalism that would unite most conservatives, distinguish conservative foreign policy sharply from its liberal alternatives, and have great appeal to the bulk of the American people.

Variations on a Theme

THE MODERN world has had three major political ideologies. Liberalism—the ideology of individualism, free markets, the rule of law, limited government and the rights to life, liberty and property—is associated with John Locke, Adam Smith, Thomas Jefferson, Immanuel Kant, John Stuart Mill and other eighteenth and nineteenth-century European and American thinkers. Its primary social base is the middle class and bourgeoisie of commercial, industrial and industrializing societies. Socialism has included theories varying from social democratic reformism to softline Marxism to hardline, revolutionary Leninism and Maoism. These theories differ on the possibility of social change through democratic means, on the role of democracy in a socialist state, and on the extent of state control of the economy. They agree, nonetheless, on a substantial role for the state in economic affairs, economic equality, national ownership of core industries, and state promotion of the economic well-being of the social bases of socialism among the poor, the proletariat and the peasantry.

In contrast to liberalism and socialism, classic conservatism is not directed to realizing a particular vision of the good society. It embodies instead a general attitude toward order and change, defending the former and constraining the latter. The goal of conservatism is to "preserve, protect and defend" existing social, economic and political culture and

Samuel P. Huntington is the Albert J. Weatherhead III University Professor at Harvard University.

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institutions.[1] Conservatives, however, may well support modest changes in the existing order so as to maintain it against revolutionary change or collapse. Bourgeois middle-class liberalism and working-class socialism oppose each other, but "the true antithesis of conservatism", as the editor of this journal has put it, "is not liberalism or socialism but radicalism, which also is best defined in terms of an attitude towards change—in its case one of uncritical approval."[2]

Significant intellectual and political conservative movements appear only when serious threats exist to the established order. Since it is a response to specific threats to specific cultures and institutions, one manifestation of conservatism has little or no relation to other manifestations, and the proponents of conservatism in one time and situation may well be its opponents in another. Conservatism is thus a positional ideology.[3] Edmund Burke is its primary proponent because he formulated and consistently expressed conservative ideas in defense of threatened institutions wherever they were located: Hindu institutions in India, the monarchy in France, mixed government in Britain, democracy in America. He articulated the same arguments and logic against the very different forces that were threatening these very different systems.

Conservatism has appeared as an intellectual and political movement at various times in the history of the West: in Europe in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries against the threats the rising absolute monarchies posed to medieval pluralism; in England at the end of the sixteenth century in response to the challenge the rise of Puritanism was posing to the existing church-state establishment; in much of Europe at the end of the eighteenth century in response to the threat posed by the French Revolution and its accompanying movements; and in nineteenth-century Europe in response to the demands for suffrage by first middle-class and then working-class movements.

The primary manifestation of classic conservatism in Europe was the response to the French Revolution. As a result, in Europe conservatism came to be associated with aristocracy, landed wealth and opposition to, or at least skepticism concerning, industrialization and democracy. As the aristocratic-landed classes' response to the liberalism of the bourgeoisie and the socialism of the emerging working class, it remained a potent force in most European countries well into the twentieth century. Landed aristocracies and gentry have now virtually disappeared in Europe, yet elements of this traditional conservatism, and its opposition to liberal individualism and competitive capitalism, continue in some places. Traditional conservatism and its modern offshoots dominated the British Conservative Party until the Thatcher revolution in the 1970s.

In the United States on the other hand, the absence of an aristocracy, the plentitude of free land, and the pervasive bourgeois and commercial ethos rendered this traditional form of conservatism of minimum consequence in American history. Its one serious manifestation was the defense of the Southern "peculiar institution" articulated by, among others, John C. Calhoun, George Fitzhugh and George Frederick Holmes. A more general conservatism was present in the polit-

[1]The quoted words, of course, come from the Constitution, which requires only two commitments of a president, the instrumental one that he will "faithfully execute" his office, and the eminently conservative one that he will to the best of his ability "preserve, protect and defend the Constitution."

[2]Owen Harries, "Senator Dole is a Hypocrite", *The Spectator* (London), November 25, 1995, p. 24.

[3]See my "Conservatism as an Ideology", *American Political Science Review* (June 1957).

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ical thinking of the Founding Fathers—Adams, Madison and Hamilton in particular—even though they were revolutionaries who fought a war of independence and created an unprecedented political order. In many respects they were, and saw themselves as, conservatives opposing a revolutionary attempt by the British government to undermine their liberties and centralize control over its colonies. They articulated many conservative ideas and were viewed as conservative by European conservatives including Burke and Gentz. For one hundred and fifty years after independence, however, major threats to American institutions, with the notable exception of that posed by Southern slavery, did not exist, and classic conservatism was virtually absent from American political discourse.

What has been called conservatism in America is very different. It is a conservative form of liberalism, opposed to popular or democratic liberalism. It has been assigned many labels, including "Whiggery" by Louis Hartz and "market conservatism" by a perceptive Russian analyst.[4] It is, however, perhaps best termed doctrinal conservatism. This conservatism is identified with the promotion of commerce and industry, *laisser faire* capitalism, private enterprise and a minimal role for government. It is associated historically with the interests of property owners, entrepreneurs and the bourgeoisie, and opposed to the interests of the less wealthy classes. In Europe it is known as liberalism and its proponents are found in liberal parties. In America, by contrast, doctrinal conservatism manifested itself in Hamiltonianism, the "New Whiggery" after the Civil War, and most recently in the neoconservatism of the 1970s and 1980s.

Doctrinal conservatism differs fundamentally from classic conservatism. The latter sets forth no utopia and has no program for fundamental change. Doctrinal conservatism has a vision to be realized and hence, for it, as Gertrude Himmelfarb has argued, a "conservative revolution" is not an oxymoron.[5]

Each of these strands of conservatism thus has a different relation to liberalism. Traditional, aristocratic conservatism stood in sharp opposition to liberalism, but lost that battle in Europe and was never able to mount one in America. Classic conservatism opposed liberalism when the latter challenged the existing order, but defended liberal values and institutions when they represented the existing order and were under attack by other forces. American doctrinal conservatism is the Whig sibling of American democratic liberalism, both of them the children of John Locke. Doctrinal conservatism squabbles continuously with its sibling, but it cannot reject their common parentage without denying itself.

The Cold War and After

THE COLD WAR proved kind to conservatives and difficult for liberals. The American nation confronted a rival superpower possessed of immense natural resources, a huge, technologically advanced defense industry, a five million-man army, thousands of nuclear weapons, a multi-continental array of allied and satellite states, and a messianic and intellectually impressive ideology that appealed to political movements with hundreds of millions of supporters throughout the world. America *was* threatened, and the classic conservative

[4]Hartz, *The Liberal Tradition in America* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1955), esp. chaps. 4 and 8; Andrei Melville, *Conservatism in U.S. Ideology and Politics* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1988), pp. 66-79.

[5]Himmelfarb, "Is 'Conservative Revolution' an Oxymoron?", *The Weekly Standard*, December 18, 1995.

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response was to give overwhelming priority to developing the policies and the means for countering that threat. Communist ideology was also the polar opposite of the *laisser faire* ideology of doctrinal conservatives. Thus ideology and national interest combined to make the containment of the Soviet Union and the defeat of communism the dominant objective for both classic and doctrinal conservatives, as well as for the great bulk of the American public apart from a few dissident intellectuals.

American liberals, on the other hand, while generally recognizing the evils of communism, also tended to play down the extent to which it posed a threat to American society, and stressed the importance of pursuing other, liberal foreign policy goals, such as the promotion of economic development, the reduction of inequality, the elimination of tyranny and the protection of human rights. During most of the Cold War, however, Republican and Democratic administrations subordinated these goals, which they recognized as legitimate, to the goal of containing communism. The liberal goals were only seriously pursued when, as with the Alliance for Progress, they could be justified as contributing to that overriding anti-Soviet aim.

The Soviet threat turned conservatives into defenders of American liberal institutions and transformed mainstream American liberals into the articulators of classic conservative ideas. The pre-eminent conservative philosopher (and theologian) of the early Cold War, Reinhold Niebuhr, was, as the archetype mainstream liberal, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., said, "the father of us all." "In preserving the achievements of American liberalism", I argued in 1957, "American liberals have no recourse but to turn to conservatism. For them especially, conservative ideology has a place in America today." Many liberals did support conservative anti-communist polices. Other liberals, however, were less concerned with defending America's imperfect liberal institutions against a monstrous evil than they were worried about being "outflanked on the left." They searched for elements of liberal virtue in Soviet communism, and denigrated the idea that serious conflicts of values and interests existed between the Soviet Union and the Free World. Along an ideological continuum, mainstream liberals shaded off into Henry Wallace liberals, fellow-travelers and outright apologists, overtly or covertly, for the Soviet Union. This progression had its own philosophical logic. "In almost every instance", Niebuhr observed in 1953, "the communist evil is rooted in miscalculations which are shared by modern liberal culture."[6] For some liberals, one miscalculation easily led to another.

THE END of the Cold War removed the need to subordinate the pursuit of liberal foreign policy goals to the overriding demands of national security against the Soviet threat. Freed from this constraint, liberals could now go forward to do good in the world. Their goals commanded great attention and support in the media and among elite groups. In addition, the position of the United States as the only superpower, with primacy in virtually every domain of power, seemed to provide liberals with the wherewithal to pursue those goals. "Enlargement", "humanitarian intervention" and "foreign policy as social work" were the result.

In contrast, the end of the Cold War discombobulated conservatives. They lost their central unifying purpose. While liberals had no problem rushing out to pursue long-standing liberal goals, conservatives had great problems even defining

[6]Niebuhr, *Christian Realism and Political Problems* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1953), p. 5.

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conservative goals. Almost no conservatives were isolationist in any meaningful sense, but beyond that they did not agree on much and endorsed a wide variety of different and often contradictory foreign policy stances, embodying varying degrees of interventionism, realism, neorealism, idealism, nationalism, internationalism, triumphalism, restraint, protectionism and free trade. The absence of an identifiable major foreign threat to American society and institutions seemed to remove any rationale or need for classic conservatism.

Neoconservatism, in the meantime, had emerged in the 1970s and 1980s as the newest form of doctrinal conservatism and the dominant form of conservative thinking in those decades. Its intellectual godfather was Milton Friedman; its most articulate advocate was Irving Kristol; its political embodiment was Ronald Reagan. Once the Cold War was over, a significant gap opened up between neoconservative and classic conservative views on foreign policy, and neoconservative views often converged with those of liberals. The end of the Soviet Union enabled neoconservatives to join their ideological siblings in efforts to reform the world in their image of the good society.

The differences between neoconservatism and classic conservatism are reflected in a 1998 survey of conservative foreign policy and national security experts identified by the Heritage Foundation. Slightly more than 50 percent of those polled called themselves "conservative", while just 20 percent said they were "neoconservative." Both groups rejected isolationism by overwhelming margins. Neoconservatives also endorsed the promotion of human rights as a cornerstone of American foreign policy, supported foreign economic aid, believed in the efficacy of economic sanctions, favored peacekeeping as a central mission of the U.S. military, and did not oppose a prolonged U.S. military presence in Bosnia. On all these issues, they clearly agreed with most liberals and differed significantly from those experts who identified themselves simply as conservative. Immigration is another defining issue between classic and doctrinal conservatives. Neoconservatives also are significantly less likely than conservatives to believe that U.S. military forces have been reduced too much and that military spending is too low.[7]

Like liberals, neoconservatives wish to use American power to promote the American dream abroad. They emphasize, however, somewhat different elements of that dream from the liberals, a difference reflected in the work abroad of the Republican and Democratic affiliates of the National Endowment for Democracy. The former gives priority to promoting markets and private enterprise, the latter democracy and elections. Neoconservatives emphasize the role of the United States as global policeman, liberals its role as global social worker. They unite, however, in assigning the United States the global mission of promoting good abroad, in contrast to the classic conservative emphasis on preserving good at home. Conservatism, it would thus seem, has come to a pretty pass when classic conservatism has lost its *raison d'être* and neoconservatism joins with liberalism in promoting "global meliorism."[8]

A Conservative Credo?

GIVEN these developments and the varied views of conservatives on specific foreign policy issues, it is conceivable that people

[7]Michael P. Noonan, "Conservative Opinions on U.S. Foreign Policy", *Orbis* (Fall 1999).

[8]Walter A. McDougall, *Promised Land, Crusader State* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1997), pp. 172ff.

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who call themselves conservative only share a preference for that label. It is also possible, however, that neoconservatives and classic conservatives may agree on some assumptions and concepts, the totality of which distinguishes them from liberals and other non-conservatives. A set of conservative first principles would not necessarily provide definitive positions on specific policy issues, but could provide a framework within which conservatives could debate and to which they could relate their differences over policy issues, much as Bolsheviks, Mensheviks, Trotskyites, Kautskyites, Bernsteinians and others debated their differences within a shared Marxist framework.

What, if anything, do conservatives have in common? Clinton Rossiter explicitly addressed this issue in his penetrating 1955 volume, *Conservatism in America*. He argued that what he termed "Conservatism" (capital C), that is, classic conservatism, and "American conservatism", that is, doctrinal conservatism, disagree on several key issues, but agree on the following basic conservative principles:

> the superiority of liberty to equality;
> the fallibility and potential tyranny of majority rule;
> the rights of man as something earned rather than given;
> the prime importance of private property for liberty, order, and progress;
> the essential role of religious feeling in man and organized religion in society;
> the conservative mission of education;
> the existence of immutable principles of universal justice.

In addition, Rossiter suggested, American doctrinal conservatives might also, with qualifications, agree to classic conservative principles concerning "the mixed and immutable nature of man", "the natural inequality of men", "the inevitability and necessity of social classes", "the desirability of diffusing power", "the balancing of rights and duties, of freedom and responsibility", "the importance of inherited institutions, values, symbols, and rituals", and "a government whose marks are dignity, authority, legitimacy, justice, constitutionalism and the recognition of limits."[9]

This is a fairly comprehensive formulation of conservative ideas. With respect to contemporary debates and the distinctions between conservatism and liberalism in America, three characteristics of conservative thought deserve emphasis: belief in God, conception of human nature, and commitment to the nation.

Conservatism is rooted in religion; liberalism is not. Obviously some liberals are religious, but more often they are secular, atheistic or agnostic. A few conservatives, following Hume, may share these views. Yet, while conservatives may or may not actively practice religion or be members of a church, it is difficult to be conservative without being religious. By and large conservatives believe in God, and since Americans are overwhelmingly a Christian people with a small but important Jewish minority, the God of American conservatism is the God of the Old and New Testaments. In contemporary America, religious commitment and conservatism march arm in arm in battle against secularism, relativism and liberalism. In conservatism, man is not the measure of all things. A Supreme Being and a supreme law, natural or divine, exist that are outside the control of human beings. To reject the existence of a Supreme Being and a supreme law transcending human will is to start down the path toward moral anarchy and "might makes right." "If you will not have God (and He is a jealous God)", T.S. Eliot observed in 1940, "you

[9]Rossiter, *Conservatism in America* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1955), pp. 216-17.

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should pay your respects to Hitler or Stalin."[10] An alternative, secular approach would argue that man is both the measure and the maker of all things, that individuals and societies determine for themselves what is right and what is wrong, and what they decide *is* right or wrong so long as they are able to make it so.

Religion is the source of conservative concepts of human nature and human relations. In conservative thinking, human beings are capable of love, generosity, heroism and self-sacrifice, but they are also capable of hate, greed, cowardice, violence, envy, pride, lust and a passion for power. Original sin is a reality, evil exists in human nature, and since, as Madison said, men are not angels, governments (as well as other social mechanisms) are necessary to control them and then must be controlled themselves. From a conservative perspective, evils can be moderated and contained, but they cannot be eliminated. The opposing view would hold that people are basically good and that evil is the product of the wrong institutions and policies. If men can only discover the right institutions and policies, they can abolish war, crime, poverty, inequality and other evils.

Conservatism thus views conflict and even violent conflict as an inherent aspect of the human condition. Real conflicts of interest exist among groups and societies. These are not the result of misunderstanding, faulty communications or shortsightedness, but are rooted in the human condition, self-interest, and the struggle for wealth, security and power. While mutual gains are possible, in almost every relationship there are winners and losers, or at least those who win or lose more and those who win or lose less. A contrary view would argue that a natural harmony exists between individuals and groups and that conflicts, particularly between states, are the result of misunderstandings and misperception of their "true" interests. Liberals tend to assume that both sides in a conflict equally desire agreement and strive to reach it. Conservatives believe that both sides equally desire victory and attempt to achieve it. They live in a Hobbesian, not a Lockean, world. Liberals assume that increased interaction between people and groups enhances understanding, accommodation and a convergence of interests. Conservatives are dubious.

Liberals tend to believe that the end of whatever is the current major conflict means the end of all conflict, hence the indulgence in euphoria in 1918, 1945 and 1989. Conservatives know that the end of one conflict creates the basis for another one. They agree with Robin Fox that

> wars are not a disease to be cured, but part of the normal human condition. They stem from what we are, not from some contingencies of what we do from time to time ('history'). They are, like religion and prostitution, basic responses to basic human fears and hopes.[11]

Liberals, on the other hand, believe that war is an aberration that can be eliminated by promoting dialogue among peoples, expanding international trade, implementing arms control treaties, reducing military spending, and strengthening the UN.

Given the nature of the world, conservatives rank devotion to country along with devotion to God. Patriotism is a—perhaps the—prime conservative virtue. Conservatives give their highest loyalty to their country, its values, culture and institutions. Unlike most liberals, they see international institutions not as good in themselves but good only insofar as they contribute to furthering the well-being of the American nation. Non-conservatives

[10]Eliot, *The Idea of a Christian Society* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1940), p. 64.

[11]Fox, "Fatal Attraction: War and Human Nature", *The National Interest* (Winter 1992/93), p. 20.

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tend to degrade national identity either in favor of ethnic, racial, gender or other sub-national identities, or in favor of identity with supranational institutions and ideals. Conservatives believe that foreign policy should promote the national interest, although they may differ as to exactly how that interest should be defined. They also resist intrusions on national sovereignty by international organizations, courts or regimes. Liberals are more likely to see, as Martha Nussbaum does, "national pride" as "morally dangerous" and to promote cosmopolitanism over patriotism. The conservative, on the other hand, would agree with Coleridge that cosmopolitanism not rooted in nationality is "a spurious and rotten growth", and that the true patriot will scorn "the false philosophy or mistaken religion which would persuade him that cosmopolitanism is nobler than nationality, and the human race a sublimer object of love than a people."[12]

In contrast to conservatives, liberals tend to question the legitimacy of the nation-state. From a liberal point of view, particularistic identities are bad because they are exclusive, creating a line between "us" and "them." Liberals instead look forward, as Strobe Talbott once said, to a time when "nationhood as we know it will be obsolete; [and] all states will recognize a single global authority." In a similar vein, Richard Sennett denounces "the evil of a shared national identity", and Amy Gutmann argues that it is "repugnant" for American students to "learn that they are, above all, citizens of the United States." Liberal scholars such as Richard Rorty and David Hollinger even find it necessary to chide their fellow liberals for denigrating patriotism and to warn them of the political consequences of doing so.[13]

Anti-national sentiments are not restricted to liberal academics: they also exist among business elites. In 1996, for instance, Ralph Nader wrote to the top executives of one hundred large American corporations, pointing to the substantial benefits they received from being located in this country and suggesting that they might show their support for "the country that bred them, built them, subsidized them and defended them" by having their officers and directors open their annual stockholders meeting with the Pledge of Allegiance to the flag and the Republic for which it stands. Half the companies did not respond. One (Federated Department Stores) answered favorably; others, such as Ford, refused on the grounds that they were multinational not American corporations, while others denounced Nader's proposal as totally nefarious. Aetna's CEO called it "contrary to the principles on which our democracy was founded." Motorola's respondent condemned its "political and nationalistic overtones." Price Costco's CEO asked, "What do you propose next . . . personal loyalty oaths?" Kimberly-Clark's executive said it was a "grim reminder of the loyalty oaths of the 1950s."[14] The equation of patriotism with McCarthyism may appeal to some businessmen and liberals, but it will not

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[12]Nussbaum et al., *For Love of Country: Debating the Limits of Patriotism* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1996), p. 4; Coleridge, in *The Conservative Tradition*, ed. R.J. White (London: Nicholas Kaye, 1950), p. 115.

[13]Talbott, "The Birth of the Global Nation", *Time*, July 20, 1992, p. 70; Sennett, *International Herald Tribune*, January 31, 1994; Gutmann, "Democratic Citizenship", in Nussbaum et al., *For Love of Country*, pp. 68-9; Rorty, *Achieving Our Country: Leftist Thought in Twentieth-Century America* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998); Rorty, *New York Times*, February 14, 1994; Hollinger, *Postethnic America: Beyond Multiculturalism* (New York: Basic Books, 1995).

[14]Correspondence provided by Nader, and Jeff Jacoby, *Boston Globe*, July 30, 1998.

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sit well with the American public and should not sit well with American conservatives of any stripe.

Robust Nationalism

THROUGHOUT much of the world, but particularly in the United States, economic globalization is creating a growing gap between denationalized elites and nationalist publics. An international class of businessmen, officials, academics, journalists and others has arisen whose members constantly travel, interact with each other, and advocate policies to expand trade, investment and profits, and to promote liberal democracy and market economies. These goals, however, often run counter to the economic interests and cultural concerns of the mass publics in their societies. The consequences, as Kofi Annan has warned, are nationalist, illiberal and populist reactions to globalization. The United States is not immune to these trends.

American wealth and power are at their peak. The national unity, economic equity and cultural integrity of America are not. In the broadest sense, American national identity is under challenge from a multiculturalism that subverts it from below and a cosmopolitanism that erodes it from above. Patriotism is passé among large sectors of American elites. Conceivably, in the future serious external threats to America could arise from China, Russia, Islam or some combination of hostile states. At present, however, the principal threats to American unity, culture and power are closer to home. The appropriate response of both classic conservatives and neoconservatives is to come together in support of a robust nationalism that reaffirms some basic truths. America is a religious country. Patriotism is a virtue, Universalism is not Americanism. Nationalism is not isolationism.

These truths resonate with the American people. In their commitment to God and country, conservatives differ from many liberal elites, but they are at one with the American people. America was in large part created for religious reasons, and throughout American history foreign observers have identified the intense commitment to and extensive practice of religion as distinguishing characteristics of the American people. This is as true, and perhaps even more true, today than it has been in the past. By every conceivable measure, America stands apart among wealthy countries in its high degree of religiosity. In cross-national polls, Americans also are almost always more patriotic and take greater pride in their country than people of other nations. Patriotism and religion are central elements of American identity.

The American public, unlike many American elites, is also robustly nationalistic in many of its views on particular foreign policy issues. The 1998 Chicago Council on Foreign Relations survey on public opinion and foreign affairs revealed significant, and in many respects growing, differences between the views of the public and those of foreign policy leaders on many key issues. The public holds a highly conservative view of the future, 53 percent believing the twenty-first century will be more violent than the twentieth century, in contrast to only 23 percent of the leaders, 40 percent of whom believe it will be less violent. Overwhelming majorities of both the public and the leaders believe that preventing nuclear proliferation, combating terrorism, and maintaining American military superiority should be "very important" goals of American foreign policy. Far more than the leaders, however, the public strongly supports curtailing the flow of illegal drugs into the country, reducing illegal immigration, and pro-

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tecting the jobs of American workers. Sixty percent of the public, but only 36 percent of the leaders, believes tariffs are necessary to protect certain manufacturing jobs. The public also is far more opposed to economic assistance programs and military interventions abroad than are the leaders, yet by a small margin the public supports expansion of military spending while the leaders by a slightly larger margin oppose it.

These data suggest that robust nationalism could have substantial public appeal and could also serve as an alternative to more narrow isolationist measures that might also win public support. Robust nationalism is an alternative to divisive multiculturalism, xenophobic isolationism and wimpy universalism. It is a foundation on which conservatives could unite to promote American national interests abroad and national unity at home. □

Freedom and Tranquility

After the French Revolution, which offered a radical, egalitarian form of democracy, Britain's appeal shifted. For many Europeans, England became both the land of liberty and the bastion of tradition, the one country whose *ancien régime* consistently survived the upheavals and revolutions that were rocking the monarchies of Europe. Perhaps the strongest single chapter of *Anglomania* is 'Graveyard of the Revolution,' which describes the lives and attitudes of the many political exiles who settled in England during the 19th century: the Italians Giuseppe Mazzini and Giuseppe Garibaldi, Germany's Karl Marx, the Hungarian Lajos Kossuth and the Russian Aleksandr Herzen. Ironically, even as London crawled with communists, anarchists and utopian socialists, England remained impervious to revolution. Buruma writes: 'All radicals in exile wondered why this should be: how had Britain managed to achieve its peculiar equilibrium, based on a combination of social stability and inequality, of freedom and dull conformity, tolerance and provincial smugness, civility and greed? . . . In Britain, as Marx concluded, even the workers were bourgeois.'

Britain's respect for tradition guaranteed liberty (for bomb-throwing anarchists as well as for ordinary citizens) but also blunted the force of revolutionary theories. The country's voracious capitalism kept England open to new ideas but made it shy away from ones that would disrupt the economic order. Gradually, thinkers began to perceive a clear link, rather than a contradiction, between British freedom and stability. As Herzen, perhaps Buruma's favorite exile, observes, 'The only countries in Europe that are tranquil are those in which personal liberty and freedom of speech are the least restricted.'

—Alexander Stille, reviewing Ian Buruma's *Anglomania*, *New York Times Book Review*, May 2, 1999

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Present Laughter or Utopian Bliss?

Gideon Rose

WHEN THE Democrats captured the White House in 1992, after a dozen years in exile, foreign policy was not at the top of their agenda. Many observers felt this a blessing, because clear and mature thought on the subject had not been one of the party's strong suits for many years.

Yet for all the criticism heaped upon it, the Clinton administration has actually not done too badly. When they received strong cards from the Bush administration, as with NAFTA or the Middle East peace process, the Clintonites have played their hand reasonably well. Trouble has come when they have tried to think for themselves, as with the doctrine of humanitarian intervention, or when they have subordinated everything to domestic politics. On balance, as the editor of this journal wrote much earlier in the administration's life, "Clinton's foreign policy is not an unmitigated disaster. It is not even a mitigated disaster. It is merely quite bad in certain ways that have limited consequences." And while Gore or Bradley could always surprise if given the reins, the odds are that a successor Democratic administration would probably offer more of the same.

Gideon Rose is deputy director of National Security Studies and Olin Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations.

On the other side of the aisle, the situation is more complex and, given current polls, perhaps more important. As with the Democrats of yore, the question with regard to Republicans today is whether they will emerge from their years in the presidential wilderness ready to exercise power responsibly. On this score, the record of recent Republican Congresses is a national embarrassment and gives cause for alarm rather than reassurance. Arms control, defense policy, economic sanctions, alliance diplomacy—all have been treated cavalierly, as if they were simply local pork, pure symbolism or opportunities for partisan advantage. The gratuitously blunt rejection of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in October is the latest example, but the nadir may have been reached last April when the House of Representatives voted simultaneously not to send ground troops to Kosovo, not to support the air campaign in progress there, *and* not to pull out. Just what practical guidance such votes were meant to offer is unclear.

Still, foreign policy wisdom is hardly to be expected from legislators, especially during good times, and so their frivolities may say little about how a future Republican administration would perform when faced with the task of running the nation's external affairs, rather than merely yapping at the heels of

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those who do. Here the views of scribblers and aspiring place-holders might be a better guide, and among Republicans these fall into four distinct camps: populist, libertarian, neoconservative and realist.

The first two can be dismissed quickly because they have few adherents within the professional foreign policy establishment. Buchanan's pitchfork-wielding followers may be an important constituency in the heartland, but in Washington opposing globalization while rehabilitating Charles Lindbergh and Father Coughlin is considered unsound. The Cato Institute's night watchman-state isolationism, meanwhile, has never caught on with the managers of the world's largest foreign policy apparat. The battle for the next Republican administration's soul thus comes down by default to a fight between the neoconservatives and the realists—although, as we shall see, on different grounds than might at first be apparent.

BOTH CAMPS derive their views from a comprehensive theory of international politics, with the difference being that neoconservatives emphasize ideology while realists emphasize power. Neoconservatives view global affairs as a clash of systems, with nations competing not only for themselves but also on behalf of larger ideological movements. Realists view international affairs as a struggle for power among states, with national interests trumping ideological concerns most of the time.

Neoconservatives believe that realists fail, as James Burnham once said of Kennan, Lippmann and Morgenthau,

> to comprehend dialectics: fail to realize that simultaneously in our age there is taking place an international competition of national states and empires . . . and also an unprecedented revolutionary struggle that is world-wide and civilization-deep.

Realists believe that the causes neoconservatives embrace vary over time—from Trotskyist world revolution in the 1930s, to anti-communism during the Cold War, to democracy promotion today—but that their ideological passion remains constant and dangerous.

In their current incarnation, neoconservatives seek to badger the world into accepting local versions of the American domestic political system. William Kristol and Robert W. Kagan, for example, suggest that the United States should establish a "benevolent global hegemony" resting on an increased defense budget, an infusion of moral concerns into foreign policy, and diplomatic activism—or, in the words of the *Weekly Standard*, the "three M's . . . Military strength, Morality, and Mastery." They assert that "The United States achieved its present position of strength not by practicing a foreign policy of live and let live, nor by passively waiting for threats to arise, but by actively promoting American principles of governance abroad—democracy, free markets, respect for liberty."

If this sounds familiar, it is because it is really old-fashioned liberalism, albeit of a particularly muscular variety. After all, it was Woodrow Wilson who asked Congress to approve American entry into World War I "for the ultimate peace of the world and for the liberation of its peoples . . . for the rights of nations great and small and the privilege of men everywhere to choose their way of life and of obedience." To be sure, neoconservatives reject certain elements in the traditional liberal catechism, such as a belief in the value of international law and institutions, and in the pacific effects of trade and economic interdependence. But they are quite comfortable with

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other parts of it, such as the need to make the world safe for democracy, and they share liberal hopes that a bright future will dawn once the evil domestic sources of foreign aggression are rooted out.[1]

Realists find such optimism risible. Their conception of international politics as a war of all against all has little room for fundamental progress. Wary balancing yielding temporary stability is usually the best that can be hoped for, they say, with perpetual peace not in the cards, no matter who is playing the game. They believe that the neoconservatives' liberal imperialism is doomed not only to fail but also to provoke a countervailing response from the rest of the world, hastening the end of America's reign as king of the hill; in its place they offer a more circumspect agenda featuring free trade and great power accommodation.

Of the two approaches, the neoconservative one has greater popular resonance, since the United States is indeed a nation "dedicated to a proposition" and Americans have always believed that their political ideals and principles are in theory universally applicable. The Declaration of Independence, as Lincoln noted, gave liberty "not alone to the people of this country, but hope to the world for all future time." From the Founding onwards, accordingly, Americans have been concerned with (and judgmental about) the domestic order of other countries in a way that pure European realism rejects. The relativist view that foreigners' political practices are presumptively legitimate, expressed most eloquently by George Kennan, is not only unusual on these shores but is in a real sense profoundly un-American.

Yet if the universal significance of the American national experiment has rarely been disputed, its implications for foreign policy *have* been, and vigorously, allowing a practical and distinctly American realism to creep in through the back door. As Robert W. Tucker pointed out in these pages more than a decade ago, those who believe that the nation should rest content with setting an example for the world have always clashed with those who believe it should try to shape political developments abroad in accordance with American ideals.[2] First emerging in the 1790s, this debate has continued to the present with little change in the basic positions on either side. Most American realists today are actually what Tucker terms "exemplars", wary of the costs associated with a messianic foreign policy and skeptical about the U.S. ability to effect true political change in other countries. Rather than going abroad in search of monsters to destroy, they prefer to cheer along democracy and liberalism from the sidelines. Most neoconservatives, on the other hand, are what Tucker terms "crusaders", more optimistic about the possibility of promoting change abroad and more willing to bear costs in the attempt. They think the United States should wield its power vigorously in support of its values as well as its interests.

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[1]The more sophisticated neoconservatives, such as Kagan, trace their heritage back to Theodore Roosevelt rather than to Wilson, and argue that the former espoused a "practical idealism, idealism without utopia, nationalist internationalism, armed liberalism." But paradoxes and oxymorons do not provide much guidance in day-to-day affairs, and even Kagan concedes that "the distinction between [the Wilsonian and Rooseveltian] brands of internationalism has often been lost on most observers of American foreign policy, and for understandable reasons." See Kagan, "History repeating itself: liberalism and foreign policy", *The New Criterion* (April 1999).

[2]Tucker, "Exemplar or Crusader? Reflections on America's Role", *The National Interest* (Fall 1985).

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American realists seek order and hope it will lead to justice; American neoconservatives seek justice and hope for order. Both values are respected by sensible figures in both camps, with debate emerging over emphasis and sequencing. In practice, therefore, what appears to be a clash between two starkly opposing belief systems turns out to be a more nuanced dispute over just how activist the country's foreign policy should be, and in which situations. The conflict between today's realists and neoconservatives is thus over means rather than ends, an expression of temperament rather than philosophy. Here the realists are the true conservatives, while the neoconservatives—like their liberal cousins—are often quite radical.

"CONSERVATISM and radicalism", Samuel Huntington has written, "derive from orientations toward the process of change rather than toward the purpose and direction of change." Instead of transcendental values and a clear vision of an ideal political outcome, they offer a perspective on the status quo and whether it should be rudely shaken up. In Michael Oakeshott's apt formulation, they are dispositions:

> To be conservative . . . is to prefer the familiar to the unknown, to prefer the tried to the untried, fact to mystery, the actual to the possible, the limited to the unbounded, the near to the distant, the sufficient to the superabundant, the convenient to the perfect, present laughter to utopian bliss.

Even those disposed toward bold adventures in private life, Oakeshott notes, might favor conservatism in politics, because "such people know the value of a rule which imposes orderliness without directing enterprise, a rule which concentrates duty so that room is left for delight." If this is true in domestic politics, American realists ask, how much more so is it in the international realm, where, in the absence of a polity, the stakes are higher, instability more dangerous, and social engineering more difficult? With Talleyrand, the realists counsel against too much zeal; with Alan Greenspan, they fear irrational exuberance.

Since conservatism involves a defense of the status quo, it should be most attractive to those under threat or with much to lose. The former was true of Americans during the Cold War, and the latter is true in its aftermath. It is precisely because the United States is the global hegemon, in other words, that a conservative approach to foreign policy is appropriate today. The country's fortunate situation is captured best by the statement of a frank British official earlier in the century:

> We are in the remarkable position of not wanting to quarrel with anybody because we have got most of the world already or the best parts of it, and we only want to keep what we have got and prevent others from taking it away from us.

Preserving such an inheritance so as to bequeath it undiminished to our posterity is not a timid goal but a noble and historically ambitious one.

What, then, might a conservative foreign policy look like? One aspect would be an appreciation of fine distinctions, and here neoconservative gusto may be a weakness rather than a strength. A recent *Weekly Standard* editorial on "Clinton's Feckless Foreign Policy", for example, argued that,

> it's hard to think of a time when America's international standing was so low, when Washington's credibility was in such disrepair, when an American president and his top advisers seemed so adrift in a sea of international troubles. Hard, but not impos-

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sible. From where we sit, the present moment looks a lot like the late 1970s. Obviously, there's no Soviet Union; but the post-Cold War world has its own set of risks, and our weakness is in certain ways as dangerous today as our weakness was in the late 1970s.

Perhaps their chairs simply face in a different direction, but realists can be forgiven if they consider the difference between mortal combat and global hegemony rather significant, and quite sufficient to make any such analogy patently absurd.

Another aspect of a conservative foreign policy would involve a sense of limits as well as opportunities, and here again the neoconservative approach offers reason to be concerned. Because it allows them to envision a world tomorrow that differs from the one today, the neoconservatives' notion that ideas can trump material "realities" is their greatest strength. But it is also their greatest weakness, since it contains no internal check against hubris, no commandment to worship prudence—"the god", as Burke noted, "of this lower world."

Thus an article in the *Weekly Standard* can demand that "our foreign policy must be ideological—must be designed to advance freedom", and conclude that "we must insist that friendly authoritarian regimes in the Middle East, Africa, and Asia share power with their own people." Yet it never pauses to consider whether we or the world would be better off exchanging, say, the unpleasant Saudi Arabian or Egyptian regimes for their still more unpleasant oppositions. Again, an editorial in the same magazine can rail against "endlessly trying to 'cope' with problems that are increasingly difficult to cope with—to 'manage' situations that become inherently less manageable", as if a sheer act of will by the United States could somehow make it otherwise.

The most common radical error, and the most dangerous, is the "must go" fallacy—the assumption that the problems of the world and the United States stem not from deep-rooted structural evils but from a few bad men who can be eliminated with relative ease. Such a diagnosis leads to a standard prescription, regularly captured in a *Weekly Standard* headline: "Saddam Must Go" (12/1/97), "Milosevic Must Go" (7/27/98), "Clinton Must Go" (8/31/98). Unfortunately, the declaration is rarely accompanied by a strategy worthy of the name for the operation in question, leaving the reader's passions aroused without hope of consummation.

TWO ITEMS on the current agenda, China and Iraq, offer a useful exploration of what a properly conservative approach to foreign policy might look like in practice. China's emergence as a Great Power is clearly one of the central features of the contemporary global scene. Whereas neoconservatives look on this development with alarm because China remains unfree and call for a strategy of containment, conservatives *per se* take a calmer view. They understand that fast-rising powers are like teenagers—simultaneously brash and insecure, reluctant to accept existing hierarchies and institutions, yet craving recognition and status on their own terms. Since rapid growth often produces social turmoil, and since East Asian politics are multipolar, underinstitutionalized and highly competitive, conservatives recognize that China's rise to power poses risks for all concerned. Yet they do not see conflict as inevitable, and argue that avoiding unnecessary confrontations is more sensible than spoiling for a fight.

One of the chief tasks of American policymakers over the next several years, in this view, will be to analyze the precise nature and extent of Chinese revisionism

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and determine what Chinese behavior would make accommodation no longer wise. After all, conservatives note, Wilhelmine, Weimar and Nazi Germany were all revisionist powers to some extent, yet obviously merited different responses. Rather than closely hem China in and risk provoking the very outcome we wish to avoid, a conservative foreign policy would try to socialize China into the international system by drawing clear red lines over a limited set of critical issues, such as military actions that threaten regional stability. Apart from that it would let Chinese politics take their natural, modernizing course, trying to stay out of the picture and avoiding taking offense at minor slights and outrages.

As for Iraq, when it invaded Kuwait in 1990, American officials realized that the national interest required direct intervention on a major scale, and so they organized an international coalition to defend Saudi Arabia and oust Saddam Hussein from his new conquests. Once these immediate goals had been achieved, however, there was little consensus about what to do next, with the result that at the end of the Gulf War, Saddam remained in power and the United States resigned itself to enforcing the ceasefire terms and policing the region. While presiding over the end of the Cold War, in other words, Bush administration officials began the cycle once again in miniature, embarking on a regional cold war with a much smaller yet similarly well-entrenched police state, hoping like their predecessors in the Truman years that they could deter and isolate the offending regime until it collapsed of its own weight. Yet nearly a decade later the situation remains unchanged, and frustration with Saddam's survival and provocations continues to grow.

One response, backed by most foreigners and some on the American Left, would scrap containment, rehabilitate Iraq, and count on Saddam to behave responsibly this time around. Another, backed by many on the American Right (the "must go" response), would also scrap containment but move in the other direction toward rollback, whether directly or by proxy. The first option is hardly conservative since it relies for success on unreasonable hopes that Saddam can be trusted. Yet given the high costs of toppling Saddam directly and the high odds against his overthrow by the Iraqi opposition, the second option may be equally imprudent. Here, as during the Cold War, the much-maligned middle path of containment is the obvious conservative choice, offering modest returns on a measured investment and above all doing no harm. Absent a clearly superior alternative, conservative policymakers understand, frustration is an insufficient reason for policy change.

Precisely how such containment should be executed is a tactical matter. A conservative approach to Iraq today would take its cue from the specific threat Saddam poses to specific interests. It would involve, as it were, the adroit and vigilant application of counterforce at a series of constantly shifting geographical and political points, corresponding to the shifts and maneuvers of Iraqi policy. Because the containment of Iraq gains depth and legitimacy through the involvement of other countries, paying a price to keep the UN Security Council on board makes sense—but only up to a point. On this and other issues, a conservative foreign policy would work with and through the UN where possible, but around it where necessary. That is, it would consider the UN and other international institutions neither as a solution to the problems of international politics nor as a whipping boy, but rather as one potential mechanism for institutionalizing and thus locking in a global order cut to American plans.

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AN AMERICAN foreign policy uninformed by moral values would indeed be reprehensible. But surely one must be skeptical about the feasibility of imposing our values on the world through force and bluster. True conservatives understand that domestic politics are not infinitely malleable, and that international politics are even less so. They do not believe progress to be impossible, only that the best route forward lies in moderation and prudence. They understand, in Burke's words, that "we are not disarmed by being disencumbered of our passions"; they concur in his judgment that "magnanimity in politics is not seldom the truest wisdom, and a great empire and little minds go ill together." Without a liberal compass, American foreign policy would be directionless and adrift; without a conservative hand on the tiller, it would be all sail and no anchor.

The challenge facing Republicans, should they capture the White House, will be to remain conservative and behave like mature adults. During youth, as Oakeshott remarked,

> Nothing has a fixed price, everything is a possibility, and we live happily on credit. There are no obligations to be observed; there are no accounts to be kept. . . . The world is a mirror in which we seek the reflection of our own desires.

In person, such an attitude can be fresh and even charming, but in politics it is a serious liability—and one American foreign policy can ill afford in the twenty-first century.

"To rein-in one's own beliefs and desires", on the other hand,

> to acknowledge the current shape of things, to feel the balance of things in one's hands, to tolerate what is abominable, to distinguish between crime and sin, to respect formality even when it appears to be leading to error, these are difficult achievements; and they are achievements not to be looked for in the young.

One can only hope that the Grand Old Party lives up to its name. □

Been There, Done That

Militarily, we seem to have gone full circle: from the days when the west beat the tripes out of poorer peoples because of its superior weapons, to the days when it beats the tripes out of them for the same reason. We have recently adjusted to the 'New World Order' war, which involves our troops killing their troops in large numbers, while sustaining scarcely any casualties themselves. Roberts draws attention to the battle of Omdurman in the Sudan in 1898, at which a British regiment opened fire on its opponents at 2,000 yards range with artillery and machine guns. By the end of the battle the toll was 10,000 Sudanese dead, 48 British and Egyptian. *Plus ça change.*

—Ben Pimlott, *Financial Times*, October 9, 1999

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The Folk Who Live on the Hill

James Kitfield

WHEN Theodore Roosevelt ushered in the American Century as the nation's youngest president in 1901, he promptly rallied the Republican Party behind his unique brand of foreign affairs activism. In short order, the former Rough Rider and hero of the Spanish-American War put down insurrection in the Philippines, abetted a revolution in Panama that led to U.S. acquisition of the Panama Canal, and won the Nobel Peace Price for mediating the quarrel between Russia and Japan. In 1907 he dispatched the Great White Fleet on a cruise around the world. An America in the "prime of our lusty youth", Roosevelt proclaimed, would "speak softly and carry a big stick" in world affairs.

At the end of the twentieth century, with American power and influence ascendant to a degree unimaginable in Teddy Roosevelt's time, emissaries from a far different Republican Party called a Capitol Hill press conference to allege presidential malfeasance. This time it was not campaign finance irregularities, personal indiscretions or technology transfers that were denounced by Senators Jeff Sessions (R-Ala.), Craig Thomas (R-Wyo.) and Larry E. Craig (R-Idaho). What irked the three Republicans was, rather, the discovery that the President of the United States had been spending too much money on trips to faraway places like China, Africa and Chile.

When queried about their own official travels, Thomas and Craig exhibited a disdain for the world beyond America's borders that is increasingly echoed in Republican ranks. Both boasted through staff that they had ventured out of the country only twice in the previous two years. This despite the fact that Thomas is chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs, and Craig is a member of the Senate Appropriations Committee with jurisdiction over foreign operations, foreign aid and defense.

The press conference was revealing, too, as political theater. That three Republican senators thought there were political points to be scored by criticizing the travel budget of the leader of the sole remaining superpower says much about the mood of the Republican Party today. Indeed, theirs was but the latest shrug in a string of gestures of indifference made by Republicans, who seem rapidly to be tiring of the burdens that attend America's status as lone superpower. After refusing to support U.S. involvement in the Kosovo conflict, which a number of prominent Republicans dubbed "Mr. Clinton's war", many in the GOP began

James Kitfield is national security correspondent for *National Journal*, and two-time recipient of the Gerald R. Ford Award for Distinguished Reporting on National Defense.

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espousing an anti-interventionist doctrine that would preclude U.S. military action save when a narrowly defined set of vital interests is threatened.

Proposed Republican cuts in next year's foreign affairs budget would abdicate U.S. commitments to the Middle East peace process, slash funding for the National Endowment for Democracy, and abandon a program to dismantle Russian nuclear weapons. Republican leaders have refused to pay back dues to the United Nations for so long that the United States is in danger of losing its vote in the General Assembly, where Republicans had left U.S. interests unrepresented for a year by holding up the nomination of UN Ambassador Richard Holbrooke.

Despite the fact that a Republican serves as secretary of defense, congressional indifference to national security matters extends to the Pentagon as well. Uniformed leaders who once counted congressional Republicans as their most reliable boosters were shaken by recent Republican-led efforts to kill the air force's next generation F-22 fighter plane; to pass a tax cut that would have reduced military spending by nearly $600 billion over the next decade; to shutter the army's School of the Americas; and to slash funding for the production of a theater-based missile defense system. Republican leaders have also continually blocked efforts by the Pentagon in recent years to close obsolete military bases and production lines in order to save desperately needed funds. And in a move that echoed one of the most infamous roll calls in history—the 1941 vote in which a majority of congressional Republicans refused to support military conscription—the Republican-led House recently voted 232 to 187 to stop requiring young Americans to register for the draft.

What accounts for this transformation of a party that not so long ago promoted itself as a champion of muscular internationalism? Explanations include the retirement of an aging cadre of internationalists within the party; the ascendance of a generation of Republican lawmakers with minimal interest in foreign and defense matters and an instinctive aversion to big government; an American public largely indifferent to the world around it; and, finally, a deeply held animus toward Bill Clinton. Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.), a candidate for the Republican presidential nomination and long-time Senate Armed Services Committee member, discerns an ominous current in Republican thinking. As McCain noted,

> Partly out of dislike and distrust of President Clinton, and an understandable feeling that his foreign policy has been conducted on an *ad hoc* basis, I am concerned by what I see as a growing isolationism in the Republican Party. . . . Fewer and fewer members of Congress today have any real interest in national security issues, and they don't appreciate that we live in a less dangerous but far less predictable world.

A Historical Pendulum

CONFRONTATIONS between the legislative and executive branches over the extent of America's international entanglements are of course as old as the Republic itself. When Congress threatened to withhold funding for the proposed around-the-world tour by U.S. naval forces in the early 1900s, for instance, Teddy Roosevelt reportedly promised to pay for half the trip out of executive funds, daring Congress not to appropriate monies to bring the fleet home. More recently, in the 1970s Congress withdrew the funding necessary to back U.S. military commitments to South Vietnam as U.S. forces exited the region.

Such partisan showdowns have on occasion reshaped the essential world-

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view of the political parties. When, for example, Senate Republican Henry Cabot Lodge took the lead in rejecting the League of Nations after World War I, as Professor Donald Kagan has observed, it was less because he was a committed isolationist than because "he was just so damn angry at Woodrow Wilson that he wanted to deny Wilson a victory. But that helped drive the Republican Party into a flight from American responsibilities around the world." The analogy is apt. Indeed, a year after Lodge's defeat of the League of Nations, Republican presidential candidate Warren G. Harding won the White House running on a rallying cry of "a return to normalcy."

By the 1930s "normalcy" for the Republican Party had evolved into a strident isolationism that culminated in GOP sponsorship of the Neutrality Acts of 1935. The creed's chief exponent was Senator Robert Taft (R-Ohio), son of Republican President William Howard Taft. Known as "Mr. Republican", Taft was himself a three-time candidate for the Republican presidential nomination, and his isolationism persisted well into the Cold War. But the 1952 election of war hero Dwight Eisenhower set the Republican Party back on the path of American leadership. Having organized the forces of NATO as its Supreme Allied Commander, Eisenhower ended the Korean War, adopted the Truman administration's policy of containment, committed the United States to an active role in the Middle East, and authorized numerous covert interventions.

After the trauma of Vietnam it was the Democrats' turn to flirt with isolationism, a phase neatly exemplified by presidential candidate George McGovern's 1972 summons to "Come Home America" (penned by current National Security Adviser Samuel Berger), and President Jimmy Carter's defense cutbacks and threats to pull U.S. troops out of South Korea. The modern zenith of Republican internationalism, meanwhile, came with President Reagan's massive defense build-up and aggressively anti-communist policies in the 1980s. Apart from strengthening U.S. forces in Europe and the Far East, deploying medium-range nuclear missiles to Europe, and nearly accomplishing the aim of a six hundred-ship navy, Reagan deployed peacekeepers to the Middle East, bombed Libya, supported anti-communist insurgencies in Central America and Afghanistan, and invaded Grenada.

The New Minimalists

THE RECENT furor surrounding Pat Buchanan's latest book, *A Republic, Not An Empire: Reclaiming America's Destiny*, is but one symptom of a new tug of war within the GOP. Arguing that the United States need not have been drawn into World War II, Buchanan was swiftly denounced by the major Republican presidential candidates. Buchanan's primary contention, however, is that "arrogant" elites have committed America to going to war in regions where the nation has no vital interests, while tying its fortunes to agencies of "an embryonic new world government."

Rep. Herbert H. Bateman (R-Va.), chairman of the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Military Readiness, has heard much the same argument from his colleagues in Congress:

> I'm very much aware of a body of opinion within the Republican Party which holds that America is trying to be the world's policeman, and too often we do undertake missions that are not really vital to U.S. national security. . . . At the same time, I've certainly never been an isolationist or 'Fortress America' type, and it's a major embarrassment that a meaningful number of Republicans can be identified as the 'Get out

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of the United Nations crowd.' It embarrasses me that those people even exist in the Republican Party.

But they do. Republicans were set philosophically adrift with the demise of the Soviet threat. The defeat just three years later of Republican standard-bearer George Bush by Democrat Bill Clinton, whose campaign mantra was "It's the economy, stupid", taught Republicans an important lesson: foreign policy activism no longer has a political constituency. That the GOP had taken this lesson to heart became evident with the Republican takeover of Congress in 1994. The "Contract with America"—Newt Gingrich's poll-tested battle plan for electoral success—barely mentions foreign policy or national security apart from a cursory plug for the national missile defense system popularized by Reagan. Even more important, the Republican revolution of 1994 signaled a generational transition within the Republican Party, shifting power from an aging cadre of cold warriors to a younger generation, which proved more committed than its predecessors to reducing the size and scope of the federal government. And these reformers soon discovered that no government agencies were larger and more costly than those that maintain America's superpower status.

Douglas Bandow, a senior fellow at the libertarian Cato Institute, believes that the Republican Class of '94 sympathizes with Cato's limited view of America's role in the world and its calls for reduced military expenditures:

> Because they didn't spend their political careers at a time when the Cold War was the reigning paradigm, and are willing to see that period as an anomaly in our history, a lot of the younger Republicans elected in 1994 are more skeptical of these massive government institutions and interventionist policies that went along with the Cold War. . . . A lot of older Republicans, however, still can't imagine a world where the United States is not totally predominant. They have a very hard time giving up that notion. I think those two groups represent a real cleavage in the Republican Party today.

Though an internationalist himself, then-House Speaker Gingrich may have furthered that divide by concentrating so much power in his own office, by-passing the committee seniority system, and elevating trusted allies to the chairmanships of key committees such as Appropriations, Commerce and the Judiciary. Gingrich further undermined the committee structure by limiting the terms of chairmen and affording the new class of Republican revolutionaries greater leeway to challenge their committee chairs on legislation. When Gingrich retired, this power promptly reverted to House leaders with a decidedly less internationalist bent, such as Majority Whip Tom DeLay (R-Tex.) and Majority Leader Richard Armey (R-Tex.). After being queried last year about his opposition to additional funding for the International Monetary Fund, Armey responded with the increasingly familiar Republican refrain: he had not traveled outside the United States since 1986, his freshman year in the House. "I've been to Europe once, I don't need to go again", Armey claimed, adding a similar comment about Asia. Soon after, it was revealed that a sizeable number of House Republicans had never held a passport.

Significantly, in the early days of the Republican revolution the seniority system was left intact in the House International Affairs and Armed Services Committees. In fact, the average age of the chairmen of the four primary committees with jurisdiction at that time over foreign affairs and national security was eighty. As opposed to years past when the heads of these committees were revered as lions within the party, the new chairmen—Sen. Jesse Helms (R-N.C.), Sen.

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Strom Thurmond (R-S.C.), Rep. Floyd Spence (R-S.C.) and Rep. Benjamin Gilman (R-N.Y.)—seemed neither predisposed nor sufficiently powerful to protect their committees from the efforts of the younger Republican revolutionaries.

As a former majority staffer on the House Armed Services Committee under Chairman Spence for much of the 1990s, Thomas Donnelly experienced that marginalization first-hand:

> When Newt Gingrich came in and pushed aside guys who were in line for seniority on various committees, he didn't bother with the foreign affairs or defense committees. Great American that Mr. Spence is, he worked tirelessly to try and increase defense spending and stop the decline of our military forces. But he was unable to carry the day. It just wasn't a high priority for the Republican leadership in Congress.

This divide between an aging cadre of internationalists and a younger generation of Republican lawmakers with little interest in foreign or defense affairs, but a natural skepticism toward big government, will surely become more pronounced as the former group recedes from the stage. Noted retirements from the internationalist wing of the party in recent years include Senators Mark Hatfield (R-Oreg.), Nancy Kassebaum (R-Kans.), William Cohen (R-Maine), Alan Simpson (R-Wyo.) and Robert Dole (R-Kans.). "I don't think there's any doubt that there's a serious identity crisis in the Republican Party right now, and it's probably been worsened by the departure of committed internationalist leaders like Bob Dole and Newt Gingrich", says Norman Ornstein, a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. The Cold War generation, he notes, "is being replaced by a new generation of political leaders that is just not deeply involved in foreign policy issues. They don't see American leadership in the world as particularly important."

Atlas Shrugs

BOTH THE SENATE and House voted this summer to cut the administration's budget for international affairs by nearly 14 percent, or more than $2 billion. These cuts come despite the fact that the United States devotes less than one-tenth as much of its GDP to foreign aid today than it did a generation ago, putting it last among industrialized nations in this category. Fundamental disagreements about the level of foreign affairs funding have been sharpest on the subject of paying arrears to the United Nations, to which the United States owes approximately $1.7 billion in back dues. Republicans in general, and Senate Foreign Relations Chairman Jesse Helms in particular, have traditionally cast a skeptical if not jaundiced eye toward the UN. But Helms and ranking committee Democrat Sen. Joseph Biden (Del.) fashioned a compromise bill two years ago that combined payment of U.S. funds with demands for stringent UN reform. And for two years running, the bill has been held up by anti-abortion language attached at the behest of Rep. Christopher H. Smith (R-N.J.). This is the kind of freelancing that would have been rapidly quashed in the days of Arthur Vandenburg. As it was, the stalemate lasted for most of Clinton's second term, before a tentative agreement was reached in November 1999.

Chairman Helms has also deftly used his power to block administration nominations, thwart arms control agreements, and reorganize the State Department. Yet, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee has not reported out a foreign aid authorization bill in nearly fifteen years. Former Chairman Richard Lugar (R-Ind.) notes that the committee today is a faint echo of its activist predecessors. As Lugar says,

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> In fairness Chairman Helms hasn't been feeling well, but the truth is the committee hardly meets anymore. . . . Back in those days I would travel around the world as chairman at the President's request, helping take care of crises in the Philippines or Guatemala, or being on hand for the transition to democracy in Latin America or South Africa. That just doesn't happen anymore.

Then, too, there is the waning Republican attachment to matters of national defense. Republican lawmakers become irate when their *bona fides* as champions of a strong military are called into question. To be sure, Republicans have twisted the administration's arm on behalf of a national missile defense system. But the ongoing efforts of budget hawks such as Chairman of the House Budget Committee John Kasich (R-Ohio)—who in 1995 joined with eighty like-minded Republicans in an attempt to kill the B-2 bomber program—beg the question nonetheless. Republican budget cutters have been aided in their efforts to slash military spending by the Defense Working Group, a group of libertarian-minded Republicans who advocate lasting reductions in Pentagon expenditures.

That Republicans would attempt to kill the F-22 aircraft and enact a major tax cut, especially at a time when the armed forces are desperately short of funds and the nation is running a budget surplus, struck many observers as an indication that Republican budget hawks have already triumphed in the struggle for the party's soul. Defense proponents were particularly alarmed by an analysis of the proposed Republican tax cut by the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, an independent policy research group in Washington, which suggested that not only would the Republican tax plan allocate $174 billion less for defense over the next decade than the administration's proposal, but unless highly unlikely cuts in domestic programs were secured, another $595 billion in defense cuts might be required.

In the words of Rep. Bateman,

> Because I think it was larger than it needed to be, I voted for the tax cut with a great deal of reluctance, and some degree of certainty that it was not the tax cut that would be ultimately approved. . . . If you look closely at the Republican conference, you'll also find Republicans from the Midwest who vote for every amendment to reduce the size of the defense budget, because they don't see a threat to justify it. . . . As for defense hawks—if that term even applies anymore—it is demonstrably the case that we are not as dominant or effective today as we were in the 1970s and 1980s.

The Hutchison Doctrine

DISAGREEMENTS among Republicans are nowhere more pronounced than over the question of when to use military force. These tensions boiled over recently in a bizarre showdown during the war in Kosovo, when the House voted to require congressional approval for the use of ground troops; deadlocked on a vote authorizing U.S. involvement in the air war despite the fact that it was already under way; and yet doubled the emergency funds that the Clinton administration had requested to conduct that war. "Give peace a chance"—in this instance the words of Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott (R-Miss.), not of some fringe pacifist group—became the Republican war cry.

Clearly exasperated by what they complain is a promiscuous use of military force by the Clinton administration, a number of Republican leaders have articulated an anti-interventionist policy that would preclude military entanglements in all cases except where vital U.S. interests

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are directly at stake. In their view, only a dramatic reduction of military deployments can avert a looming crisis in military preparedness.

Certainly there is ample evidence to suggest that America's military is nearing a critical phase as it enters the twenty-first century. In recent years the armed services have suffered chronic shortfalls in the areas of recruiting, military readiness, and equipment modernization and acquisition. At the same time, the rate of overseas deployments has increased more than 300 percent over the Cold War average. Lately, for example, the U.S. military has been entangled in stressful and draining conflicts in, among other places, Yugoslavia, Bosnia, Iraq, Haiti and Somalia. Despite this expanding catalogue of missions, the armed forces still have as their primary responsibility deterring, and if necessary fighting and winning, two major theater wars, a task that requires the maintenance of forward-deployed, combat-ready forces in Asia and the Middle East.

Sen. Kay Bailey Hutchison (R-Tex.), a member of the Armed Forces Committee, says,

> We are stretching our forces so thin today that we have a crisis in military readiness, retention and recruitment. . . . We've so dissipated our resources and energies by getting involved in regional conflicts and misguided peacekeeping operations that our allies and others could do as well as the United States, that we've threatened our core capability to accomplish those missions that only a superpower can do.

Hutchison has in fact been among the most vocal of the Republican proponents of a minimalist foreign policy. In some ways her efforts hearken back to a doctrine promulgated by Reagan-era Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger, who detailed six "tests" that should be passed before the United States placed its forces in harm's way. The country's vital interests must be imperiled, and the United States must be willing to commit sufficient forces to triumph quickly. Both the political and military objectives of the mission should be clearly defined and the military forces structured to achieve them. There must also be a reasonable likelihood that the American public will support an intervention, and, finally, U.S. forces will be committed to action only as a last resort.

The strategy advanced by Hutchison goes even further. Under her proposal, the United States would redefine its strategic role by providing itself and its allies protection under a missile defense umbrella, while maintaining air superiority and strategic lift capabilities. But the United States would leave the burden of pacifying regional conflicts and the vast majority of peacekeeping operations to its allies. Hence, in the Fiscal Year 2000 Defense Authorization, Hutchison inserted a provision calling on the administration to examine where the United States might reduce its global commitments and withdraw its forces from missions whose time has passed, including those in South Korea and Saudi Arabia.

Given the obvious strains on the military resulting from a frenetic pace of deployments and operations, such a hard-headed and realistic approach to military intervention is certainly defensible. It is nonetheless difficult to fathom exactly how America is to retain its superpower status if it eschews all regional crises and insists that its allies shoulder the risks on the ground. For nearly three years, the Clinton administration adopted such an arms-length policy while Bosnia burned, European allies vacillated, and the Balkans imploded. The calamitous results of this indifference are by now well known.

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MANY Republican internationalists claim that if one of their own were to win the White House in 2000, the non-interventionist wing of the party would be vanquished, *à la* Taft and the Old Guard. In this view, the Republicans would benefit from the unifying influence of a commander in chief in the White House, much as the election of Bill Clinton masked fissures between globalists and protectionists in the Democratic Party.

And, indeed, the leading Republican presidential candidates have all proclaimed fealty to a robust brand of internationalism. In officially announcing his candidacy in September, Sen. McCain devoted much of his speech to the importance of American leadership. If elected, McCain has promised to spend more on defense, military training and missile defense:

> I believe that President Clinton has failed his first responsibility to the nation by weakening our defenses, but he's not the only one to blame. Both parties in Congress have wasted scarce defense dollars on unneeded weapons systems and other pork projects while 12,000 enlisted personnel, proud young men and women, subsist on food stamps. That's a disgrace.

As for George W. Bush, despite his disdainful references to peacekeeping and nation-building operations, and his apparently tenuous grasp of world affairs, the Texas governor has assembled a brain trust that reads like a "Who's Who" of assertive internationalists. The team includes former Defense Secretary Richard Cheney, former Secretary of State George Schultz, former National Security Council analyst Condoleezza Rice, former Undersecretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz and former Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Perle. On issues ranging from relations with China and Russia to confronting rogue states, they depict a Bush foreign policy as one that will be more muscular and assertive than the Clinton-Gore approach in its promotion of American interests. As Rice was at pains to assure:

> I think Governor Bush is one of those people who believe that America pursues its national interests best by involvement in the international system, rather than letting that system buffet us around because we withdrew from it and left a huge, global vacuum. At the same time, I think he'll work very hard to establish a more coherent foreign policy driven by some central priorities, because despite our unmatched historical power, there's a sense of drift in American foreign policy right now.

Of course, two other possibilities exist. One is that, even if a Republican president were to be elected in 2000, he would soon find his foreign policy aims being undermined by an obstructionist Republican Congress. Representative Joe Scarborough (R-Fla.), who has lately been directing the crusade to close down the army's School of the Americas, explained: "Any Republican president who expects the House members and probably the newer members of the Senate to merrily go along and rubber-stamp" his national security policies "will be very disappointed." The second possibility is that a Democrat will win the presidency, in which case, after four more years of partisan positioning on foreign policy issues, the Republican Party may find itself drifting into unsettling but all too familiar waters. Just as Henry Cabot Lodge's fierce opposition to Woodrow Wilson begat Warren Harding's "return to normalcy", and opposition to Franklin Roosevelt yielded Robert Taft's anti-interventionism, so might strident Republican opposition to Bill Clinton's successor herald a new era of isolation. The party has been down that road before, with nearly disastrous results for the nation. □

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Kofi's Rule

Humanitarian Intervention and Neocolonialism

Edward Luttwak

KOFI ANNAN was once a solid bureaucrat who could count on the loyalty of a so-called "African Mafia" among UN officials. He systematically promoted the career interests of the many Africans who found refuge in well-paid UN jobs from the chaotic, often violent politics of their home countries, and did nothing to energize the rare investigations of theft and corruption in the UN's notoriously leaky emergency relief programs for Africa (in which non-African UN officials were also involved). Even the worst offenders, who sold off food supplies meant for starving refugees, suffered no greater punishment than early retirement—with generous pensions. In return, Kofi Annan could count on the full support and admiration of the UN's African officials; and as he rose in the organization's ranks, he did so with the backing of the representatives of almost all African states.

Personable, bright and energetic, since his elevation as secretary-general he has become increasingly popular the world over. In the future, Annan may find even more admirers, but African governments are unlikely to remain among them. For in his new guise, no longer the smooth bureaucrat but rather the world statesman, Kofi Annan has just promulgated a new rule for the conduct of international affairs, one which in the long run is incompatible with the continued independence of most African states.

Echoing Clinton's justification for bombing Serbia and a phrase made famous by his predecessor, George Bush, in opening the new session of the UN General Assembly Annan declared that the world would no longer allow the sovereignty of member states to shield them from the consequences of outrageous misconduct: "Massive violations of human rights will not stand." After Kosovo and East Timor, it was clear what this meant.

While deploring the failure of NATO to seek Security Council authorization before bombing Serbia-Montenegro, Kofi Annan clearly endorsed the violation of its sovereignty in the name of the political rights of Kosovo's Albanians. And, of course, the UN officially accepted the outcome of the war by establishing the protectorate that is now ruling Kosovo under a plenipotentiary UN official. True, the UN still recognizes Serbia-Montenegro's sovereignty over that territory, but then NATO did too, before, during and after its bombing campaign. That, however, is a very peculiar sovereignty to say the least, because it excludes both Belgrade's administration and the presence of any of

Edward Luttwak is senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. His latest book is *Turbo-Capitalism: Winners and Losers in the Global Economy* (HarperCollins, 1999).

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its troops from nominally Serbian territory. As for East Timor, yesterday it was still part of Indonesia; today it too has become a UN protectorate, pending the creation of an independent state and government.

Possible Candidates

WHAT WILL be the next Kosovo or East Timor? Or, rather, if both represented "massive violations of human rights"—Kofi Annan's announced standard for intervention—what other countries should now, by the same standard, be forced to surrender territories and populations to UN protectorates? There are some obvious candidates: Saddam Hussein's regime can no longer massacre Kurds, but is still oppressing the country's Shiite majority, and indeed Iraqis of all backgrounds, with habitual brutality. There is no doubt that the government of Slobodan Milosevic was harsh in Kosovo, as was the Indonesian army in East Timor, but if both warranted international intervention, why not the far worse plight of the Iraqis, who easily outnumber the combined populations of both?

Another obvious candidate is Afghanistan, where the Taliban, who control most of the country, are systematically depriving the female half of the population of its rights—not just the right to vote but even the right to go shopping. And then there is North Korea, where oppression is both constant and invisible, but where systematic government policy—notably the upkeep of vast armed forces and costly weapons projects—is starving the population. If it was so important to assure the political rights of Kosovo's Albanians, or the right of the East Timorese to an independent state, it should surely be even more urgent to assure the physical right of North Koreans to eat enough to survive.

And so it goes on, wherever the usual pattern of ordinary political repression is broken by outrageous government misconduct. Of course, if it is the sheer magnitude of human rights violations that counts, China should be put at the top of the list. Milosevic, try as he might, could only deprive some two million Albanians of their political rights, while the Indonesians had even fewer East Timorese to oppress. The Chinese government, by contrast, deprives two entire nationalities of their self-expression—the Tibetans and the Uighurs of Xinjiang (they alone are far more numerous than all the Albanians in Kosovo, Macedonia and Albania combined)—while denying freedom of religion both to millions of Catholics and to Falun Gong members, who again outnumber the entire population of most UN member states.

One can add to this list quite a few other candidates for intervention, because in the belt of non-democratic states that runs across North Africa and the Middle East from Morocco to Pakistan, the habitual denial of political rights is often compounded by even harsher human rights violations. In Saudi Arabia, which is one of the rare countries that has never conducted an election, not even a fake one, the denial of political rights is absolute, while citizens can still be imprisoned at the say so of any one of hundreds of princes. In Iran, by contrast, there are elections, if strictly limited to "approved" candidates. But its semi-democracy coexists with outbursts of murderous religious persecution. Presently, thirteen Jews accused of espionage in a provincial town, one of them an elderly rabbi and another a boy under sixteen, face the death penalty. On a much larger scale, there are still periodic manhunts for Bahais—who face the death penalty as *descendants* of converts from Islam—and in recent years, Assyrians, Armenians, even Zoroastrians have been cruelly persecuted.

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When Rules Collide

IT IS OBVIOUS, therefore, that the choice of Kosovo and East Timor was more than a little arbitrary. Yet it is pointless to denounce the inconsistency. That no one is preparing to bomb China, invade North Korea, advance to Baghdad, occupy Afghanistan, or impose democracy on Middle Eastern governments cannot be a decisive objection to Kofi Annan's new rule for the conduct of world affairs. If a principle is sound, it remains sound even if it cannot be applied immediately and everywhere.

The old rule, after all—*that every internationally recognized state is the absolute sovereign of its own territory and everything in it, people very much included*—left the world without any recourse in the face of the Khmer Rouge auto-genocide and assorted massacres both before and since, not to speak of routine political oppression by party or personal dictatorships. True, the old rule did allow the possibility of some sort of world order—if only by making the world safe for tyrants, who could do whatever they pleased to their own subjects so long as they did not violate the sovereignty of another state.

That, in effect, was the "New World Order" promoted by George Bush, which was universally embraced precisely because it was not new at all. His proposal that armed coalitions authorized by the UN Security Council should guarantee the sovereignty of all UN member states was in fact the strongest possible reassertion of the established order—with not a word said about human rights.

While the Russian, Chinese and even the French governments jealously resented the prominence of the United States in leading the 1991 Gulf War coalition, they could not seriously object to the principle involved. Their own interests, in any case, would be well safeguarded, because in the Bush version of collective security nothing could be done without a positive authorization by the UN Security Council, in which they maintain a veto. Moreover, the leaders of weak states around the world, both democratic and dictatorial, greatly welcomed the New World Order's guarantee of their sovereign power, and would hardly have welcomed Russian, Chinese or French opposition.

It was a quite different force that demolished George Bush's New World Order: public opinion, and its refusal to tolerate *visible* atrocities. Immediately after the Gulf War ended, a victorious Bush proclaimed that he had no intention of dismembering Iraq or imposing democracy on Kuwait. This was his attempt to inaugurate an era of "cold-blooded geopolitics." He would not intervene to help the Kurds once again suffering massacre: first, that would be a violation of Iraqi sovereignty; and second, Bush was waiting impatiently for the Iraqi general who would overthrow Saddam Hussein, and he wanted a strong Iraq for him to rule, with all its territory intact. He would not ask the Emir of Kuwait to allow elections—the war had been fought to restore Kuwait's sovereignty and Bush would not violate it by interfering with its governance.

As it turned out, this era of cold-blooded geopolitics lasted roughly two weeks. Confronted by the televised images of starving Kurds trekking across snowy mountains with their women and children to flee Iraqi reprisals, the American public demanded action. After resisting briefly, Bush gave in. The outcome was "Operation Provide Comfort", which carved out a Kurdish security zone from Iraq's territory. Thus already in 1991, long before the Clinton administration formally repudiated the New World Order to attack the sovereign state of Serbia-Montenegro, George Bush had himself abrogated its substance, violating Iraq's sovereignty for the sake of the Kurds. He had no choice: the U.S. electorate, along

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with what passes for world opinion, simply did not accept the traditional view that sovereignty always outranks human rights whenever the two collide.

That is why Kofi Annan need not be troubled by the practical obstacles that prevent any consistent application of his new rule. The selection of a Kosovo or an East Timor may be quite arbitrary, and to bomb Belgrade rather than North Korea's Pyongyang, or for that matter Beijing, may be unfair. But for all its shortcomings, the new rule—whereby human rights outrank sovereignty—must still prevail, because the old rule is simply dead. No democratic government can openly endorse it any longer.

The Problem of "Easy" Cases

KOFI ANNAN's real problem is not with the hard cases like China, but rather with the many places where his new rule could be applied all too easily: weak states in which "massive" human rights violations are a persistent reality—*and* which lack the nuclear weapons of China, or the large armed forces of North Korea and Iraq, or even the inaccessibility of vast, landlocked Afghanistan. Those candidates for armed UN interventions, followed by UN protectorates of indefinite duration, are mostly in sub-Saharan Africa as it happens, and they are not just a few countries either.

Sierra Leone, long ravaged by a bandit army of robbers, rapists and torturers, is an all too obvious example. Actually, its extreme atrocities—the mutilation of men, women and children, now condemned to live without hands or feet in the poorest of countries—misleadingly obscure a much broader reality. That the people of Sierra Leone deserve the security of a UN protectorate *sine die* even more than those of Kosovo or East Timor is perfectly evident. But even in states that are not ruled by cruel robber-dictators as Sierra Leone and Liberia are, or that are not ravaged by chaotic civil wars like the Congo ex-Zaire, the "massive" violations of human rights that Kofi Annan says "will not stand" are simply part of normal, unreported, unremarkable everyday life.

Naturally, this too is an evil legacy of Africa's colonial past. For the standard accusation—that European colonialists came to rob under the sign of the cross; that they smashed traditional societies, grabbed what they could, and then left abruptly for their own selfish reasons, dressed up in the self-serving verbiage of decolonization—is perfectly true, but only part of the truth.

For the greatest crime of colonialism came at the very end, when the Europeans left without taking their colonial armies, police forces and tax-collecting bureaucracies with them. Those synthetic tribes were left behind with weapons and civil powers that allowed them to oppress and exploit all the natural tribes; having grown hugely since independence, their oppression and exploitation has grown in proportion. Inherently parasitic, they consume such a large proportion of scant agricultural surpluses, of the fluctuating foreign exchange earnings of commodity exports (whose volume has declined overall), and of any and all foreign aid still fecklessly pressed into their hands, that mere crumbs remain for educational expenditures and for investments in infrastructures. In fact, not enough has been spent in most countries even to maintain the meager inheritance of colonial infrastructures.

In exchange for all they consume, the neocolonial ruling class of soldiers, policemen, tax collectors, administrators and politicians provides an habitual misgovernment of malfeasance, misfeasance and nonfeasance. All over sub-Saharan Africa, including countries with democratically elected rulers, the unavoidable encounters with the ubiquitous road-

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AP/Wide World

threatened with death at the point of a gun just to show off or merely to pass the time. Such scenes are common even in the largest cities, even where military rule has given way to elected governments.

All over sub-Saharan Africa, taxes, dues, export levies and monopoly imposts are ruthlessly extracted from malnourished and sickly populations to pay for the extravagance of rulers (even elected ones), of their sprawling, acquisitive families, of top officials and top cronies. Children must die for the lack of ten-cent vaccinations so that champagne may be imported by the plane load for presidential dinners, so that ministers and generals, and their wives, and mistresses, and brothers and cousins may travel in shiny new Mercedes cars. It was not the famous billionaire dictator-thief Mobutu Sese Seko who bought a long-range passenger jet for his young wife's shopping trips to London, but Zimbabwe's elected President Robert Mugabe—and he did so in the midst of the country's worst economic crisis since independence, when rescue talks with the

blocks operated by habitually drunken or drugged soldiers or policemen are occasions for routine extortion, as well as all too frequent beatings and even rape. In many regions of many countries, truck drivers and the tiny minority of non-official car drivers know that in addition to fuel money, roadblock money is also necessary to go from A to B, while in some countries younger women must simply reckon that a journey is likely to result in rape if a roadblock is encountered.

The outward trappings of soldiers and policemen—their uniforms and perhaps some drills—faithfully retain colonial models, but the very concept of military or police *service* for the state and its citizens is entirely alien. Soldiers and policemen treat their weapons not as tools of state power, entrusted to their care under rigid rules of use and pursuant to specific orders, but as personal entitlements to extract whatever they can from unarmed civilians. Often, with extreme poverty so common, all that they can obtain is the spectacle of humiliated, trembling victims,

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IMF were imminent. Nor was it some outrageous Idi Amin or Emperor Jean-Bédel Bokassa who spent more than a billion dollars to build the world's biggest church in his native village (its cupola dwarfs that of St. Peter's), but rather the learned Félix Houphouët-Boigny, the then much-respected president of one of Africa's soundest and most livable countries, the Ivory Coast. A political class that is on the whole neither conservative nor radical, but rather relentlessly kleptocratic, extracts and diverts more wealth from Africa than European colonialists ever did.

All over Africa, civil servants do not serve, government doctors provide no patient care, customs officers levy personal bribes rather than tariffs, inspectors do not inspect, judges sell their verdicts to the highest bidder, and state education officials and professors award degrees and diplomas for hard cash rather than term papers or exam results. No blood need be spilled—though it often is—but outrageous misgovernment is pervasive nonetheless, with the ultimate result that millions die needlessly each year from easily preventable diseases, and the vast majority of the productive population is kept in extreme poverty.

The human rights thus violated are much more elemental than political or national rights, and should enjoy a correspondingly higher priority. Only racism can explain, and nothing can justify, elevating the right of Kosovo's Albanians to their own government, or the right of the East Timorese to their own state, above the existential human rights of Kofi Annan's fellow Africans.

This, then, is the ultimate problem—not the obvious cases like Liberia, Sierra Leone and the Congo ex-Zaire, where only outside interventions could bring an end to years of atrocious suffering, but rather that the entire governance of so many sub-Saharan African states amounts to a "massive" violation of human rights. Multilateral interventions under the authority of the UN, Kofi Annan's own proposal, are plainly the only possible remedy.

There are of course some practical difficulties. First, no sub-Saharan interventions can be accomplished by today's favored "post-heroic" means, the remote bombardment of high-contrast targets with cruise missiles or with ordnance launched from a suitably safe remove. The Kosovo intervention was executed by NATO pilots who flew in greater safety than the passengers of some Third World airlines, but in sub-Saharan Africa the infantry will have to go in to disarm the war bands both of failed governments and of their opponents. No serious combat or significant numbers of casualties are to be expected, for local soldiers and rebels alike are only capable of terrorizing civilians, not fighting trained soldiers. But ground forces would still be needed, there would be some fighting, and cruise missiles or laser-guided bombs would not do the trick. For post-heroic armed forces, a reversion to actual combat, even on the smallest scale, might not be easy.

Second, UN interventions in sub-Saharan Africa to disarm all comers and establish law and order cannot be mere raids or visitations *à la* Somalia, where utter anarchy was followed by more of the same after the UN withdrawal. They must instead lead to the establishment of UN protectorates that can build infrastructures, provide education, and administer all the necessary functions of civil government. Of necessity the duration of these protectorates is more likely to be measured in decades rather than years. Thus, if Kofi Annan's call is heard, very few African states would retain their independence. And that is no small matter. □

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Moralpolitik: The Timor Test

Donald K. Emmerson

ON AUGUST 30, 1999, the United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) held a referendum on the territory's future. Voters were asked whether they wished their homeland to remain inside Indonesia. The government of President B.J. Habibie in Jakarta had tried to make continued integration more palatable locally by calling it "special autonomy"—a status elaborated in a fifty-nine article document that few East Timorese bothered to read.

They did bother to vote, however, despite widespread intimidation by Jakarta-backed militias. Out of a population of perhaps 850,000, more than 400,000 had registered to take part in the referendum, and of these, a stunning 98.6 percent went to the often considerable trouble of voting. Many walked miles from their homes to polling stations and back. Of the ballots cast, 78.5 percent—nearly four out of every five persons—rejected continued ties with Indonesia.

I was in East Timor to observe the balloting for the Carter Center. The night before the vote, my co-observer, Annette Clear, and I had camped on a bluff at the easternmost tip of the province. We had hoped to stay with a local notable in Los Palos, but two nights before, men with machetes had slashed him to death and torched his house. He had favored independence. From the evidence we saw or heard, he appeared to have been murdered by pro-integration militiamen, or by soldiers from the Indonesian army, or both, possibly at the behest of the Indonesian-appointed head of the district. At his funeral, his distraught younger sister voiced her misery in a stream of Portuguese (Lisbon ruled East Timor from the sixteenth century to the mid-1970s). Possibly mistaking me for a UNAMET official, she threw herself at my feet, as if I could relieve her grief.

Not just on this occasion, but repeatedly throughout my stay in East Timor, I was infuriated by feelings of powerlessness in the face of injustice. The night I arrived in East Timor, two close relatives of one of the Carter Center's East Timorese drivers were murdered. On the day after the vote, we visited a town, Quelicai, whose inhabitants had fled to the hills to escape the militias and their Indonesian backers. Later that same day, entering Dili from the east, we were forced to negotiate five roadblocks manned by militias looking for pro-independence Timorese. Our only recourse was to stop and make assuaging displays of our harmlessness and deference. We

Donald K. Emmerson is a senior fellow at Stanford University's Asia/Pacific Research Center, and editor of *Indonesia Beyond Suharto* (M.E. Sharpe, 1999).

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smiled, waved and politely requested permission to proceed—permission from thugs who for months had been killing and coercing those who favored independence.

While approaching the first of these roadblocks, my initial urge was to ask our driver to do a U-turn. A nephew of pro-independence leader Xanana Gusmao, his safety was at far greater risk than ours. But clearly he felt comfortable going ahead, so we did. My second and wilder impulse, at the roadblock itself, was to arrest these punk vigilantes and turn them over to the authorities. But the authorities—Indonesian soldiers and police—were already there, lounging with their weapons just yards away, obviously complicit in the activities of the roadblockers.

Following the announcement on September 4 that the plebiscite had overwhelmingly rejected integration with Indonesia, hell broke loose. Most of Dili, among other towns, was looted and destroyed by militias and soldiers alike. In the course of this rampage, hundreds of thousands of East Timorese were forced to flee their homes. More than a month later, the whereabouts of many of these refugees were still unknown. Our driver, we later learned, escaped to safety in Bali. Reports of massacres and discoveries of grave sites, however, made it clear that some would never return.

Humanitarianism With Teeth

I STRIKE this personal note to signal a larger argument: As long as outrages are committed, outrage will be felt. Democracy necessarily includes and preserves the chance to translate anger into policy—moral revulsion into humanitarian intervention. In polity after polity since the Cold War, democratization has enlarged and entrenched this opportunity.

To be sure, people who rationally estimate and compare the costs and benefits of humanitarian intervention may well conclude that it should not be tried, especially if clear-cut success has eluded such efforts in the past. Outright failures or compromised outcomes in Cambodia, Haiti, Somalia and Yugoslavia come readily to mind. Humanitarian war is also oxymoronic, in a sense exemplified by the notorious case of Ben Tre, the village in Vietnam that had to be "destroyed" in order to be "saved."

But people are also moral and emotional beings. A rational choice theorist who pictures the act of voting as risking a little in exchange for a low return would have learned a lot on referendum day in East Timor from the crowds who braved bodily harm to create a mandate that resulted in the veritable decolonization of their homeland. Nor does the greater insulation of most foreign policy elites from physical danger necessarily make them more dispassionate. One could argue that the presumption of safety actually encourages risk, including letting anger trigger action.

In this light, Charles Krauthammer's recent epitaph for military intervention on behalf of humanitarian ends appears, if not premature, impermanent.[1] Globalization's assault on barriers to communication has enlarged the scope for empathy, and with it the potential legitimacy of moralpolitik. Televised images of the corpses of American soldiers being dragged through Mogadishu's streets may supersede footage of malnourished and maltreated Somalis. But just as the Vietnam syndrome did not endure long enough to prevent that disastrous African intervention, so should one wonder whether, in Washington, the triumph of realpolitik can ever be more than temporary. I doubt that humanitarian war is, as

[1]Krauthammer, "The Short, Unhappy Life of Humanitarian War", *The National Interest* (Fall 1999).

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Krauthammer concludes, "an idea whose time has come, and gone." And even if he is right, its passing may be less a disappearance into oblivion than the swinging of a pendulum whose oscillation is far from complete.

Certainly, as a test case of the advisability of forceful intervention on humanitarian grounds—moralpolitik with teeth—East Timor's time has come, and will not soon go away. For several years, possibly longer, diplomats and analysts will be watching and judging the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) as it tries to accomplish a daunting set of tasks: rebuilding East Timor while funding, managing and tutoring its 850,000 people into a viable and democratic independence.

UNTAET personnel will comprise up to 8,950 soldiers, 1,640 police, 200 military observers and a large number of civilian officials, who will administer virtually all public services in the territory, and UNTAET's troops will be free to use force if necessary. The UN hopes to keep costs for the first year below a billion dollars, but the need to rebuild infrastructure could push the actual tab higher. Once the force is fully deployed, a third of all 29,000 blue helmets posted abroad could find themselves in East Timor.

The Security Council created UNTAET and authorized its mission on October 25. Britain's chief delegate, who had drafted the resolution and its sweeping terms, promptly announced "the dawn of a new era for both the United Nations and East Timor." He urged the mobilization of "the resources of the entire UN system" on behalf of UNTAET, in whose "every step" the East Timorese people "must be fully involved." Such phrases are well meant. But they also bind a global body to a tiny, faraway place and whatever happens there. So recently a killing ground, East Timor has now become a proving ground for the proposition that humanitarian intervention to rescue and build a new nation from the bottom up is a sound and feasible idea.

As a test case for moralpolitik, intervention in East Timor is distinctive in several respects. These include the territory's size and proximity to Indonesia; the basically non-American auspices of the rescue effort; and the key role of Western activists in shaping perceptions of East Timor and pressuring Western governments to intervene. A look at these aspects of the "Timor test" can help to clarify its implications for the future of humanitarian intervention.

East Timor is small, about the size of Connecticut. That could be good news for UNTAET. Other things being equal, one would expect external intervention to be more successful in a smaller place. Potentially, however, the territory's shape and location negate this advantage. East Timor consists of two noncontiguous parts: a main portion covering the eastern half of the island of Timor, and a much smaller enclave on the north coast of western, that is, properly Indonesian Timor. These two chunks of land are not only embedded in the southeastern flank of the world's fourth most populous country, Indonesia. Communications and transportation links between the two parts of East Timor, separated as they are by Indonesian soil, cannot be maintained without the tolerance of the Indonesian government.

It would be difficult to exaggerate the importance of Indonesia to East Timor, and therefore to UNTAET's success or failure. Without Indonesia, UNTAET would in fact not exist. Blue-helmeted peacekeepers are being inserted into East Timor to clean up a mess created in large measure by the insertion of Indonesian troops into the territory nearly a quarter century before. And without Jakarta's willingness to hold the referendum and involve the UN in the outcome, no second

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intervention would have occurred. Even at the height of the violence in East Timor in September, no foreign country seriously contemplated dispatching troops to the territory against Indonesia's will.

Malign Neglect

INDONESIAN relations with East Timor have been more or less catastrophic since the mid-1970s. In Lisbon in 1974-75, democratization gutted the Portuguese appetite for empire. But centuries of malign neglect by Portugal had left East Timor unprepared to manage its own future by democratic means. Inside the territory, diverse local forces quickly formed to contest the newly opened political space.

Abetted by Jakarta, one faction advocated joining Indonesia. Another wanted to associate the territory with Portugal. A third urged independence. In 1975 East Timor slid into a civil war. The independistas won. But rather than seek reconciliation, they declared the formation of a sovereign "democratic republic."

In 1975 the Cold War was on, and the thought that the Berlin Wall could fall to democracy was still a fantasy. Indochina had fallen to communism in April of that year. In this context, the situation in East Timor alarmed then-President Suharto and his anti-communist colleagues in the military. They had failed to entice the territory into Indonesia's embrace. They feared the use of a radical enclave by outsiders bent on disuniting the Indonesian archipelago. And they recognized that Washington would not intervene to rescue a leftist government from Jakarta's troops, not with the Cold War still under way and Americans still recovering from scenes of humiliation in Saigon at the hands of another "democratic republic."

So, on December 7, 1975, Indonesia invaded and occupied East Timor. In May of the following year, the Indonesian army convened a meeting of pro-integration East Timorese, who duly petitioned Suharto in Jakarta to let them join his republic. In July he obliged them by declaring East Timor the twenty-seventh province of Indonesia. In 1978 the largely appointed and politically compliant members of the People's Consultative Assembly in Jakarta unanimously ratified this annexation. By then, a cycle of repression and resistance that would last for nearly two and a half decades was well under way.

Later, Suharto's foreign minister, Ali Alatas, compared his country's discomfort over East Timor to feeling "grit in one's shoe."[2] Some grit. From 1975 to 1999 Indonesia's war destroyed the lives and livelihoods of an unknown but certainly very large number of East Timorese. Thousands of Indonesian soldiers and their Timorese recruits also died. Meanwhile, the brutality of Jakarta's intervention, coupled with the popularity of the Timorese struggle for self-determination, prompted activists in Australia, the United States and Western Europe to denounce Suharto's regime and demand the imposition of sanctions against it. A watershed—and more bloodshed—occurred in Dili in November 1991, when Indonesian troops fired into a crowd of demonstrators, killing more than a hundred. The presence of Western journalists and activists at the scene of this massacre assured its rapid dissemination, in pictures and text, around the globe.

So long as General Suharto and his authoritarian regime remained in place, a change in the status of East Timor was not to be. It was his civilian vice president and successor, B.J. Habibie, who upset the status quo. In May 1998, whipsawed

[2]Peter Carey, Introduction to *East Timor at the Crossroads: The Forging of a Nation*, ed. Peter Carey and G. Carter Bentley (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1995), p. 1.

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between financial collapse and spiraling unrest, the aging general resigned in favor of Habibie, who promptly announced a timetable for moving Indonesia toward democracy. That schedule turned out to include what Suharto had always withheld from the East Timorese: a fair chance to influence their own political future.

In January 1999, to the surprise and consternation of Indonesian military leaders in Jakarta and Dili, who were not consulted beforehand, Habibie proposed asking the East Timorese whether they wished to remain inside Indonesia. And if they wanted out, Habibie claimed, he would advise the People's Consultative Assembly to cancel its 1978 resolution and let them go. That Assembly was itself scheduled to be revamped along more democratic lines in the wake of another major innovation: competitive legislative elections, successfully conducted at polling stations throughout Indonesia on June 7.

By then, Indonesia, Portugal and the United Nations had agreed to implement Habibie's idea by holding a "popular consultation" in East Timor, whose results would be implemented with the cooperation of the UN. But Jakarta insisted on retaining sole responsibility for security in the run-up to the vote. That provision allowed the Indonesian army, in tandem with the pro-integration militias that it had sponsored and armed, to pursue a strategy of intimidation intended to win the vote for Jakarta, or at least to withhold a clear victory from the anti-Jakarta side.

The militias and their Indonesian sponsors apparently believed that if enough pro-independence Timorese could be frightened into voting for "autonomy", or into not voting at all, the outcome would favor Jakarta, or at least be inconclusive. The act of self-determination that took place on August 30 was thus doubly influenced by Indonesia. Had it not been for President Habibie, the referendum would not have occurred at all. And it likely would not have succeeded—the balloting was almost entirely free of disruption—had the Indonesian army and its militias not so grossly overestimated their capacity to intimidate.

In the end, though not without some kicking and screaming, Jakarta went along. In September, Habibie agreed to allow an Australian-led international force to enter East Timor and establish the security that Indonesia had promised and failed to provide. Asian contingents were included in this exercise, in deference to Indonesian sensitivity toward what some in Jakarta perceived as their nation's humiliation at the white hands of Canberra. Such feelings could be seen, for example, in Indonesia's decision to rip up its 1995 security agreement with Australia.

Aftermath

ON OCTOBER 20 in Jakarta, a newly and mainly democratically formed Assembly cancelled its 1978 approval of East Timor's absorption into Indonesia. In its new resolution, the Assembly also acknowledged the results of the August referendum. Possibly to avoid an embarrassing split in their ranks, the delegates did not actually vote on these questions. Instead, the Assembly chairman announced that agreement on the resolution had been reached, and no delegate contradicted him. A little-noticed provision of the resolution held that recognizing the vote against integration did not diminish the rights of the losing side—the large minority of East Timorese who had voted to remain loyal to Indonesia.

Indonesia has good reason not to upset the present balance in East Timor. Without the cooperation of Western governments and companies, and international financial institutions more or less under Western control, the Indonesian economy will not recover. Restoring

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Indonesia's economic health is one of the two highest priorities of its new president, familiarly known as Gus Dur. His other priority, however, is to preserve the territorial integrity of Indonesia now that East Timor has been lost.

It is likely that Indonesian officers and their counterparts in the militia destroyed East Timor's infrastructure in part to prompt the archipelago's other restive peoples to ask themselves: What price independence? And if this is so, it follows that the government of Gus Dur, too, may have an interest in the failure of East Timor as an independent country.

Meanwhile, Australia has the greatest stake in turning East Timor into a viable state. For it was Canberra, not Washington, that took the initiative to intervene. That impetus had many sources. But the most decisive of them was the extraordinary media-driven mobilization of Australian public opinion against Indonesian cruelty and in favor of East Timorese self-determination. Again the causal link between outrages and outrage in a democracy should be clear: As the violence and destruction mounted on their doorstep, the Australians had to act, even though their army numbers a mere twenty-four thousand. "No Australian government", in the judgment of two expert local observers, "could have survived if it stood by and did nothing."[3]

WHAT THIS MEANS for Krauthammer's epitaph for humanitarian intervention is this: "Compassion fatigue" and a growing aversion to stepping into potential quagmires in far-off places may well have made the Clinton administration less eager to enlist American power on behalf of humanitarian aims. A case in point has been the almost audible relief in Washington at Canberra's willingness to act out the conscience of the "international community" in East Timor.

At the same time, however, Australia's willingness to engage in moralpolitik suggests that humanitarian intervention does, after all, have a future. In a globalized world, moral indignation may be instantly ignited by media coverage of crimes that, in earlier times, might have remained obscure. Democratization has made governments more subject to pressure from activists not to stand idly by in the face of evil. Even if the international rescue of the East Timorese should fail or fall short, the temptation to engage in humanitarian intervention will not soon disappear. Rather, at different rates and in different countries, the pendulum between moralpolitik and realpolitik will continue to swing. □

[3]Paul Dibb and Peter Prince, *International Herald Tribune*, October 27, 1999.

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The (*Not So*) Great Game

Anatol Lieven

THE IMPORTANCE of the Caspian region to American foreign policy is grossly exaggerated. Until the demise of the Soviet Union, not even Antarctica was more remote from the American mind than were the lands around the Caspian Sea, and this for good reasons. Of all the new states in the area, only the Christian ones of Georgia and Armenia in the southern Caucasus had ever existed as nations before the conquest of the region by the Russian Empire in the nineteenth century. The Muslim areas were previously ruled by a variety of princes (including in some cases and for certain periods the Shah of Iran), and most of what are now Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan were inhabited by tribal confederations that acknowledged the rule of no state. "National identities" in the modern sense only took shape under Russian and Soviet rule.

With the Soviet collapse, the nine "union republics" of the region became internationally recognized independent states: Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Russia itself. At around the same time, several of the autonomous regions incorporated into these republics by Soviet fiat revolted and tried to assert their own independence: Karabakh from Azerbaijan, Abkhazia and Ossetia from Georgia, and Chechnya from Russia itself. Georgia also experienced a civil war between forces loyal to the nationalist president, Zviad Gamsakhurdia, and supporters of the former local communist boss, Eduard Shevardnadze. In Tajikistan, a bloody civil war between Islamist and tribal forces and the former communists was won by the latter, with strong support from Russia and Uzbekistan.

In the early 1990s, America's very limited interest in this region mostly expressed itself through support for the Christian Armenians in their conflict with Azerbaijan. There was also some concern about the threat of increased Iranian influence. In the mid-1990s, however, four factors combined to alter this picture: the prospect (vastly exaggerated) that the oil and gas reserves of the region would rival those of the Persian Gulf; the rapid deterioration in relations between the United States and Russia; the growing instability within Russia itself; and strengthened U.S. ties to Turkey. With a strong admixture of the personal interests of some State Department officials and academics, the result was an ambitious

Anatol Lieven is editor of *Strategic Comments* at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London. As a correspondent for the *Times* (London), he covered developments in the Caucasus and Central Asia between 1990 and 1996.

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strategy of attempting to "roll back" Russian influence in the region and to replace it with a new, more benign American hegemony. This strategy was always naive, and now appears thoroughly inappropriate. But as so often is the case, the policy itself continues to trundle along under its own momentum, and is likely to carry on doing so until the road ahead curves and the cart ends up in the ditch.

THE PAST importance of Central Asia came from only two sources, both now long vanished. The first was the fact that the region lay athwart the world's greatest trade route, between China, the Middle East and Europe. This state of affairs disappeared at the end of the fifteenth century, with the opening by Europeans of the sea route to Asia round Africa, and later via the Suez Canal. It will never return as a factor of global importance, given the capacity of modern shipping and the enormous distances, appalling roads and high insecurity of the land route. Economically, there has never been anything in Central Asia itself to make it a place deserving of the world's attention.

The second source of importance was Central Asia's capacity to produce repeated waves of warrior nomads, at a time when the mounted bowman was the most effective soldier in the world. This too ceased to be relevant more than four hundred years ago, with the rise of the musket and the cannon. In fact, the last time that developments in Central Asia were of truly great importance for the wider world was during the early sixteenth century, when Babur's hordes swept into India to found the Moghul Empire. In the twentieth century, Central Asia has at no stage played an important role in deciding the fate of the world.

Much copy has been written about the parallels between present geopolitical rivalry in Central Asia and Kipling's "Great Game" between Britain and Russia in the nineteenth century. But it is vital to remember that Britain was interested in the region not for reasons of world hegemony but only because it was ruler of India. Britain's concern was purely defensive, motivated not by a desire to conquer Central Asia but by the fear that Russia would employ the region as a base from which to attack India or to march through Persia to the Gulf and threaten British lines of communication. The same fear lay behind Britain's support for Turkey against Russia, which led to its participation in the Crimean War. No Russian attack on the subcontinent is currently in prospect.

Even in the nineteenth century, the rivalry between Britain and Russia in the region was a great deal less important than propagandists on both sides cracked it up to be. In 1907 all the outstanding issues of respective influence and control in the region were solved relatively easily in the negotiations leading up to the Anglo-Russian Convention of that year. For this, two developments were responsible: the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5 had revealed the Russian armed forces to be far less formidable than had been thought; and, much more important, the rise of Germany threatened the interests of both powers—not in some peripheral Asian desert, but where they really mattered: in Europe.

Seven years later, on October 28, 1914, Turkish and German warships dealt the death blow to more than eighty years of British anti-Russian strategy when they attacked the Russian Black Sea ports and heralded Turkey's entry into the First World War. Seven months after that, British, Indian and Australian troops were dying in their tens of thousands at Gallipoli as they struggled to smash their way through to Constantinople and serve Britain's vital interest of opening a supply route to the Russian armies fighting

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Germany on the Eastern Front. The consequences for humanity of their failure are almost too painful to contemplate.

An Inflated Importance

ALMOST a century later, the rhetoric of U.S. engagement in Central Asia has moved far ahead of America's interests in the region, and the resources it is willing to commit there. Present U.S. strategy in the region is not, as is frequently stated, "dual containment" of Iraq and Iran. It is quadruple containment, of these two states as well as Russia and now Afghanistan (and one might even consider adding Pakistan to that list). This is not diplomacy, it is strategy by autopilot, with the course set a generation ago. It also commits the cardinal sin of badly overstating the real power that the United States is willing to commit to achieve its aims in the region. Indeed, by providing Russia and Iran with a reason to undermine local U.S. allies who will not be supported in a crisis, American policy may in fact end up helping to destabilize the Caspian Basin.

While the U.S. approach to the former Soviet south has been accompanied by a lot of pseudo-historical nonsense about the area's putative geopolitical importance, the truth of the matter is that the United States has always assumed it would not have to pay or fight to secure its interests there. Instead, the boom in oil and gas production would be the engine of local growth, of independence from Russia, and of the extension of American and Turkish influence. Moreover, it was believed that if the United States could help secure their protection from Russian "meddling", the region's newly independent states would be freed to strengthen themselves through economic reform and democratization.

None of this has proved true. At barely 2 percent of the world's proven oil reserves (around a thirtieth of the Gulf's reserves), it should be blindingly obvious that Caspian energy does not constitute a "vital U.S. interest." Nor are there any signs that this picture will change radically in the future. Moreover, to the presently low price of oil must be added the immense costs of poor communications, state corruption and incompetence in the region, which raise the cost of extracting and exporting to more than three times the world average. Not surprisingly, such costs discourage investment by multinational oil companies. Oil, gas and other raw materials may be sufficient to stabilize Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, but they will not lead to prosperity and progress for the region as a whole.[1]

Indeed, as Neil MacFarlane has written, commenting on a statement by the special counselor to the Department of Commerce on Caspian Energy:

> Given the amounts of oil and gas at stake [in the Caspian region], and the current state of world energy markets, one must wonder whether statements of vital interest are overstated and are intended to serve as justifications for policies adopted with other objectives in mind (such as containment of Iran and weakening Russian influence).[2]

For more than a year now, several things have been clear to Western oil companies. First, the oil reserves so far established, and likely to be established, in the Caspian do not justify massive investment in a new main oil pipeline from

[1]See Amy Myers Jaffe and Robert A. Manning, "The Myth of the Caspian 'Great Game': The Real Geopolitics of Energy", *Survival* (Winter 1998-99); and Martha Brill Olcott, "The Caspian's False Promise", *Foreign Policy* (Summer 1998).

[2]MacFarlane, "Western Engagement in the Caucasus and Central Asia" (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1999), p. 20.

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Azerbaijan to the Turkish Mediterranean port of Ceyhan. In fact, for the foreseeable future, what Azeri oil there is can be accommodated easily enough by the existing pipeline to the Georgian port of Poti, and then shipped to various destinations around the Black Sea.

Second, the idea that Russia may be able to force the creation of a new main pipeline to the Russian port of Novorossiisk is simply ludicrous. Given price, quantity and the security situation in Chechnya and Dagestan, Western oil consortia are not going to invest in any such thing, and Russia certainly is not able to. Now that it controls northern Chechnya, Russia may be able to restore the existing, limited oil link to Novorossiisk, but that is all. Finally, so long as there remains a possibility that a U.S.-Iran détente will allow the construction of a much shorter and cheaper pipeline via Iran to the Gulf, the oil companies would be profoundly foolish to invest heavily in other routes.

Equally important, much of the discussion about Central Asia in the United States has centered on the threat of renewed Russian hegemony, whereas what the experience of Chechnya proves is that Russia, although often brutal, is a great deal weaker than was assumed in the early 1990s. Chechnya provides a searing example of the dangers of state collapse, anarchy and growing Islamist radicalism that currently beset the Caspian region. For if one aspect of the disasters that have befallen Chechnya has been the cynicism, incompetence and chauvinism of the Yeltsin regime, another has been the disappearance of the institutions and culture of a modern state in the territory. This fate may yet await other territories in the region, as its various post-Soviet regimes prove incapable of carrying out effective reforms and overcoming the enormous social, political and economic problems confronting them.

I say this with the deepest regret. During their last war, I came greatly to like and admire the Chechens (one reviewer accused me of being in love with them), and to sympathize with what they have had to endure. While the Russian campaign of terror bombing has its international—and, indeed, recent Western—precedents, that does not make it any the less deplorable. One can only hope that the Kremlin will not be led into another lunatic and morally criminal attempt to conquer the whole of that state. For this would likely lead to a scale of devastation and suffering exceeding even that of the war of 1994-96, which played such a disastrous role in fomenting banditry and extremism in the region.

Nevertheless, it must also be recognized that these tendencies were already present in Chechnya before 1994. They stemmed from economic collapse; from an anarchical social tradition; and, above all, from the fact that, while the Chechen national revolutions of 1991 destroyed the old Soviet structures, the Chechens have proved incapable of creating effective state institutions of their own.[3] Instead, as in Afghanistan after the fall of the communist regime there, the resulting vacuum has been filled by a rule representing a mixture of traditional social codes and warlords, against the backdrop of the growing power of radical Islamists supported by or even directed from the Middle East. Terrorism by these Islamist revolutionaries has already become a serious threat in Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, and in recent months has spread into Kyrgyzstan.

[3]For the collapse of Chechen state institutions under General Dudayev, see my *Chechnya: Tombstone of Russian Power* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), chaps. 1 and 2; and Carlotta Gall and Thomas de Waal, *Chechnya: A Small Victorious War* (London: Pan, 1997), chaps. 5, 6 and 7.

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It is, of course, not impossible that the recent bombings in Moscow were executed by forces close to the Yeltsin regime in an effort to create an excuse for the declaration of a state of emergency. This seems counterintuitive, however, given what we know of the background of the Saudi-born leader of the radical Islamist forces in Chechnya, Khattab, and the terrorist record of such groups elsewhere. If such people were willing to kill hundreds of innocent Africans (including Muslims) in attacks on U.S. embassies, why should they have hesitated to kill Russian civilians? All one can say with certainty is that if dark forces in Moscow were looking for "cover" for a terror campaign, the presence of Khattab and his men in Chechnya, and their incursion into Dagestan in August, gave all the "cover" anyone could possibly have desired.

Irrelevant and Dangerous

AS A NUMBER of states in the region increasingly confront the possibility of Chechen-style collapse, it is essential that the United States face the fact that it is neither strong enough, nor indeed interested enough, to contribute seriously to Central Asian stability. U.S. and Western assistance can be very useful where local leaders and conditions genuinely favor reform, as in Georgia; but in Central Asia, programs like NATO's Partnership for Peace are wildly irrelevant to the actual threats facing the region. They are also dangerous, for they provide regimes with the impression of a U.S. commitment that simply does not exist, while at the same time thoroughly alarming and irritating Russia.

Many advocates of stronger U.S. engagement in the region argue that the United States should in effect substitute an increased military commitment and even the deployment of U.S. forces for economic growth and political stability. Stephen Blank suggests that, "NATO, under U.S. leadership, will now move closer to becoming an international policeman and hegemon in the Transcaspian and define the limits of Russian participation in the region's oil boom."[4] If this were to happen, it would be a truly catastrophic error. But it almost certainly is *not* going to happen, given the profound opposition to any such move by the Europeans, the U.S. Congress and the Pentagon. What could well transpire, however, is that irresponsible statements by U.S. officials may persuade Russia, Iran and the Caspian states that such a military commitment is indeed forthcoming.

Then, too, Washington's turning a blind eye to Turkish human rights abuses, and its sponsorship of the expansion of Turkish influence in the region, have probably done more than anything else to convince Russians that American rhetoric about human rights is hypocritical, and that the United States is implacably hostile to Russian interests. If the United States possessed vital interests in the Caspian region, and were prepared to secure them with determination, there would then be a case for saying to hell with Russian opinion; in the absence of those conditions, many aspects of existing policy seem like unnecessary and even frivolous provocations. This applies most clearly to GUUAM, the U.S.-sponsored anti-Russian pact linking Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Moldova. Given the internal conditions of most of these states and their limited capacity to aid one another, the most appropriate comment on them seems to be a variant of the old gibe about the

[4]Blank, "Every Shark East of Suez: Great Power Interests, Policies and Tactics in the Transcaspian Energy Wars", *Central Asian Survey* (June 1999). The title is revealing—because, of course, there have been no wars to date over Caspian energy.

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Nonaligned Movement: "ten drowning men holding on to each other."

If the United States is to contribute to general stability in the region, that end will be achieved not through a policy of trying to "roll back" or "contain" Russian and Iranian influence, but rather by trying to engage these states in the pursuit of common interests. In this context, it is vital to understand that even before the massacres of Afghan Shiites by the Taliban last year brought Afghanistan and Iran to the brink of war, Tehran was strongly hostile to the growth of Sunni radicalism in the region. Portrayals of Iran as standing behind the radical Islamists in the former Soviet Union are in fact desperately wide of the mark—especially as Iran now regards Russia as a quasi-ally against Turkey, Azerbaijan and the United States, and would certainly not wish to witness Russian power in the Caucasus being undermined by the Islamists. Further, the fact that Iran is by definition a Shiite state, whereas (outside Azerbaijan) the vast majority of Central Asians are Sunnis, places very strict limits on the potential for Iranian dominance. As for Iran-backed Shiite terrorism, except in the limited and very special case of Hizballah in Lebanon, it ceased several years ago.

If U.S. policymakers could free themselves from the admittedly bitter legacy of past relations with Iran, they would recognize that the rise of radical Sunni terrorism creates a shared vital interest with Tehran, one that will endure irrespective of whether its government is a relatively liberal one or a theocracy. Indeed, for historical and religious reasons dating back more than 1,300 years, hostility to the Taliban and their like is even stronger among the conservative Shiite leadership and its supporters than among Iran's liberals. During last year's Iranian-Afghan crisis, for example, the force that pressed hardest for military action against the Taliban was not the Iranian Army but the conservative Revolutionary Guard.

Not Our Sonuvabitches

U.S. POLICY toward the Caspian states reflects two widespread failings. The first is that it continually looks to "democracy" as a panacea for the region's ills. The second is that it ignores the effects of America's policies on the behavior of these states. This may be morally convenient, but it leads to repeated missed opportunities to influence them in a moderate and conservative direction. The issue of future U.S. strategies in this region therefore raises some fundamental questions concerning both the conduct and the philosophy of U.S. foreign policy in general; above all, to what degree the United States is or should be a "satisfied" and conservative power, and to what degree an "unsatisfied" one, pursuing a revolutionary program of political and economic change, and an aggressive expansion of American influence at the expense of other powers.

Now in many parts of the world, including Central Europe, Latin America and East Asia (and perhaps Georgia, Armenia and to a lesser extent Azerbaijan), a program of promoting democracy and free markets makes perfect sense. But in much of the Caspian region, as in much of Africa, the claim that American policy rests on the development of "stable, free-market democracies" rings hollow, and is in fact an illusion. For the expansion of U.S. geopolitical influence in Central Asia is based on thoroughly rotten foundations: an opportunistic set of dictatorships that are at once weak, brutal, unstable and economically retrograde. The whole point of a client state is that it should be stable. Otherwise, the patron state, far from benefiting, risks being drawn further and further into a quagmire in order to rescue its clients from

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internal revolt—as with the Soviets in Afghanistan during the late 1970s or, for that matter, with the British there in the early 1840s. There is also a moral aspect: faced with threats in Central America, where its interests truly are vital, the United States must play the "our sonuvabitch" game. To do so where its influence is slight, its interests peripheral, and its potential proxies extremely unpleasant is, however, immoral and irresponsible.

This applies with particular force to proposals that Uzbekistan be the key U.S. ally in the region and its regional "anchor."[5] It is true that without Uzbekistan as a base, the task of expanding U.S. influence in Central Asia would prove exceedingly difficult—but that truth just serves to highlight the foolishness of such a strategy. For Uzbekistan under its current president, Islam Karimov, suffers from just about every conceivable disqualification for such a role. The regime's brutal repression of its domestic opposition makes it an embarrassment, and any U.S. commitment to Karimov will be heavily, and rightly, criticized by U.S. human rights groups. In fact, Karimov's ruthless suppression even of moderate Islamist groups has been a significant factor in their radicalization.[6]

Despite, or perhaps due to, Karimov's iron rule, Uzbekistan is increasingly unstable. Its economy is in shambles; it is reeling from the effects of a population boom and an acute employment crisis among its male youth; it is disliked and feared by its neighbors; and it is mired in a set of regional conflicts and territorial claims in which the United States has no interest whatsoever. Backing Karimov would repeat every one of America's mistakes *vis-à-vis* the Shah's regime in Iran in the 1960s and 1970s, and, worse, would do so for no discernible purpose.

As in Uzbekistan, the failure of most Caspian regimes to develop stable, new, post-communist structures derives from their highly personalized, and in most cases extremely autocratic, structures of governance. What will happen when the present generation of leaders passes from the scene—which in the case of the ailing leaders of Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan may be soon—remains uncertain. In the absence of any clear mechanism of succession—whether democratic or oligarchic—many of these leaders intend to establish their sons as designated successors. But it is far from clear that other players in these regimes will accept the notion of hereditary dynasty; and, equally important, most of the designated sons are extremely unimpressive characters. Under Soviet rule, they lived the lives of playboy children of the Soviet elite, and subsequent exposure to Western millionaire lifestyles has led them to embrace decadent consumption on a scale not seen since the Indian Maharajas under British colonial rule. With or without U.S. support, these rotten vessels will not stay afloat for long once their fathers die.

At present, though, power in the region is still wielded by the old Communist Party bosses and their personal and patronage networks. It goes without saying that they have been unable to check their countries' declines. Martha Olcott emphasizes

> the drastic decline in the ability of the Caspian governments to maintain even minimal levels of public services and social welfare protection, not to mention the kinds of benefits that the pre-independence population enjoyed.

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[5]See S. Frederick Starr, "Making Eurasia Stable", *Foreign Affairs* (January/February 1996); and Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives* (New York: Basic Books, 1997).

[6]See Stephen Winterstein, "The Market for Central Asian Legitimacy", *Orbis* (Summer 1999).

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It is the nature of the post-Soviet regimes and the Soviet legacy, then, not Russian or Iranian pressure, that is crippling growth in the region.

In these circumstances, the rise of radical Islamism, especially in the old Muslim centers of the overpopulated and ecologically ravaged Ferghana Valley of Uzbekistan, is not hard to explain. Neither, for that matter, is the rise of organized crime and narcotics production and smuggling. Hence, when the present generation of leaders begins to pass from the scene, the result is likely to be not "democratization" but revolution and anarchy. Turkmenistan, for example, where an extravagant personal dictatorship and "cult of personality" around President Saparmurat Niyazov presides over a largely tribal, pre-modern society with no local state tradition, has more parallels with Somalia under Siad Barre than it does with Russia to its north.

Russia's Weakening Presence

IT SHOULD BE clear from all this that the greatest threat to stability in the Caspian region comes not from Russia or Iran, but from within the individual countries. While Russian policy has certainly contributed to the internal problems of Georgia and Azerbaijan (and obviously Chechnya), in Central Asia the picture is altogether different. In Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, Russian influence has for several years been quite limited. Insofar as close ties have endured, it is only because those countries share a common interest with Russia in combating mutual threats, most notably that posed by Sunni radicalism.

In Kyrgyzstan, too, strong ties with Russia are not the result of a forced hegemony but arise from that state's extreme weakness and fear of its Uzbek and Chinese neighbors. The Kyrgyz fear the prospect of overlordship by these nearby states far more than they do the fading power of Moscow. There is in fact almost no chance that Moscow will ever possess the will or even the desire to impose hegemony over most of Central Asia, let alone the new "empire" with which so many Western commentators have sought to terrify us.

In the Caucasus, Russian interests remain far greater, if only because of the greater proximity of Russia's own territory. The threats from ethnic and Islamist revolt (in the Russian northern Caucasus) and from expanded U.S. and Turkish influence (in the southern Caucasus) are keenly felt by Russian policymakers. Even in the Caucasus, however, Russia's power now rests more on local allies than on its own crumbling strength. Thus, Armenia has by far the best armed forces in the region but welcomes the presence of Russian troops (only about 6,000 of them by the last estimates) as security against any future Turkish intervention on the side of Azerbaijan. To judge by opinion polls and a recent visit of my own, this presence is supported by an overwhelming majority of the Armenian population. Nor is this at all surprising, given the past history of Turkish-Armenian relations, and the historical failure of Western powers to aid the Armenians.

The very unwelcome Russian presence in Georgia, by contrast, stems from the Russian desire for influence over that state—or at least from a wish to prevent the United States and Turkey from establishing bases there—but it is also dictated by the Russian commitment to Armenia, which requires a military position in Georgia to ensure Russian lines of communication. A Russian withdrawal from Georgia can therefore only take place in the context of a general settlement in the region, and one in which both Armenians and Russians are assured that their interests will be protected, and that retreat will not be followed by Turkish advance.

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Russian forces in Georgia have certainly played a destabilizing role (though they also played a key part in ousting the crazy Gamsakhurdia and bringing Shevardnadze to power in the winter of 1991-92, and keeping him there in the autumn of 1993). Yet, the Russian stake there is more ambiguous than has often been recognized. For if the Russian commitment to Armenia requires a presence in Georgia, it also gives Russia a certain interest in Georgian stability.

As several Armenian officials pointed out to me, if a new civil war were to break out in Georgia involving the disruption of Armenia's only trade route to Russia and the West, this would automatically reduce Armenia to the appalling economic circumstances of 1992-94, from which it has only partially extricated itself with difficulty and suffering. Thus, the nature of the plot behind the recent assassination of the prime minister of Armenia and his colleagues is not yet clear and may never be; but an obvious factor was the extent to which government, security services and politics have become mixed up with organized crime in the country. As in Chechnya—though not yet nearly to the same degree—this development risks destroying the entire fabric of the state. It must also be noted that a large proportion of the "Russian" soldiers stationed in Javakhetia, the Armenian-populated area of Georgia, are actually local Armenians. It is therefore an open question which is better for Georgia, a Russian presence or a Russian withdrawal leaving behind a heavily armed local militia.

Another indication of just how complicated is the balance of interests in the region is the fact that the Abkhaz war, in which Russian forces supplied the Abkhaz, proved a disaster for Russia. The *de facto* separation of Abkhazia meant that Russia no longer had a means of putting pressure on Georgia from within. Even more important, the severing of what had been one of the main communications routes to the southern Caucasus from Russia contributed greatly to the decline of Russian economic influence.

Indeed, Russian influence throughout the former Soviet south now depends mainly not on enforced hegemony, nor on the increasingly meaningless "Commonwealth of Independent States", but on a set of bilateral relations in which most of its partners are engaged for their own very good reasons. In the northern Caucasus, for example, Russian rule is increasingly based not on military power or administrative control mechanisms, but on the support of various local peoples (notably the Ossetes, most of the Dagestanis, and above all the local ethnic Russians themselves) who fear their local ethnic and religious adversaries far more than they do Moscow.

RUSSIANS LIKE to convince themselves that the decline of their influence in the southern Caucasus and Central Asia is above all the result of American and Turkish strategies, and certainly U.S. rhetoric has furthered that impression. In fact, this is only partially true. I spent long periods in the southern Caucasus between 1990 and 1993, and, like many of my colleagues, my feeling at the time was that the new states had made such a mess of their independence and mutual relations (with some help from Moscow) that the creation of a new Pax Russica, a regional security order under Russian supervision, would be the inevitable result.

Russia, of course, failed to establish such a stable order, and for reasons having little to do with American influence. As for Turkish influence, it suffered a severe setback with the collapse of the anti-communist regime in Azerbaijan in 1993. Since then, Ankara has pursued a much more cautious policy based on a series of important lessons. Although the Turkic

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states of the region certainly welcome links with Turkey, they have no desire for a new big brother to replace Moscow. The Turks have come to acknowledge both the extreme difficulty of profitable investment in these states, and their own lack of funds for such investment.

If, nonetheless, Russian hegemony has also crumbled, one obvious reason for this was that Russia was simply not strong enough to assert such a hegemony. It possessed neither sufficient economic weight nor military force to compel states in the region to submit to its will, at least when alternative patrons became available. This has proved equally true in Central Asia. In Chechnya, the Russian withdrawal in 1996 resulted not just from Chechen military victory, but from a belief that a new leader, General Maskhadov, would reach an accommodation with Russia. For this, however, the Russians would have had to subsidize him very heavily—a course that was precluded not just by chaotic conditions in Chechnya and short-sightedness in the Kremlin, but by the poverty, corruption and weakness of the Russian state itself.

Equally important was the discovery by the Russians that they could not satisfy the competing demands of their different client regimes. They could not, for example, restore Abkhazia to Georgia while retaining Abkhaz support; they could not help Azerbaijan regain sovereignty over Karabakh while keeping the support of the Armenians. In the northern Caucasus, they could not satisfy the demands of both Ingush and Ossetes (nor, more recently, Karachai and Cherkess) for the same piece of land.

False Assumptions

RUSSIAN weakness notwithstanding, the United States has neither the reason, the power, nor the will to replace a largely vanished Russian hegemony in the Caspian region with a hegemony of its own. This argument, of course, runs flatly counter to the assumptions on which U.S. policy in the region has been based for the past three years. These assumptions are false in just about every particular. Some are indeed so historically and even geographically illiterate that it is difficult not to see their proponents as blinded either by a truly pathological degree of russophobia, or by personal ambition.

As to the first of these, a feeling exists both among some would-be Republican foreign policy leaders and among the more russophobe present policymakers that a much more ambitious U.S. policy in the Caspian region has been thwarted by the malign influence of "russophiles" led by Strobe Talbott. In small part, perhaps; but the real reason is that if you go to a senior Pentagon official, or the great majority of congressmen, and suggest the deployment of U.S. troops to the Caspian region—to bases or as peacekeepers, let alone in conflict—they look at you as if you had sprouted a very large pair of hairy ears.

Even if for a while U.S. rhetoric over a "forward policy" in the Caspian region intensifies under a future administration, this severe restriction will continue to apply, for it reflects two fundamental realities: that as soon as you compare the Caspian to Europe, East Asia, Central America or the Middle East, its "vital importance" is immediately revealed as nonsense; and that the great majority of U.S. educated opinion, let alone of the general public, is overwhelmingly indifferent to developments there. A small but telling example of this appeared at the time of the attempted assassination of President Karimov of Uzbekistan in February 1999, allegedly by Islamist extremists. His death would have caused a political earthquake in the region—but the attempt was barely noticed by the U.S. media.

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In fact, the only sizeable portion of the American public that has a significant emotional stake in the Caspian region is the Armenian-American community—and they, like the government in Yerevan, are increasingly alarmed by the present trend of U.S. policy. An exponent of a forward U.S. policy in the region once told me that the United States ought to "twist the Armenians' arms till they break" in order to get them to submit to U.S. priorities. Not, I think, if you are a congressman from southern California. The existence of the Armenian-American lobby (and its Greek and other allies) means that in any future war over Karabakh, the United States would not be able simply to back Turkey against Russia. It would in fact find itself on both sides at once. In recent months, intensified U.S. mediation has led to hopes that an agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan might be imminent; but at the time of writing, the assassinations in Yerevan have thrown this into doubt again.

There is also the matter of personal ambition. For as a U.S. diplomat told me recently, in the past few years the Caspian region has been seen as "seriously sexy" in terms of Foreign Service careers, less because of the presumed economic future of the region than because of the romance of the new "Great Game", and the feeling of being a pioneer on a new frontier of diplomacy and geopolitics. I felt the same way myself as a young freelance journalist back in the early 1990s. Nonetheless, it is perhaps now time for older and cooler heads to take an objective look at the region.

The lessons for U.S. policymakers when it comes to Central Asia are twofold: the first is that, to adapt Palmerston's well-known dictum, "the United States has neither permanent friends nor permanent enemies. The United States has only permanent interests." The second is to be clear as to the exact nature of those interests. There are in fact only two that are vital in this region. The first is that the Caspian states should not provide safe havens for terrorists. The second is that the region should not become the source of major conflict, above all between a militarily superior Turkey and a nuclear-armed Russia.

The chief U.S. priority in the area should therefore be the engagement of Russia and Iran, particularly in an attempt to reach a settlement of the Karabakh conflict. Although this war is not in immediate danger of resuming, Turkish arms supplies to Azerbaijan, and Russian ones to Armenia, are deeply worrying. Realizing this, the next U.S. administration should seek greatly intensified dialogues with both Russia and Iran—irrespective of what precise regimes are in power in these countries—in order to serve U.S. interests in a settlement of the Karabakh conflict, in the prevention of Islamist terrorism, and in the stability and development of the region. Where America's truly vital interests are concerned, like any other state it has a duty to be ruthlessly egotistical. But where lesser and more complex interests are at stake, collective security and enlightened self-interest should be the order of the day. □

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Affluence and Influence

The Conceptual Basis of Europe's New Politics

Peter van Ham and Przemyslaw Grudzinski

THE EUROPEAN Union may, with profit, be regarded as a qualitatively new type of security organization, one that seeks to create cooperation and harmony through a high level of economic and political interdependence. Whereas NATO remains at heart a military organization, the EU defines its security concerns in terms of an ever widening "sphere of affluence", rather than a classical "sphere of influence." This distinction is more than just a play on words: it underscores the importance of economics and trade as the current basis for stability and democratic development. Although EU member states pursue what they still imagine to be their "national interests", already those interests are essentially reduced to rather modest policy preferences, constrained within a tightly bounded multilateral framework. A myriad of treaty commitments now limits the room for maneuver of European states and locks them into dense networks of activities created by institutional and political decisions. It is these sunken costs of European integration that preclude "sovereign" member states from tearing up the Union's founding treaties, packing their bags, and returning to a policy of national autarky.

The EU has transformed once proud and sovereign nation-states beyond recognition, changing their role and place both in Europe itself and in the world at large. A wide range of traditionally national prerogatives is now either pooled collectively or shifted to the supranational (or federal) level. Whereas the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia inaugurated a European system of autonomous states, the 1991 Maastricht Treaty has *de facto* ended any hopes of saving that system.

Despite this, most analysts and policymakers continue to think about the EU, not as a radically novel entity, but as one that merely mirrors the qualities and drawbacks of the traditional nation-state. The simple fact that we continue to classify certain actors as something-national (*sub*national, *supra*national, *trans*national) indicates that our thinking remains based on and bound by the hegemony of the "nation-state" that has characterized recent centuries. But just as employing hammer and nail to fix one's personal computer would be counterproductive, so bringing "modern" concepts to bear on postmodern European politics will prove similarly futile.

Peter van Ham is professor of political science at the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies (Garmisch-Partenkirchen).

Przemyslaw Grudzinski is deputy foreign minister of Poland. The authors published jointly *A Critical Approach to European Security* (Pinter Publishers, 1999). The opinions expressed are those of the authors.

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Very early in the new millennium, a new Europe will come fully into being. It will have three defining elements, already clearly visible. The first and most essential of these involves a changed attitude toward national sovereignty and territoriality. The second is a novel understanding of security, which is rapidly shifting from the traditional military concept to a much broader one. The third innovation concerns the way the Western part of the continent (which up to now has constituted the "new Europe") is adopting an open, decentered approach toward enlarging its sphere of affluence into Central and Eastern Europe. Taken together, these three changes are destined to transform not only Europe itself but the international system as a whole. The consequences, not least for America's involvement in Europe and NATO, will be momentous.

Malleable Sovereignty

THE WESTPHALIAN state-centric framework that is now being undermined by globalization and European integration relies on a territorial conception of politics. But the commandment of Romans 13:1—"let every person be subject to the governing authorities, for there is no authority except from God, and those authorities that exist have been instituted by God"—has been corrupted since Nietzsche declared God dead. Intellectual inertia in coming to terms with this systemic change has produced a somewhat schizophrenic state of affairs, one in which Europeans continue to worship the nation-state as the optimal cultural and democratic area at a time when most West European states are in the process of selling the remains of their national sovereignty to the highest bidder. European nation-states cling desperately to as much political authority, democratic legitimacy and problem-solving capacity as they possibly can, while they also seem prepared (and are occasionally coerced) to relinquish their sovereignty as the price for remaining geopolitically relevant.

The EU is seen as the only available raft, not so much to ride the waves of globalization as to break up these waves into more manageable and human proportions. The hope is that the EU, by merging the power and influence of individual member states, can restore the primacy of politics over global commerce. Monetary union and the euro are considered the paramount instruments to this end. Europeanization is thus perceived essentially as a protective strategy, one devised to guard Europe against the onslaught of forces that threaten its uniqueness, its identity and the independence of its constituent states—and which involves surrendering some of that identity and independence precisely in order to prevent their total destruction.

Philip Cerny's concept of the "competition state" best captures the EU's novel role in European politics.[1] Cerny argues that the state constitutes the main agency of the process of globalization, driven by its concern both to fit into that process and at the same time to remain relevant to "its" people. More precisely, the central challenge to the EU member states is to maintain at least rudimentary domestic welfare systems while promoting the essential structural reforms necessary to improve their international competitiveness. It is not easy to maintain a balance between these two ends. In the not-so-long run, maintaining the first depends on success in achieving the second, for an increasingly expensive welfare state requires maintaining a thriving, competitive economy.

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[1]Cerny, "Paradoxes of the Competition State: The Dynamics of Political Globalization", *Government and Opposition* (Spring 1997).

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But there is a dilemma: for as Europe's competition states are inevitably driven to give the latter goal priority, they are undermining the traditional national bonds of communal solidarity (*Gemeinschaft*) and identity that have given the modern nation-state its deeper legitimacy, its institutionalized power and social embeddedness. The European competition state now values efficiency over equity, competitiveness over solidarity; increasingly its language is the universal discourse of commerce, which proceeds in terms of consumers, not citizens. Europe's states are turning consumption and purchasing power into the defining essence of what was until recently a polity and a community, thereby annihilating the very ideas of communality and a "public" that are central to societal relationships. Globalization does not merely scratch the surface of a democratic society, it corrodes the skeletal frame of political life.

These transformations do not call for an *end* to politics, but they do turn many traditional state-based political institutions into semi-obedient servants, catering to the tastes of the economic and financial performers of late-capitalism. Cerny therefore argues that the competition state has to do both *more* and *less*: it has to "reinvent government" by fostering (or even imposing) adaptation to global competitive forces; and in return it has to provide at least temporary protection and legitimacy for its citizens. It has become apparent that globalization requires a tighter monetary policy alongside a looser fiscal policy through tax cuts. It also demands that competition states encourage mergers and industrial restructuring; promote research and development; encourage private investment and develop new forms of infrastructure; pursue a more active labor market policy; and in general deregulate—while simultaneously imposing new regulatory structures designed to facilitate global market forces.

These shifts in responsibilities of the nation-state are mirrored by similar shifts in the EU itself. It has now acquired a character similar to that of the many competition states of which it is comprised, becoming in effect a supra-competition state. The crisis faced by its constituent nation-states has required the EU to become a kind of international economic and political *ninja*, entering into combat on behalf of its member states against emerging trading blocs around the globe and sheltering them from global turbulence. Within the World Trade Organization, for example, the EU negotiates on behalf of all member states, trying to get the best deals for Europe as a whole. Similarly, the euro has proved to be Europe's strategic answer to the process of economic and technological globalization, based on the understanding that only a consolidated Europe will be strong enough to weather the many global economic and financial viruses that have for so long infected West European economies.

The crumbling of national sovereignty is not always clear and obvious. European law more often than not cross-dresses as national law, disguising its supranational origins and often deceiving citizens by presenting itself as home-made. Thus, for example, while in 1998 more than 60 percent of German legislation had its origin in Brussels as so-called "directives", it had to be transposed into national law, with a certain flexibility allowed for local circumstances but with a specific deadline imposed. Clearly, these shifting forms of sovereignty pose new challenges to the notion of democracy. Maintaining individual communication with and any degree of control over government was difficult enough in the nation-state. How can democratic citizens now enter into any sort of relationship with "the EU" to discuss the merits of its

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policies? And how can they hope to "throw the rascals out" when they are seriously displeased? These are simple questions that, from a democratic perspective, have a rather embarrassing answer: it is just not possible.

Then, too, the notion of "territory" seems to have lost its almost fetishistic fascination within West European countries. In this part of the world, after two disastrous wars and the loss of several empires, the impulse for territorial conquest has waned, as knowledge and information replace material resources as the main sources of wealth. This has led Richard Rosecrance to suggest that we are now entering a world of the "virtual state", one that has deliberately limited its territorially-based production capability and has almost "emancipated" itself from the land.[2] Since transnational firms locate their production facilities wherever it is most profitable, the competition state has to negotiate with foreign and domestic firms and labor organizations to entice them into its economic space. In this new era of "virtual states", territory and size no longer determine economic potential and "power." Within contemporary Western Europe, sovereignty and territoriality have lost much of their historical charm and political relevance.

Pop Security and Lite Powers

A QUESTION ARISES: Can such a Europe ever live up to its self-proclaimed aim of developing a Common Foreign and Security Policy, let alone a Common Defense Policy? This seems rather unlikely, and a strong argument can be made that contemporary Europe is incompatible with Great Power politics. Barry Buzan, for one, has argued that the European citizens of today do not put much trust in their governments and are no longer prepared to die for their countries. Individualism and a consumer ethic have transformed West European citizens into lethargic free-riders, looking mostly in vain to an illusory "international community" (a.k.a. the United States of America) to put out the many political and military bush fires that continue to flare up around the world.[3]

Post-Cold War conflicts are often murky affairs that lack an ideologically sanctioned division between the forces of good and evil. At the same time, emphasis on ethical and moral issues of a humanitarian kind, as well as the obligation to comply with international law, complicate efforts to conduct a resolute foreign and security policy. As well, the interconnectedness of the world makes it difficult for individual states and societies to sustain myths of national superiority and uniqueness. It has therefore become more difficult to engage cosmopolitan, postmodern society in military conflicts. In a relativistic world in which a public consensus rarely exists regarding the West's right and responsibility to impose its will on other peoples, domestic concerns are increasingly taking preference over international issues.

Although West European states still very much *look* like classical modern states, they are qualitatively different, most obviously because they emphasize wealth and welfare rather than warfare. In this new environment, traditional concerns like borders, national identity and state sovereignty are subordinated to the pursuit of prosperity, democratic governance and individual well-being. It is the EU, rather than other international orga-

[2]Rosecrance, "The Obsolescence of Territory", *New Perspectives Quarterly* (Winter 1995); and "The Rise of the Virtual State", *Foreign Affairs* (July/August 1996).

[3]Buzan, "The Rise of 'Lite' Powers: A Strategy for the Postmodern State", *World Policy Journal* (Fall 1996).

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nizations like NATO or the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, that is now shaping people's existence and making a difference, affecting the prosaic concerns of European citizens (whether they like it or not) by dealing with everything from food labeling to pension entitlements to maternity leave regulations. In the field of heroic politics, on the other hand, and especially in its efforts to develop a more cohesive European foreign and security policy, the EU has so far hardly been able to make a fist and is unlikely to do so in the future.

Instead, Europe closely follows the strategy of building a democratic peace based on open markets and liberal democracy, the two major requisites laid down for Central European countries to join the EU. In its most profane form, Europe therefore follows the Big Mac thesis of international politics, which claims—wrongly, as the Kosovo conflict proved—that "no two countries that both have a McDonald's have ever fought a war against each other." This understanding—or misunderstanding—of global affairs is characteristic of a world in which "politics", as a deliberate, willful endeavor to shape events, hardly matters. It is a view that has surrendered a voluntaristic approach toward politics to a doctrine based on the positive, if unwilled, effects of free trade through globalization and new technologies.

WHEREAS Western Europe now concentrates most of its political energy on institution-building and monetary integration, other parts of the continent are witnessing the devolution of state authority to units of marginal power and size, often connected with atavistic ethnic strife and conflict. With the end of the East-West divide, Central European countries have gone through a phase of nationalist celebration, rediscovering their original identity after decades of communist domination.

Public opinion in these new—and in some instances still rather delicate—states clings to the old, attractive abstractions of national sovereignty and independence. At the same time, Central European political elites have committed themselves to joining Europe's key institutions (NATO, EU and WEU), realizing all too well that this implies compromise and the sharing of their recently reclaimed and highly valued national sovereignty. The institutionalized schizophrenia that results—a condition that combines the rhetoric of newly salvaged independence with acceptance of the harsh conditions of globalization—is confusing to the general Central European public, even if the two concepts are in themselves perfectly intelligible. The dissolution of Yugoslavia and the Bosnian war have served as grim reminders that claims to sovereignty and self-determination are still very much alive on the continent, even as most of its nation-states are gradually surrendering their autonomy both upward and downward.

All this serves to demonstrate that the frequently used metaphor of a "developing European security architecture" is misleading. The image conveys a sense both of progression and of a logical structure that is far-removed from reality. At best Europe's security "architecture", with its overlapping memberships and responsibilities, seems to follow the organic art nouveau style of a Gaudi rather than the straight and functional lines of a Corbusier. Anyone looking for a "grand design" for European security will be disappointed: there just isn't such a thing.

A more modest and appropriate metaphor, as suggested by the British historian Sir Michael Howard, might be that of a garden. Howard maintains that the

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> peoples of Europe and their institutions should be regarded as distinct and living organisms, rooted in the peculiar soil of their regions, their communities and their cultures. . . . And as with all gardens, the work of cultivation is never ending.[4]

Thinking along these lines has the considerable advantage that it enables European security to be seen as an ongoing process of cultivation, and not (as with architecture) as something that can be given a final shape, cut in stone, and never altered. But then again, it might be doubted that many politicians will have the patience required for tending even the simplest of gardens.

No Center, No Periphery

THE well-intentioned desire to see military force eliminated as a means of settling international disputes has proved to be realistic only for a part of Europe, not for the continent as a whole. The rhetoric of Europe as a "zone of peace", in which democratic countries would thrive and prosper, has been useful in defining a political objective. But this rhetoric flourished at a time of bloody conflict in the former Yugoslavia, military clashes in Moldova, and civil wars in Georgia and Chechnya. In all those instances, the "international community" declined to adopt policies and take action to end the conflicts, only reluctantly intervening in the case of Yugoslavia after a long delay.

The security constellation in much of Central Europe and the former Soviet Union is markedly different from that in Western Europe. This does not mean that we have to think in terms of two disconnected *worlds* of security; if the post-Cold War era has taught us anything, it is that the fates of the different parts of Europe are intertwined. What is true is that Europe still has many different "security neighborhoods." As is the case in most cities of the world, in which conspicuously rich and safe neighborhoods can coexist with dreadfully poor and dangerous ones, so it is with Europe.

Most strategic analysts—from both East and West—continue to think in terms of "borders", "boundaries" and "dividing lines" as central elements of European security. And indeed, when thinking about security and its prospects one should recognize that the diversity of Europe's nation-states places natural limits to the logic of enlargement and the process of continent-wide institutionalization. Thus, to take the most striking and important example, while Russia may be a European state according to geography and some definitions, in most respects it is not a full-fledged part of the continent's frameworks of cooperation, not an integral part of "Europe."

There is no reason, however, to exaggerate this diversity. While national borders still remain meaningful, they are fading in significance, becoming more like administrative boundaries than classic fire walls. Certainly, from now on it will be well-nigh impossible to re-create one decisive dividing line between two competing blocs, as happened during the Cold War. Instead, and as we have already begun to witness, what will characterize the future will be a variety of different borders, boundaries and perimeters, most of them ephemeral and porous.

It makes sense, then, to look at the Europe of today and of tomorrow as a continent full of delicate-looking walls, elegant hedges and fences of varying heights. These run along economic, political, cultural, religious and many other lines. They exist, and will continue to exist, to protect Europe's local *patriae*, its local languages, its prejudices and mores,

[4]Howard, "Land of War, Land of Peace", *The Wilson Quarterly* (Winter 1997), p. 36.

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and its distinctiveness. They serve to make Europeans feel *gemütlich* and safe. They stand within and between the rich and the poor regions of Europe. This idea of a multitude of small differences and fences allows Europeans to minimize the significance of any cultural "velvet curtain" that might exist between East and West, to realize that being on the other side of any boundary need not result in total exclusion or confrontation.

Indeed, the political goal should be not only to dismantle impenetrable walls, but to maintain the many elegant fences that make Europe manageable. The EU's emphasis on "flexibility", on making its institutions more effective in an effort to prepare for enlargement, illustrates an awareness of this need. Just as it is an error to think in terms of one dividing line running across Europe, or to insist on redefining Europe's identity in one exclusive way, so it is also wrong to insist that every aspect of the process of European institutionalization should be all-inclusive, necessarily embracing all applicant countries regardless of their readiness and willingness to become fully involved. On the contrary, Europe's institutions will function best when they reflect the continent's diversity, and an awareness that not all European countries need to belong to the same set of cooperative arrangements and alliances.

If things are handled properly, what will emerge over the coming decades is a Europe not of concentric circles, in which some countries are at the center and some at the periphery, but a security framework that consists of a pattern of overlapping Olympic circles, in which all countries are involved in one way or another. Like the five circles of the Olympic flag, there will be no single center but three or four—and no single periphery either. Most countries will find themselves on the margins of some activity or some arrangement, either from choice or necessity, and near the center of others. An awareness of the wisdom of such an arrangement was evident in the remarks of NATO's then Secretary-General Javier Solana in February 1998:

> I would like to erase from our consciousness the words 'dividing lines.' These are words from the Cold War. They meant that some countries were 'in' and some were 'out.' Today, none are in or out—some are only partly in and partly out.[5]

For many (if not all) European countries, NATO and the EU will remain the core of Europe's developing security framework, but the flexible and *ad hoc* arrangements that will become increasingly more prevalent will gradually blur the practical distinctions between full membership and other qualified relationships. The borders between countries in the new Europe will not be static and permanent, but will be subject to modification to reflect changing circumstances. When Central European countries adopt and truly internalize Europe's culture of cooperation and reach a certain level of economic and political development, the institutional boundaries of Europe will alter, and this will be a continuing process. So long as Europe's key security institutions overlap with a genuine European identity, this model for a future Europe will be one of the best guarantees of its stability and prosperity. But it will be a basic and prosaic Europe, one that lacks *der Wille zur Macht* and that will therefore continue to lean on the United States for heroic support, both in Europe itself and further afield. □

[5]Quoted in *Washington Times*, February 10, 1998.

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Paradise Lost

The Ordeal of Kashmir

Alexander Rose

IN KASHMIR, this year's "annual spring exercises"—as the more worldly local commentators like to joke—escalated into the most severe and sustained bout of fighting since 1971, when India and Pakistan clashed for the third time since Partition. In the Kargil Mountains, at an altitude of 17,000 feet, where the air is so thin the trajectory of artillery shells cannot be predicted and helicopter rotors have difficulty generating lift, Pakistani-backed "freedom fighters", mostly imported from Afghanistan, battled with Indian troops. After eight weeks of fighting, many hundreds of deaths, and international alarm over a possible nuclear exchange, the ceasefire line remains basically where it had been before the fighting began, and Kashmir stays partitioned.

Divided between three nuclear-armed powers—India, Pakistan and China—Kashmir remains one of the great unsolved, perhaps insoluble, questions in world politics. In this Himalayan Kosovo, Kashmir's owners cannot give an inch for fear of setting off a chain reaction of ethno-religious turmoil within their own countries and the surrounding region. Indeed, all but the unfortunate Kashmiris (and even they are divided between Muslims, Hindus and Buddhists) may emerge better off if Kashmir is sacrificed on the altar of regional stability. This predicament may be unfair, but it lends a semblance of order and balance to South Asia.

How did tiny, paradisiacal Kashmir end up in this terrible position? History and geography go a long way toward providing an answer. Indeed, for centuries before the current dispute began in 1947, geography alone practically foreordained that Kashmir would become a pivotal space on the earth's surface.

In 1320, after twenty-one dynasties of ruling Hindus, Zoroastrians, Buddhists and Jains, and five centuries after Hamim the Syrian brought Islam to Kashmir, the first Muslim sultan of Kashmir ascended the throne, and over the next few generations most of the population converted to their lords' religion. The Muslim sultans were replaced in 1586 by the Moghul Emperors, who were in turn supplanted by the Afghans in 1753. Then in 1819 the martial Sikh Empire of Lahore—the creation of the one-eyed Maharajah Ranjit Singh—turned Kashmir into a tributary.

One of those who marched in the Sikh army was an illiterate twenty-seven year-old Hindu chieftain, Gulab Singh, described by a contemporary as

> a fine tall portly man. . . . To all appearance the gentlest of the gentle, and the most sincere and truthful character in the world . . . but he is the cleverest hypocrite in existence,

Alexander Rose is an editorial writer and columnist on foreign affairs at the *National Post* (Canada).

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

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as sharp and acute as possible, devoured by avarice and ambition and when roused horribly cruel.

He had already distinguished himself in battle, and as reward in 1820 or thereabouts the Maharajah conferred upon him the small, hilly principality of Jammu.

By 1840 the freshly minted Raja had brought most of the surrounding principalities and kingdoms under his sway. Gulab Singh's expanding empire brought him into contact with the British, who were equally intent upon expanding theirs. In December 1845 a Sikh army crossed the Sutlej and, after fighting four battles in fifty-four days, was finally defeated by the British and their Indian sepoys. As a prize for remaining neutral during the Anglo-Sikh war, the East India Company allowed Gulab Singh, now raised to Maharajah, to purchase the Sunni Muslim-populated Vale of Kashmir for a knockdown price—on condition that he "and the heirs male of his body" acknowledge "the supremacy of the British Government." It was laid down in the 1846 Treaty of Amritsar that Gulab Singh's annual rent to the governor-general, Sir Henry Hardinge, was to be a horse, twelve perfect goats and three pairs of cashmere shawls.

Hardinge was no fool: there was now a powerful, pro-British ruler with a proven army sitting on the Sikhs' flank. At the time, the fact that the ruler was a Hindu and most of the people he ruled were Muslim did not seem particularly important. After Gulab's death in 1857, his son extended Jammu and Kashmir's border northward into Gilgit. Maharajah Ranbir Singh was, in many ways, a typical Victorian, in that he built schools and funded public works. But unfortunately his tax reforms failed miserably, and corruption set in among the ruling Hindu bureaucratic class. Within four years of Ranbir's death in 1885, Kashmir was bankrupt.

Nevertheless, Ranbir's son, Pratab Singh, held a trump card that ensured continued British support for the Singh dynasty: Kashmir's strategically unique position as the guardian of the ancient invasion routes into British India at a time when the Great Game—the struggle for supremacy in Central Asia between the jostling Russian and British Empires—was in full swing.

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IN 1925 the childless Pratab was succeeded by his nephew, Hari Singh, whose time in England had not been wholly unremarkable (he was blackmailed over his love life). During Hari's reign two Kashmiri men came to prominence in India: the first was a Hindu, Jawaharlal Nehru, who issued a call for *Purna Swaraj* (Indian independence from Britain) at the 1929 Indian National Congress; the second, Sir Mohammad Iqbal, was a Muslim intellectual who in 1930 declared the millions of Muslims throughout the subcontinent a distinct political, cultural and religious entity. Iqbal's goal of creating a separate, post-Raj Muslim state was excitedly pursued in Kashmir, where Hindu rule was becoming more onerous. By the summer of 1931, Muslim agitation against the Maharajah was rife. Even when the Maharajah offered concessions, such as a state constitution, it was too late to stop the ethno-religious contagion spreading throughout India.

Liberated by the Maharajah's concessions, a Kashmiri Muslim Conference was formed. In the winter of 1933, a pamphlet, *Now or Never*, was distributed advocating the creation of "Pakistan" (an acronym supposedly formed from the first letters of Punjab, Afghania, Kashmir, Sind and the "tan" from Baluchistan) as a Muslim homeland hived off from Hindu-dominated India. Then in 1940 Muhammad Ali Jinnah and the Muslim League unanimously resolved that, after the war,

> no constitutional plan would be acceptable [unless] geographically contiguous units are demarcated into regions [where] the areas in which the Muslims are numerically in the majority . . . should be grouped to constitute Independent States.

Nehru and other leaders of the Indian National Congress, the party founded in 1885 to promote independence, had other ideas. They were determined to unite a country that had in fact never been conceived by its British overlords as a *bona fide* country. Particularly galling to them were comments by such luminaries as Sir John Strachey, a veteran Imperial administrator, who in the 1880s had counseled:

> this is the first and most essential thing to learn about India—that there is not and never was an India, or even any country of India, possessing, according to European ideas, any sort of unity, political, physical, social or religious: no Indian nation, no 'people of India', of which we hear so much.

At bottom, however, Nehru was a thoroughly Anglicized Brahmin (educated at Harrow and Cambridge, he even served time in His Majesty's prisons), and he found the British way of administration crucial to his conception of building a centralized and unified state, clothed, as he said, in the "garb of modernity." Taken with the West's traditions of democracy and socialism, Nehru was less enamored with Europe's cultural homogeneity. Imposing one cultural tradition—inevitably Hindu—on an India of, as Congress literature now trumpets, "920 million people, 4200 communities, 1652 dialects, 26 states, 18 official languages [and] nine major religions" in the hope of creating a single form of Indian-ness would invite dissolution. So, to evolve a shared Indian national identity, Nehru strove to balance a democratic framework, overwhelmingly loaded in the Hindus' favor in terms of votes, with religious, ethnic, linguistic and cultural equality for all. In a kind of preview of contemporary multiculturalism, moreover, minorities were encouraged to buy in to the Indian dream with legal exemptions, economic breaks, recognition of linguistic boundaries and assorted other benefits (for instance, Section 370 of the Indian constitution limits the power of the federal par-

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liament to make laws for Kashmir). In the Nehruite conception, India's Muslims would be protected from Hindu domination, and Pakistan, therefore, was a needlessly divisive extravagance.

The Departure of the British

AT THE END of the Second World War, the Attlee government set in motion a hurried British withdrawal from the Raj, ending 350 years of imperial rule. To fill the immense vacuum, there were to be two new independent states—India and Pakistan—created, Big Bang-like, at the same instant on August 15, 1947, when Hindu-majority and Muslim-majority areas would be partitioned. The task of leaving the directly administered British areas, which accounted for about two-thirds of the subcontinent, and transferring power to Indian or Pakistani authorities proved relatively simple; what was diabolically intricate were the arrangements pertaining to the 565 or so Princely States taking up the remaining third.

These Princely States were spread

> from the 200 states of Kathiawar or a score of states of Rajputana in the west, to the Manipur and a score of Khasi chieftainships in the extreme east, from Kashmir and minute Simla Hill states in the north, the Mysore and Madras province states in the south, a limitless miscellany of hundreds of states of every shape and size . . . with a total area of 712,000 square miles and a population of 81 million (1931 census) or nearly one-quarter of the Indian population. They ranged from states like Hyderabad, as large as Italy, with 14 million of population, to petty states like Lawa with an area of 19 square miles, or the Simla Hill holdings, which were little more than small holdings.[1]

Kashmir, of course, was one of these autocratic Princely States. But a combination of three factors made it unique: it was a Muslim-majority state ruled by a Hindu; it was geographically contiguous to both India and Pakistan; and its strategic location was highly prized, convincing both the Muslim League and the Congress party that possession of it was a non-negotiable national interest. Nehru, for instance, explained to Clement Attlee that "Kashmir's northern frontiers . . . run in common with those of three countries, Afghanistan, the USSR and China. Security of Kashmir . . . is vital to the security of India." Liaquat Ali Khan, the Pakistani Prime Minister, offered similar reasons why "the security of Pakistan is bound up with that of Kashmir", but paid special attention to the Indian menace from the south.

The man chosen in February 1947 to carry out the British "exit strategy" was Lord Mountbatten of Burma, the last Viceroy of India and a man composed of colossal vanity, grinding snobbery and vaulting ambition in equal, but competing, parts. On June 3 he presented a plan conceding the right to the creation of an independent Pakistan "on the basis of ascertaining the contiguous majority areas of Muslims and non-Muslims." He soon established two Boundary Commissions (one for the northwestern Punjab, and the other for northeastern Bengal) to determine the new borders. Their chairman was an eminent British barrister, Sir Cyril Radcliffe, who had never been to India before he was chosen for the job of dividing the Raj. Making sure he kept himself strictly aloof from Indian and Pakistani pressure, Radcliffe was to present his hand-drawn map to Mountbatten a few days before the handover.

As Auden's penetrating lines on Radcliffe in the poem "Partition" attest, the chairman's mission was a thankless one:

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[1] V.D. Chopra, *Genesis of Indo-Pakistan Conflict on Kashmir* (New Delhi: Patriot Publishers, 1990), p. 12.

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Shut up in a lonely mansion, with police night and day / Patrolling the gardens to keep assassins away, / He got down to work, to the task of settling the fate / Of millions. The maps at his disposal were out of date / And the Census Returns almost certainly incorrect, / But there was no time to check them, no time to inspect / Contested areas. The weather was frightfully hot, / And a bout of dysentery kept him constantly on the trot, / But in seven weeks it was done, the frontiers decided, / A continent for better or worse divided. / The next day he sailed for England, where he quickly forgot / The case, as a good lawyer must. Return he would not, / Afraid, as he told his Club, that he might get shot.

Indeed, as soon as his job was done, Radcliffe destroyed all his papers relating to the Boundary Awards, departed for England, and never returned to India. He left behind a gnawing Kashmir problem. While the Boundary Commission was supposed to rely on majority geographical contiguity in its map-making, the June 3 plan added that "in doing so, it will also take into account other factors"—which were left unspecified. This was done for leeway's sake, for, as Mountbatten recalled, he told Radcliffe, "It's up to you, but basically I hope that you are going to get the right population on the right side of the line. But the line must make some sense [because] if you make it an impossible line to work along, there'll be trouble."[2]

Unfortunately, one such "impossible line", one requiring Radcliffe to take "other factors" into account, was situated on the southern intersection of Kashmir, Pakistan and India: the Gurdaspur District, a Muslim area of 1.4 million people. On both geographical and religious grounds, Gurdaspur was destined for Pakistan, but Radcliffe awarded three out of its four sub-districts to India. Of those three, two were substantially Muslim-majority, making the decision even more bewildering.

Radcliffe later explained that "there [were] factors such as the disruption of railways, communications and water systems that ought in this instance to displace the primary claims of contiguous majorities." It is true that Radcliffe's decision kept these systems intact, and, more important, ensured that the Sikh Holy of Holies, Amritsar, was not surrounded by hostile Muslim territory, but for the outraged Pakistanis this was self-justification *ex post facto*. The real reason, they felt, was that Nehru had leaned on Mountbatten (already, and rightly, suspected of pro-Indian leanings), who in turn had leaned on



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Radcliffe to alter the boundary: it was no coincidence that the only road and railway linking India with Kashmir ran through the new Indian sub-districts of Gurdaspur.

"Had the Gurdaspur District not been awarded to India", judged the soldier Lord Birdwood, "India could certainly never have fought a war in Kashmir", since it would have been nearly impossible to send troops to Srinagar, Kashmir's summer capital. Mountbatten, who himself had a great deal of military experience, was certainly aware that without Gurdaspur India could wave goodbye to Kashmir. For decades, nonetheless, the Pakistanis were accused by Mountbatten's defenders of slandering the Viceroy. Then in 1992 the last British official with intimate knowledge of the Partition process, Christopher Beaumont (Radcliffe's private secretary), revealed that Radcliffe had originally allotted two contiguous sub-districts to Pakistan, but at lunch Mountbatten successfully prevailed upon him to change the Award. The result is that Pakistan remains bitterly convinced that Nehru, in collaboration with the deceitful Mountbatten, defrauded the Muslims out of their rightful property. (It may or may not be relevant that Mountbatten's wife, Edwina, and Nehru were intimate friends and possibly lovers.)

The Accession Question

GURDASPUR is just one of several bones of contention that continue to poison relations between India and Pakistan. More substantial is the Accession question, which today forms the basis for each country's allegation of the other's illegal occupation of Kashmir.

As Radcliffe's writ did not apply to the Princely States, their rulers (not the people) were given the stark choice of acceding to either India or Pakistan (a third option, independence, though technically permissible, was frowned on). Almost without exception the choice was an obvious one, so that by the mid-August handover 552 out of 565 princes had made up their minds. One of the few exceptions was Kashmir.

For more than two months after the August 15 deadline, Maharajah Hari Singh dithered. Then, so the Indian version goes, in late October "thousands" of rowdy Pathan tribesmen—semi-nomadic Afghan warriors from the northwest frontier—crossed into Kashmir. Capturing Muzaffarabad on October 24, they advanced—razing, raping and pillaging—toward Srinagar. Alarmed, Singh appealed to New Delhi. Mountbatten and Nehru decided on October 25 to send a detachment of airborne troops (using the Gurdaspur road would have taken too long), but they did not mobilize until the next day, when, as the price for New Delhi's rapid intervention, the Maharajah voluntarily signed the Instrument of Accession assenting to Kashmir's transfer to India. On October 27, as the airborne troops landed at Srinagar airfield and proceeded to beat back the marauders, Mountbatten formally accepted the Maharajah's decision and Kashmir officially became part of India.

The Indian version of events hinges on dates, but the Pakistanis pick gaping holes in the chronology. They say, first, that far from being disinterested saviors, the Indians took advantage of the Maharajah's panic to impose the Instrument of Accession by telling him the Pathans were organized by Pakistan, whereas they were actually acting on their own accord. Second, the Pakistanis ask how Hari Singh could have signed

[2]Alastair Lamb, *Incomplete Partition: The Genesis of the Kashmir Dispute, 1947-1948* (Hertingfordbury, UK: Roxford Books, 1997), p. 56.

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the Instrument on October 26 when it is known he was travelling that day by motorcade from Srinagar, which he had abandoned, to Jammu, his winter capital, and was therefore incommunicado. Hence, Indian troops were on their way to Kashmir even before the Instrument had been signed and accepted, indicating that the Maharajah's assent was obtained under duress.

It is easy to see both how Pakistan can regard Kashmir as having been stolen from underneath its nose, and how the Indians can claim they were saving it from Pakistani aggression. Though it is clear that the Pathan invasion was not spontaneous (it seems to have been a covert operation cooked up by several zealous Pakistani colonels), the Indians still have a lot of explaining to do. They have never, for instance, been able to produce the original copy of the Instrument of Accession.

It seems that neither side acted honorably or entirely honestly that October. But instead of allowing the Indo-Pakistani enmity to simmer down, Mountbatten's letter accepting the Instrument of Accession brought the inflammatory principle of self-determination into conflict with the Indian desire for territorial integrity. In his letter, Mountbatten stated that, "It is my Government's wish that, as soon as law and order have been restored in Kashmir and its soil cleared of the invader, the question of the State's accession should be settled by a reference to the people."

At first, the Indians were willing to grant such a plebiscite, but they dropped the idea when it was realized that a non-Hindu majority was unlikely to vote their way. In 1966, drawing upon Nehru's concept of Indian identity, his daughter, Indira Gandhi, uncompromisingly explained New Delhi's eternal policy on the matter:

> India agreed and indeed suggested a plebiscite at the time, but on condition that the State was first cleared of the invader [Pakistan] and peace restored. . . . Since this basic condition was never fulfilled by Pakistan, there could be no question of a plebiscite. . . . Any plebiscite today would by definition amount to questioning the integrity of India. It would raise the question of secession. . . . We cannot and will not tolerate a second partition of India on religious grounds. It would destroy the very basis of the Indian State.

Hardened Positions

THUS, INDIA cannot afford to appease the "Pakistani invaders" in Kashmir. Nor can it even acknowledge that Kashmir is "disputed territory" without stoking the fires of religious secessionism in its other states. From the Indian perspective, then, Kashmir is the key to holding the subcontinent together, especially in this era of increasing ethno-religious nationalism. Consider that, according to the 1991 census, there are Christian, Sikh or Muslim majorities in five Indian states. Further, consider that in another six states Hindus coexist with significant Christian and Muslim minorities. There are already Sikh separatists in Punjab fighting for an independent "Khalistan", and virtually the entire east of India (bordering Bangladesh, Myanmar and China) is overwhelmingly non-Hindu and may agitate to depart from New Delhi's rule if Kashmiris are allowed to secede.

Indians of every political color profoundly fear the consequences that would follow Kashmiri independence. Atal Behari Vajpayee, leader of the "Hindu nationalist" BJP, and current prime minister of India, warned Pakistan in 1990 that "if it is asking for four million Kashmiri Muslims, it should be ready to receive 120 million Indian Muslims in case Kashmir

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secedes from India." Though the BJP has since moderated its tone, it continues to reject the Nehruite "salad bowl" philosophy where all creeds assimilate into a newly invented Indian identity that glories in, and legally protects, their diversity. Rather, the BJP demands that these discriminatory legal and political protections (such as Kashmir's exemptions provided for in Section 370 of the constitution, as well as the promise of a plebiscite) be dismantled for the sake of the Hinduist Partition "perfidiousness." Indeed, the Pakistani military believed its own government had been perfidious when Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif pulled the insurgents out of Indian-held Kashmir. The commander of the armed forces and the strategist behind this year's "spring exercises", General Pervez Musharraf, was reportedly concerned about the withdrawal, which contributed to his decision to oust Sharif. As in India, there is a great deal of ethnic strife within Pakistan that

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Creating the Problem.
Lord Mountbatten, with Nehru on his right and Jinnah on his left, 1947.

"melting pot." Hence, mindful that religious difference casts aspersions on their loyalty, Muslim groups have lately been vociferous in asserting their allegiance.

For Pakistanis as well, Kashmir is essential to maintaining national identity. Ceding control of the third of the country it occupies to the Indians would be regarded as a betrayal of Pakistan's historic portrayal of itself as a pan-Islamic homeland. Currently exulting in the Middle East's adoration owing to its possession of nuclear weapons, Pakistan risks its standing if the Indians were to profit from their could explode if Islamabad falters in what Benazir Bhutto called a "thousand-year war." In the province of Sind, for example, the native Hindu Sindhis and newly arrived Pathans and Punjabis are at odds with the socially and economically dominant *Mohajirs* (Muslim settlers who came from India in 1947), leading to secessionary fears.

There is also the China factor. From the 1950s onwards, Beijing has laid claim to an eastern portion of Kashmir named Aksai Chin, which lies between the Chinese province of Xinjiang and Tibet.

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In 1957 the Indians were infuriated to discover that the Chinese had secretly built a road between Xinjiang and Tibet running through Aksai Chin, which India regards as sovereign territory. China's defeat of India in the 1962 border war confirmed Beijing's say in any future negotiations regarding Kashmir's status. Whereas during the 1960s and early 1970s China was very close to Pakistan (which it regarded as anti-Soviet), in recent years the Chinese have shelved their traditional support for "Kashmiri self-determination" (a pro-Pakistan code for a plebiscite) in favor of bilateral Indo-Pakistan negotiations.

It was not just the fall of the Soviet empire, or the rise of India as the regional superpower, that brought the change in Chinese foreign policy. Since the late 1980s—contemporaneous with the birth of the Kashmiri independence movement—there have been numerous uprisings among Turkic separatists in predominantly Muslim Xinjiang, which shares a long border with Kashmir. In such a remote region the last thing Beijing desires is more dangerous talk of plebiscites and the possible spread of Muslim unrest from Kashmir into western Xinjiang. So for China, maintaining the status quo between India and Pakistan is a necessity, even if it comes at Kashmir's expense.

Similarly, while India's and Pakistan's acquisition of nuclear weapons may be decried, there is something to be said in favor of the South Asian nuclear triangle as it now stands. India's overwhelming conventional superiority, which might otherwise have tempted New Delhi into conquering Kashmir, has been neutralized by Pakistan's reservation of the right to first-use. Moreover, Pakistan would be foolish to launch a surprise nuclear attack, given Indian efforts to build a deterrent capable of surviving a first strike. Finally, China will retaliate if its territory—including Aksai Chin—is attacked by either side.

To be sure, this is not an overly reassuring picture. But if the fighting in Kashmir can be kept at the relatively low level we saw earlier this year, there is a possibility that, in time, the anger and distrust of Partition and four wars will slowly ebb away. For the moment, the most inflammatory thing the West could do is try to impose a peace where it is not wanted. □

Ah, Those Were the Days

There is nothing more ridiculous than the notion that socialism is inexorably dying. . . . The world we face today makes a socialist approach all the more relevant. . . . The Nineties will not see the continuing triumph of the market, but its failure.

—Tony Blair,
London Review of Books, October 29, 1987

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Did Western Civilization Survive the 20th Century?

Alan Charles Kors

THE VERY FACT that the question posed above might reasonably be asked is in itself alarming, though it should not be. The West, in its various incarnations, has feared the end of its own civilization almost from the beginning. We do ourselves and our civilization a great disservice if we imagine ourselves the unhappiest of souls at the unhappiest of times, or as the last bearers of the Western torch.

Imagine the question of the end of something akin to Western civilization being posed when Athens fell; or when Christian Rome was sacked by barbarians; or when the Norsemen ravaged settled Europe; or when feudal warlords reigned unchecked; or when the Black Death left soul and society without mooring. Imagine the question posed by critics of the papacy, when visiting the decadence and bad faith of fourteenth-century Rome, or by Catholic apologists when they saw Western Christendom rent first in two and then into a multitude of competing sects. Imagine the question posed during the religious civil wars, or, indeed, during the devastation of the Thirty Years War, when Europe became a charnel house of competing militant creeds and dynastic interests; or during the Terror, the decades of Revolutionary and then Napoleonic Wars. Coming closer to our own time, imagine the question posed on the slaughterfields of World War I, or at Auschwitz or in the Gulag. The West is resilient beyond all seeming possibility, and something gives it that resiliency. The West has survived its barbarians without and, more dreadful yet, its own barbaric offspring within. If it could outlast Attila the Hun, Julius Streicher and Michael Suslov, it surely can outlast Jacques Derrida, Stanley Fish and the Friends of Bill.

At each moment of seeming dissolution, there have been diverse Jeremiahs, profound voices who in rightful lamentation analyze compellingly the depths to which we have fallen, the irretrievable loss of something vital—and yet the West has survived. It has been a matter of mind and spirit. Greece fell, but its philosophers conquered the minds of those who conquered its soil, and, indeed, its muses touched consciousness and sensibility wherever its language became accessible. It fell, but when the human bearers of Christian revelation sought a human voice of natural philosophy by which to explain, justify and elaborate upon their beliefs, they found it, almost despite themselves, in Greece—first in Platonic and neo-Platonic philosophers, later in

Alan Charles Kors is professor of history at the University of Pennsylvania. He is editor-in-chief of the *Oxford Encyclopedia of the Enlightenment*, and co-author of *The Shadow University: The Betrayal of Liberty on America's Campuses* (HarperCollins, 1999).

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Aristotle, sometimes even in the Greek skeptics. Greece fell, but its mathematics still measures, actually and metaphorically, the world. It fell, but its natural conceptual categories still organize our understanding of, and debates about, reality and knowledge.

Rome, too, fell but its language became the *lingua franca*, and, thus, the natural, definitional universe of Christendom. Its history became the great drama by which to understand the glory and the baseness of political life. The barbarian tribes believed that they had conquered Rome, but Rome, in greater part, had conquered them. The descendants of those tribes called their realm the Holy Roman Empire, and these words were not, until much later, empty ones.

When the Norsemen came, learning fled to monasteries, but that learning, and those monasteries, eventually conquered the Norse, whose descendants founded universities in Britain that live to this day. It is the last thing that any frightened monk taking desperate shelter in the eighth century ever could have imagined.

The Thirty Years War seemed the end of civilization, but its battles are now mostly forgotten. What remains of the seventeenth century? Bacon, Galileo, Descartes, Hobbes, Pascal, Bayle, Boyle, Harvey, Huyghens, Newton, Locke. Louis XIV is a tourist attraction at Versailles; his wars changed precious little.

The conceptual revolution of the West, however, changed a great deal in that same century. It was born of the very dynamics of the West's models of learning, disputation, accounting for appearances, refining inductive and deductive logic—all now linked to expanded education and to printing. What happened in the minds of the graduates of Europe's Christian universities changed the human relationship to nature, to knowledge, to charity armed with *scientia*, to the rights of inquiry and conscience, and to political and economic life. When Galileo was charged with offering an astronomy that contradicted Scripture, he replied by citing the ancient fathers of the Church themselves, above all Augustine, who had insisted that there was but one truth, that it was consistent, that it shone in nature also, and that no one had the right to tie faith to what could be proven false in the created, natural world. The Christian West kept the traditions of the Greek mind alive and, thus, by its own debates, overthrew the presumptive authority of the past in matters of natural knowledge and its application. The West believed that we were not cast fatally adrift in this world, but that we could learn new things and that we could bring the sorry scheme of experience closer to the heart's desire for knowledge, order and well-being. It was not Faust, dreaming of occult knowledge that would make him a demigod, but Bacon, commanding that knowledge proceed from humility and charity, who became the prophet of the great scientific revolution of the West. Louis XIV is a statue; Bacon is a living force wherever the West touches minds.

Revolutionary Social Work

THROUGH natural catastrophe, anarchy, war and despotisms, the West survived, its religion teaching always that the greatest of sins is despair, a lesson that each generation needs to learn afresh. Conservatives need to relearn that today. It is odd, indeed, that conservatives should question whether Western civilization has survived the twentieth century at a time when the cultural Left defines that civilization as a singular hegemony that stands astride the globe. What, after all, is the "multiculturalism" so ardently but desperately proclaimed in higher education but the belief that there is a hegemonic Western civilization that, unchallenged, frames all

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issues and provides almost all modes of understanding? For the so-called multiculturalists, the question is not whether what they see without complexity as Western civilization will survive into the twenty-first century, but whether anything other than Western civilization will so survive. Shouldn't we take heart from their despair, a despair so intense that they are reduced to trying to save the world by doing revolutionary social work among the children of the Ivy League?

What, after all, do the multiculturalists mean by the hegemony of the West? It is not physical colonialism and imperialism that concerns them anymore. They see as far more ominous what they term the cultural colonialism and imperialism of the West, a triumphant colonialism of the mind by a civilization that believes in universal categories that transcend itself. The West believes its faiths and values to be accessible to all human souls. The West believes its science to be a method by which all human beings, everywhere, can rise above ignorance, superstition, helplessness and prejudice. The West believes that there are rights and obligations that belong to humanity *qua* humanity, beyond the power of governments and political wills. Conservatives despair about the West's disappearance; the cultural Left despairs about its transcendent success.

There are profound ironies about the multiculturalist Leftists, many of which testify precisely to the dynamism and inescapable appeal of that Western civilization to whose dismemberment they are in theory committed. If we take them at their word, multiculturalists hold the view that there is no fixed point from which to value or analyze cultures objectively. They believe, in theory, that all cultures are inherently equal, rightfully judging themselves from perspectives relative to themselves. If this were true, of course, their judgments of the injustice, inequity and malevolence of Western culture compared to the rest of the world would be self-contradictory of their theory.

Their self-contradictions betray their inability to escape from the civilization they claim to despise. In their epistemology, multiculturalists are the third-rate heirs of the Greek skeptics and historians, without, to their shame, even knowing that fact. Their assaults upon dogmatism, at best, never rise above the level of the subtleties and paradoxes handed down to us by Sextus Empiricus, chronicler and compiler of the Greek skeptical tradition. Sextus Empiricus was a bestseller of the sixteenth century, and widely translated in the seventeenth century. His writings intellectually delighted European men of letters, including clerics, many of whom embraced him as a tonic antidote to the pride of human reason. Many philosophers modified their views of the claims of metaphysics in the face of such skepticism.

The West always has been concerned with the limits of reason and knowledge, the role of received prejudice and custom, the appropriateness or arrogance of its metaphysical conclusions, and with the phenomenon of paradox. Indeed, the West authored the formal exposition and mental pyrotechnics of such concerns. The heirs of the least subtle forms of that tradition do not even know their parentage, but their inheritance attests to the dynamism, for better or worse, of the Western intellectual dialogue itself.

It was the Greeks and their heirs—not any Third World critics of post-colonialism—who obsessed so creatively about the role of King Nomos, of received opinion, of education and prejudgment, of the seeming relativity of values, beliefs, and taste to time, place, and accident of birth. Montesquieu, in the eighteenth century, was profoundly struck by the malleability of the human condition, and by the relativity of what might seem the most foundational aspects of human existence to geography, time and historical vicissitudes. He

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also saw, however, what our current social constructionists do not: as undeniable as that malleability may be, there is a natural reality that underlies, conditions and sets limits to it, and the relationship between human malleability and natural reality is the appropriate subject of deep objective study. For Montesquieu, civilizations may flourish ephemerally without solving real problems of reciprocity, justice and virtue, but they cannot survive. Further, he believed that while certain forms of social arrangements may persist for as long as terror and despotism sustain them, there is a real human nature and a set of real human needs, and these will out toward their true ends when coercion is lessened by chance or struggle. Montesquieu, and indeed Enlightenment thinkers in general, often are equally loathed by conservatives who believe them excessively relativistic, and by postmodernists who see them as excessively dogmatic. In fact, few in the Enlightenment would have disagreed with the observation that Adam Smith made, in 1759, about "the necessity of justice to the existence of society."

The failure of the postmodernists' canon and politics fully to grasp the irony of their proclaimed alienation from Western thought and values signifies a profound failure of self-knowledge. Their ideologies derive not from non-Western culture, but from the internal debates of the West and the products of its educational vitality: from Marcuse, Gramsci, Marx, Hegel and Rousseau—from, in short, the debates that the West has always had with itself. Their kaleidoscopic values eventually return to the West. They sought sanctuary in Christian churches, that most medieval of protections, for the Leninists of Latin America. They campaign against, and seek asylum in America for the victims of, involuntary female circumcision, citing *our* notions of legal equality and universal human dignity, not *their* alleged commitments to the relativity of all human values and cultures. They seek tenure at universities with medieval traditions of what the West called "philosophical liberty." They wear ribbons for greater funding of Western medical research into the causes and cures of AIDS and breast cancer. Hypocrites without self-knowledge will not bring down this civilization, unless we join them in its demolition and work even harder than they do.

The Radical Tradition

AS PRESENTED to the public, multiculturalism invites the deep study, appreciation and celebration of a diversity of cultures, removing legitimacy from all claims of cultural superiority. Thus, college cafeterias occasionally have their Korean or African food days, cuisine being, in my view, multiculturalism's strongest suit.

In fact, the primary, true meaning of the term "multiculturalism" is quite different. It means precisely this: there is one dominant culture in the West—Greek, Judeo-Christian and Enlightenment in its sources; this culture is the enemy of authentic debate, human freedom and altruism everywhere; it is capitalistic, sexist, racist and Eurocentric; it spreads ignorance, injustice, despotic power and poverty everywhere. Any voices that challenge this hegemonic culture, and only those voices that challenge it, are "multicultural"—that is, progressive enemies of the singular, dominant culture. This explains why neo-Marxism in Africa or among black academics is multicultural but Thomas Sowell is not; why queer theory that attacks the scientific tradition is multicultural, but gay Log Cabin Republicans are not; why the Sandinistas are multicultural, but the Cuban entrepreneurs of Dade County are not.

"Multiculturalism" does not mean a deep study, appreciation and celebration of evangelical Protestants, traditionalist

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Catholics, the Eastern Orthodox, black American Pentecostals, or the gender roles of Orthodox Jewish and Shiite Islamic cultures. It does not mean a deep study, appreciation and celebration of any assimilationist immigrant cultures, or of white, rural Southern cultures. It does not mean the serious study of West African Benin culture or of Confucian culture, both requiring linguistic accomplishment and rigorous Western inquiry to achieve understanding. All that it means is the deep study, appreciation and celebration of those Westernized intellectuals who think exactly the way multiculturalists do about the nature and causes of oppression, however nonrepresentative those thinkers are of the broader groups they allegedly represent. These thinkers are not multiculturalists in any meaningful sense. They are Western radicals, in the Western radical tradition, with the most imperial, dogmatic and absolutist aspirations of all.

Further, they are the beneficiaries of the Western commitment to intellectual debate, instead of a coerced intellectual conformity, in the Republic of Letters. They are the beneficiaries of our Western tolerance of dissent and extreme heterodoxy. They are the beneficiaries of our tradition—from Aristotle's insistence that we overcome all possible arguments against our beliefs; to the medieval insistence upon *sed contra* objections in formal disputations; to Mill's insistence that beliefs untested by free criticism are no longer truly alive—that we must consider radical dissent. They are the beneficiaries of our own philosophical pluralism, and, indeed, of its constant extension. As they seek to deny to others those values of which they are themselves beneficiaries, however, they lose, by their own hypocrisy and arrogance, any legitimate claim upon the protections that these values offer, and there will be a day of reckoning. It may take time, but it truly is as simple as that. They are here by our forbearance.

The current barbarians within also remind us that the West is, again and again, the author of its own worst follies and abuses, compared to most of which the postmodernists pale into virtual insignificance. We are the authors of our own religious wars and persecutions, our own enthusiastic superstitions, our own conquests of lands and peoples over which and over whom we had no rights, our own ultimate nightmares of National or Leninist Socialism, which drowned our world in blood unimaginable in any century but the twentieth, and which truly threatened to bring this civilization to an awful end. We have had the will, however, to learn from depravity and from reality, and to bear ultimate witness to the higher sides of our being. What civilization ever has engaged in more searing analysis and soul-searching of its own sins?

The American Accomplishment

HAVING DEFEATED the National Socialists and the Communists within, the bearers of the best of this civilization have reason for a moment of optimistic pride. What often denies us both optimism and pride, however, is the very stringency of our self-judgment untempered by historical realism. It is a dangerous intellectual error to imagine that goodness, wisdom, order, justice, peace, freedom, legal equality, mutual forbearance and kindness are the normal state of things in human affairs, and that it is malice, folly, disorder, injustice, war, coercion, legal inequality, murderous intolerance and cruelty that stand in need of historical explanation. The West, in theory, always has understood that man has a lower side to which he is drawn, that man is a wolf to man, and that we are governed more by prejudice and passion than by the rational capacity of our minds. The West, in theory, has always understood that knowledge, including

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moral knowledge, is a hard-won acquisition, and that its application is even harder.

If that is so then we err grievously in our assumptions of what it is that requires particular explanation in the world. We understand the defaults; what should astonish us is the ability to change them. Rousseau and the postmodernists have it all wrong in this domain. It is not aversion to difference, for example, that requires historical explanation; aversion to difference is the human condition. Rather, it is the West's partial but breathtaking ability to overcome tribalism and exclusion that demands explanation, above all in the singular American accomplishment. It is not the injustice of difference in America that requires historical explanation, as if this were the odd phenomenon of human affairs. That injustice indeed requires reflection, so that we never lose sight of human moral weakness in general or of our own malice in particular. But historically, it is the existence and agency of Western values by which that injustice has been and is being progressively overcome that truly should excite our curiosity and awe. Anti-Semitism is not surprising; the opening of Christian America to Jews is what should amaze. Racial aversion and injustice are not the source of wonderment; the Fourteenth Amendment and its gradual implementation are what should astonish. It is not the abuse of power that requires explanation, but the Western rule of law.

Most dramatically, of course, it is not slavery that requires explanation—slavery is one of the most universal of all human institutions—but the values and agency by which the West identified slavery as an evil and abolished it. Finally, it is not relative pockets of poverty in the West that should occasion our wonder—the general state of poverty once went under the name of "the human condition"—but, rather, the values, institutions, knowledge, risk, ethics and liberties that created such prosperity that we even notice such poverty at all, let alone believe that it is eradicable. We are surprised, in a failure of intellectual analysis, by all of the wrong things, and we lose our wonder at the accomplishments and aspirations of our civilization as a tragic result.

That attempt to contain depravity, indeed, has been so successful in the West, relative to the human condition, that the other world fantasized by the multiculturalists seeks entrance, again and again, at our doors. One sees the alleged victims of Western civilization hopefully seeking entrance to it; one does not see the intellectual despisers and would-be despoilers of this civilization beating down the doors of the cultures they claim to celebrate. Leave Harvard for Sierra Leone, MIT for contemporary Vietnam? Gender feminists escaping the oppression of the West for Kenya, Guatemala, Cuba, Afghanistan, India or the territories of the Inuits? I think not.

Some might argue that it is merely the West's material wealth and prosperity that draws people to it. It would be bizarre to hear the multiculturalists argue that. Have so many been willing to die merely for the prosperity of their neighbors? Does the prosperity of the West not reflect the fruits of its values, its freedom, its notions of individuality, liberty and responsibility, its faiths, its institutions of law and legal equality, its commitment to reciprocity, and its intellectual realism?

Reality and Reason

IT IS WORTH reflecting on this latter trait of the West, its intellectual—its philosophical—realism. While various extreme epistemological and ontological skepticisms and various radical irrationalisms have flourished in our history, sometimes with brilliance and profundity, Western civilization always has had at its core a belief that there is a reality independent of our wishes and

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ideas; that natural knowledge of that reality is possible, and, indeed, indispensable to human dignity, and that such knowledge must be acquired through a discipline of the will and mind; and that central to that discipline is a compact with reason. The West has willed, in theory at least, to reduce the chaos of the world to natural coherence by the powers of the mind. When some Christian voices condemned such efforts as impious, the great doctors of the Church proclaimed them indispensable to a coherence on which human understanding of the faith depended. The Christian universities of the West began higher education in philosophy, and to reason badly or against straw men was always deemed an error of grave import.

The Greek principle of self-contradiction as the touchstone of error is the formal expression of a commitment to reason well that the West always understood to separate us from beasts and madmen. To live with self-contradiction was not merely to fail an introduction to philosophy, it was to be less than human, less than coherent, less than sane. Induction from experience always had a logic, and the exploration of that logic was one of the great and ultimately triumphant pursuits of the Western mind. The Christian universities of Europe emphatically rejected that their enemy was the logic of deduction and induction applied to a knowable natural reality. On the contrary, they believed that philosophy was the friend of faith, and that although it was not necessary to salvation, it was necessary to a coherent natural understanding of the creed, to reasoned belief, and to full human dignity.

It was not surprising, therefore, that those Christian universities were far more dynamic and productive of intellectual innovation than their caricaturists—either their rebellious children or their later historians—ever allowed. The great minds whom we associate with the conceptual revolutions of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were almost all educated by those universities, and they remained true to the call to know an independent reality by means of human inquiry and reason, avoiding logical error, false induction and a failure to account for appearances. Although there were many radical ruptures in the history of certain disciplines in the West, there were no radical ruptures with the Western compact with reality and reason.

It is this compact that led to a civilization in which religion itself led the scrutiny against superstition, which gave rebirth to critical scholarship and, ultimately, to a tolerated heterodoxy that could question the West's religion itself; a civilization in which the mind could appeal against the irrational with ultimate success—however slow the appellate process—to the rational; a civilization in which belief in learning as a constant self-correction, the goal of which was understanding of a reality that did not depend on a human self, led to the sciences that have changed both the entire human relationship to nature, and our sense of human possibilities tempered by our knowledge of human nature and society.

The fruits of that civilization have been an unprecedented ability to modify the remediable causes of human suffering, to give great agency to utility and charity alike; to give to each individual a degree of choice and freedom unparalleled in all of human history; and to offer a means of overcoming the station in life to which one was born by the effort of one's labor, mind and will.

ABUNDANT AS they have been, with merely those fruits the civilization of the West might well have remained a parochial one to the rest of the world, closed, xenophobic and all-conquering. There have been those, indeed, who wished and worked for

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that, and there have been depredations occasioned by our arrogance—which we subject to critical study and restudy in almost all domains of social, political and moral knowledge. The drama, however, is that this civilization of the West, for all of its faults and sins, believed that its values and knowledge were not parochial, but universal, the birthright of every human life and soul. It believed, in the final analysis, that its values transcended its own geographical space.

To believe, as the multiculturalists do, that this is a source of suffering, not hope, in the world as the twentieth century ends is to break the compact with reality, with reason, and with the logic of inductive inference. Let the inhabitants of the world take or leave that offering—we have come, by our own dynamic and experience, to treasure voluntary, not coerced, exchange—but to the extent that Western civilization survives, and only to that extent, the hope of the world survives: the hope to eradicate unnecessary suffering; to speak a language of human dignity, responsibility and rights linked to a common reality; to minimize the depredations of the irrational, the unexamined, the merely prejudicial in our lives; to understand—with the possibility that both interest and charity will apply that understanding for good—the world in which we find ourselves.

Has that civilization survived? Which is to ask: Has a human relationship to the world based upon the assumption of a knowable reality, reason, and a transcendent value to human dignity and responsibility survived? Has a recognition of human depravity and the distinctively Western recognition of the need to limit the power of men over men survived? It is also to ask whether human beings throughout the world, observing the fruits of different ways of being human, find foundational importance in the way of the West. Free men and women are not likely to abandon that hard-won shelter from chaos, ignorance, parochial tribalism, irrationalism and, ultimately, helplessness that after enormous effort—and frequent failure—Western civilization has succeeded in erecting. □

Ideological Fraud

Havel discerned the fraudulence of what I would call the 'interpassive socialism' of the Western academic Left. These leftists aren't interested in activity—merely in 'authentic' experience. They allow themselves to pursue their well-paid academic careers in the West, while using the idealised Other (Cuba, Nicaragua, Tito's Yugoslavia) as the stuff of their ideological dreams: they dream through the Other, but turn their backs on it if it disturbs their complacency by abandoning socialism and opting for liberal capitalism. What is of special interest here is the lack of understanding between the Western Left and dissidents such as Havel. In the eyes of the Western Left, Eastern dissidents were too naive in their belief in liberal democracy—in rejecting socialism, they threw out the baby with the bath water. In the eyes of the dissidents, the Western Left played patronising games with them, disavowing the true harshness of totalitarianism. The idea that the dissidents were somehow guilty for not seizing the unique opportunity provided by the disintegration of socialism to invent an authentic alternative to capitalism was pure hypocrisy.

—Slavoj Zizek, *London Review of Books*, October 28, 1999

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Self-Inflicted Wounds

Hilton Root

THE GLOBAL financial crisis that began with the collapse of the Thai baht in mid-1997 was fundamentally one of information mismanagement—that is, banks failed and markets collapsed mainly because crucial information was not collected and distributed to investors. Once burned, those same investors have understandably proved reluctant to return to markets where they mistrust the available financial data and, more generally, the credibility of host governments. To lure back investment, armies of financial specialists have been dispatched to Asia by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and other multilateral institutions to establish basic standards of accounting and disclosure requirements for banks and firms.

But what these specialists have discovered is that the mismanagement they seek to remedy is often the product not of inefficiency but of direct and willful government action. More precisely, governments in Asia routinely misuse financial information for corrupt purposes or unreasonable taxation. Firms then respond by withholding this information, thereby reducing potential trade and investment. If a firm in China, for example, were to maintain the same standards of accounting as its counterparts in the United States, it would soon find itself subjected to a wide range of capricious interventions by state officials.

By contrast, the transformation of the U.S. economy made possible by the emergence of the public corporation in the late nineteenth century depended upon protection from arbitrary government. Without government financing, managers turned to the public and issued stock, the sale of which required the release of vital information. Because governmental opportunism did not jeopardize firms that accurately disclosed information, American businesses were able to create a thriving equity market. As firms grew by drawing capital from dispersed shareholders, enormous economies of scale developed. Municipalities learned that responsible public accounting permitted the financing of infrastructure by issuing bonds.

Private sector initiatives have not emerged, however, in present-day China, India, Russia and a host of smaller countries having their first serious encounter with a market system. This is not surprising: information about a firm's assets or ownership structure is simply not available in these places. Fearing confiscation of their assets, firms disguise their holdings as well as their management structure, which in turn constrains their ability to access capital effectively.

Hilton Root is senior fellow and head of Global Studies at the Milken Institute, Santa Monica, CA.

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Yet merely insisting upon improved accounting or auditing will accomplish very little in the developing world. The problem here is one of governance—specifically, malign governance. Legislation that forces banks to reveal their assets, liabilities and loan-loss provisions misses the source of these information failures. The obstacle to transparency in the financial sector is not a dearth of legislation but the developing world's political leadership. Financial mismanagement at the government level, which culminates in the plundering of banks and the restriction of access to alternative capital markets, has become a means of political survival in many states, one not easily surrendered to market forces the leadership cannot control. It is, of course, hardly news that many of the world's leaders stay in power by mismanaging their nations' resources. But until the practice ceases, the logic of international financial rescue will remain dubious.

IN JULY 1998, defending a $4.8 billion IMF loan to Russia that subsequently evaporated, then-Undersecretary of the Treasury Larry Summers reasoned that the United States took a calculated risk "because it was vastly better that Russia succeed than not succeed." The IMF loan was intended to foster financial sector reform. Instead, according to the IMF official that brokered the deal, the $4.8 billion was wasted on propping up Russia's currency long enough to "let the oligarchs get their money out of the country." IMF funds likewise provided Indonesia's Suharto sufficient breathing space to designate a successor while his children were overseas directing the family's money out of the country. As a result, the Suharto clan now possesses the resources to buy back at discount prices enough assets to dominate the Indonesian economy for years, perhaps even generations.

Indeed, it is in East Asia that we find this pattern at its worst. Twenty years ago leaders in that region were busily channeling resources toward national development and growth. As wealth and prosperity increased, however, supervision of the financial system as a public good declined. Instead, Asian leaders today routinely provide their friends and supporters with bank loans, public funds and access to subsidized credit, disregarding the economic risks of doing so. Hence, politicians concerned primarily with political power for its own sake have looked the other way as domestic banking credit has outpaced GDP growth, with predictably ruinous consequences.

The transformation of Korea's banking sector as that country became wealthy and democratic illustrates the point. Because political access lowered their cost of capital, Korea's large *chaebols* set about acquiring new assets, many of them unproductive. In the process, they disregarded profitability, subsidized loss-making business ventures, and promiscuously invested in unrelated sectors of the Korean economy, from steel and automobile manufacturing to real estate and hotels. Even the financial crisis that now threatens the country's prosperity has done little to disrupt this expansion. Quite the contrary: economic collapse has enabled the top five *chaebols* to seize control of a still larger portion of the devastated economy. Loss-making industries are simply dislodged on the public, while the *chaebols* consolidate the profit-making jewels.

Japan, too, features a banking system in which loans are divorced from market considerations. As in Korea, government policy in Japan, which encourages informal banking arrangements, has reduced the cost of capital for firms, allowing them to measure performance on the basis of market share rather than on rates of return on investment. For years,

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Japanese officials have looked aside as firm managers created vast profits not reflected in corporate accounts. Many observers believe that the Japanese government rejects full disclosure of the banking system's assets and liabilities out of fear that political malfeasance will be exposed. And though international organizations promote the use of outside auditors to ensure that the business sector discloses its borrowings, the Japanese Finance Ministry has simultaneously promoted a means of circumventing this practice. It simply places a cap on how much a private firm can spend on an audit, a cap established at a level sufficiently low to thwart an effective job being done. If fraud is later exposed, it is the accounting firm, handicapped from the outset, that is usually blamed. Accounting firms, in turn, accept this risk as the price of gaining new business.

Japan is not the only country in which politicians encumber full disclosure of assets and liabilities. Political leaders across the globe have designed governmental bureaucracies with the express purpose of hiding financial information. Banks that cannot, or do not, perform basic accounting functions are often part of a larger structure of opaque regulations, politicized judiciaries and capricious tax systems. The resulting budgetary chaos distorts economic performance, to be sure, but such corruption keeps politicians in power.

The banking crisis the world confronts today recalls an observation once made by Schumpeter: "The public finances are one of the best starting points for an investigation of society, especially of its political life." One of the most basic tests of accountability that a country must pass is the ability to identify and collect taxes. It should come as no surprise, then, that the largest debtor countries in the world collect only a small fraction of the taxes owed them. Of the estimated 73 million Brazilians in the work force, only 7.6 million pay income taxes. Out of a Pakistani population of 140 million, an estimated 1 million pay income taxes. Mexico reports about 19 million registered taxpayers in a country of nearly 100 million people, and its finance secretary reports the country has the highest rate of tax evasion in the world. In the Philippines, of 12 million potential taxpayers only 2 million contribute. The situation in Russia is better; collections there account for as much as 50 percent of what taxpayers owe the treasury. Citizens in many of these countries so distrust the government that they hide their fortunes under mattresses or stash them overseas.

IRONICALLY, international financial assistance often exacerbates mismanagement by insulating failed regimes and allowing them to continue to reward supporters. Investors, of course, view loan-making institutions as a source of credible information. Indeed, the mere willingness of these institutions to extend credit establishes certain expectations about a nation's economic performance. Unfortunately, their loan approval processes rely on information gleaned from a compromised source—namely, the same political leaders who wrecked their nations' economies in the first place. Being accountable to their membership, international organizations thus become vehicles of misinformation and lack the independence to play the role expected of them as a neutral source of analysis and information. Under Suharto, for example, the representative of the Indonesian government at the World Bank was able to prevent the dissemination of research that questioned the wisdom of Indonesia's economic policies.

Then, too, international loan packages, which are often negotiated through

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secret agreements with a single branch of government, actually weaken the main source of policy reform: the need for public accountability. When domestic financial crises broke out in England (1669), France (1789) and Japan (1868), no international donor existed to bail out political leaders. Bankrupt rulers were driven into the hands of their own citizens, who insisted on sound policies in exchange for the taxes they remitted. Indeed, international watchdogs can never substitute for accountability to citizens who pay taxes and thereby tie their fortunes to those of the state. Such organizations can at best empower local systems of accountability. However, when the deal is secret and conceals essential economic data, neither investors nor citizens can assess how a government is performing. And such agreements allow leaders, *ex post facto*, to claim a lack of public support and to renege on loan agreements once the funds have been dispensed. Recall how in early 1998 Suharto sought to use the riots that his policies induced in Indonesia as a pretext for evading the conditions of the deal he had signed with the IMF.

Contrary to prevailing wisdom, the serial fiscal failures of some of the world's best endowed nations are not the result of a mysterious contagion, nor of exploitation by developed countries or by the "international system." The blame lies closer to home. The afflicted nations—Brazil, Indonesia, Mexico, Pakistan and the Philippines, to name a few—have all become caught in binds of their own devising. And the financial architecture that has been engaged to surmount this global economic disaster has merely ended up compounding it. That architecture—which has allowed leaders to draw support from international organizations without engaging the will of the citizens who must pay these organizations back—has created a fundamental misalignment of economic incentives, the benefits of which have been largely private, while the debt has been public and sovereign. Fostering greater accountability where it is ultimately needed will require subjecting the leaders of sovereign states to the will of the peoples they govern. Only then can this global system of taxation without representation be reformed. □

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The Way It Ought To Be

Andrew J. Bacevich

THE KILLER ANGELS, Michael Shaara's immensely popular novel of the Civil War, recounts the Battle of Gettysburg from the point of view of those who fought there, artfully blending history and imagination. On the Union side, Shaara tells his story chiefly through the eyes of Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain, commander of the 20th Maine Volunteers, who actually won the Medal of Honor defending Little Round Top.

At the outset of the narrative, Shaara's protagonist finds himself facing a delicate leadership challenge far removed from combat. On the eve of battle, the high command has saddled Chamberlain with 120 mutineers, the remnants of another Maine regiment whose members have seen enough of war. His orders are to make the mutineers fight—and to shoot them if they refuse. A citizen-soldier himself, Chamberlain understands the futility of attempting to browbeat or coerce volunteers. Moreover, he cannot conceive of ordering his own troops to turn their guns on men from their home state. So rather than making threats, Chamberlain decides on a riskier course: employing the plain, unadorned idiom of American idealism, he simply reminds the disgruntled mutineers of the Cause for which they first took up arms, asking them on that basis to set aside their grievances and join his regiment.

"This is a different kind of army", Chamberlain tells them.

> If you look at history you'll see men fight for pay, or women, or some other kind of loot. They fight for land, or because a king makes them, or just because they like killing. But we're here for something new. . . . We're an army going out to set other men free.

It is a masterful performance. Moreover, nothing about that performance is contrived or false. When Chamberlain stipulates freedom as the peculiarly American purpose for which the Union Army fights, we know that he speaks with conviction: the speech works. The mutineers join his own battle-depleted ranks, providing the essential increment of fighting power that enables Chamberlain's regiment to hold Little Round Top, the action on which victory at Gettysburg, and arguably the entire war, turns.

This belief that Americans at war constitute—or at least ought to constitute—"a different kind of army" exercises a powerful hold on the national consciousness. But there is more at work in this belief than mere patriotic pride. The insistence that Americans fight "to set other men free" has helped to validate the

Andrew J. Bacevich directs the Center for International Relations at Boston University.

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nation's transformation from a republic of modest means and ambitions into a military superpower with interests spanning the globe. In the aftermath of the Cold War, as the use of force by the United States has become increasingly commonplace, reaffirming the historical uniqueness of the American soldier has taken on renewed importance. Assuring ourselves that our troops fight not for land or booty or because they are ordered to do so, but as conscious agents of liberation sustains the ancient claim that we are ourselves unique, both as people and nation.

Indeed, among devotees of U.S. global primacy—a group currently including just about everybody to the right of Noam Chomsky and to the left of Patrick Buchanan—merely to suggest that the American soldier might not be so different after all is to provoke outrage. The heated criticism evoked in some quarters by *Saving Private Ryan*, Steven Spielberg's moving tribute to the generation that fought World War II, offers a case in point. That Captain John Miller and his Rangers were remarkably good at killing Germans was, in the eyes of these critics, not good enough. However brave and resolute they may have been, however great the sacrifices they rendered, Spielberg's GIs flunked the litmus test of ideology. They manifested little appreciation of Nazism as a threat to liberty. They seemed oblivious to the fate of those imprisoned in Hitler's death camps. They just did as they were told, hoping that by saving Ryan, they might earn their passage home.

NOW ANOTHER filmmaker has entered the fray. *Three Kings*, David Russell's consciously revisionist interpretation of the Persian Gulf War, begins where standard accounts of that conflict leave off—after Desert Storm. This shrewdly chosen vantage point permits Russell to disregard the war's origins in favor of its uglier consequences, and to ignore the crimes that Iraq perpetrated while focusing on the punishment that Iraqis themselves endured.

Three Kings is above all a barbed rebuke directed at President George Bush, whom Russell indicts for being either morally obtuse or coldly cynical. Russell's main gripe is that Bush called off the war too soon. Although he framed the crusade against Saddam Hussein as a moral imperative, Bush halted U.S. forces as soon as they had secured the loot (in the form of Persian Gulf oil), ignoring the claims of freedom advanced by Iraqis eager to throw off their shackles. While a mighty American army sat preening itself on its success, Saddam brutally and methodically crushed this uprising. Rather than fulfilling their historic responsibility to serve as agents of freedom, American soldiers, through their inaction, became complicit in its destruction.

To recast the war in these terms, Russell must bring American soldiers face to face with the Iraqis whom he accuses the United States of forsaking. The story that he concocts to arrange that confrontation is, in many respects, a preposterous one. Immediately following the ceasefire, three young GIs, reservists assigned to a civil affairs unit, recover a map from an Iraqi prisoner of war. The map purports to show the location of Kuwaiti bullion looted by Saddam's army and now stashed in Iraq, well beyond the area occupied by coalition forces. Disappointed at having missed out on the "action", disoriented by their surreal surroundings (they struggle to distinguish between "our ragheads" and "their ragheads"), the three GIs hatch a scheme to enjoy at least one *bona fide* adventure before going home. They will re-enact Desert Storm in miniature, making their own dash across the desert to relieve Saddam of his ill-gotten gold. Joining them and masterminding the expedition is one Major Archie Gates (George

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Clooney). A hard-bitten professional, Gates spent his war servicing the media's voracious needs, occasionally even providing information. On the eve of retirement, he intends to leave the Persian Gulf with a nice nest egg to ease his transition to civilian life.

So Gates and his three cronies commandeer a Humvee and set out. Picking their way through the detritus of conquest—luxury cars and Rolexes, color TVs and stereos, Cuisinarts and cell phones—they get their hands on the bullion with remarkable ease. Yet in doing so they become enmeshed in the bloody struggle between Saddam's Republican Guard and a group of Iraqi dissidents, with whom, reluctantly, they make common cause.

Various misadventures ensue, some comic and macabre, others harrowing and horrific. One of the four Americans is killed. A second undergoes gruesome torture. Pursued by both Saddam's henchmen and their own highly incensed commanders, the three survivors are eventually cornered and confront their moment of truth: they must choose between treasure for themselves and freedom for others. Their understanding of the war's true meaning now transformed, they forfeit the gold to ransom several dozen erstwhile victims of Saddam's wrath who slip across the border to safety.

The implication is clear: if a handful of errant GIs could accomplish this much, then General Schwarzkopf's idle legions could—and should—have saved many more. Rather than merely restoring the independence of one country (Kuwait) and preserving the independence of another (Saudi Arabia), both of which rank among the world's least likeable, the U.S. military would then have kept faith with its time-honored tradition of expanding the realm of freedom.

It is a heartening proposition. Yet it is one that Russell's own story line cannot sustain. The sanctuary to which the dissidents escape is not America, nor even Kuwait, but Iran. No doubt survival in the Islamic Republic is preferable to death at the hands of Saddam's goons, but it hardly qualifies as freedom. Moreover, the conversion of Russell's three surviving heroes proves to be a temporary affair. The end of the movie finds the former Major Gates not crusading for human rights, but happily cashing in on his military skills as a technical adviser in Hollywood.

The expedition on which Gates embarked with his young comrades is an adolescent fantasy of war. Like scrubs who sat out the big game, they hankered for the chance to sprint out onto the field even if the final gun has sounded, the crowds departed, and the varsity has gone to the showers. It is hardly surprising that such an enterprise should go awry.

FOR ALL OF his film's apparent realism and candid acknowledgment of war's brutality, David Russell attempts to foist onto the viewer his own fantasy. Back in Washington, politicians and generals may conspire to conceal or disregard moral considerations, he seems to suggest, but the common soldier in the field retains the capacity to discern truth and to act accordingly. Even if our system of governance appears irredeemably compromised, Russell implies, the conscience of the American soldier may yet prevent the United States from sinking to the depths of ignobility that marked every other empire that has held sway across the globe. Indeed, as the last reservoir of American idealism, he may yet permit the United States to use its vast military power to do good works.

A more fundamental misunderstanding of the reality of war can scarcely be imagined. Any soldier thrust into war views events through a thick shroud of moral ambiguity. Combat does not instill clarity of vision. Rather, it tests the capacity of individuals to maintain even the

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most rudimentary distinction between good and evil. Too frequently, that distinction is lost altogether, with tragic consequences. Incidents such as My Lai or the recently revealed massacre at No Gun Ri make the point that Americans are not exempt from this phenomenon.

Yet there is no need even to look back as far as Korea or Vietnam. The years since Desert Storm provide an abundance of examples suggesting that resorting to force, however worthy the motivation, leads to moral complications that soldiers are ill-equipped to resolve. In Somalia, troops sent to feed the starving ended up gunning down women and children in gun battles in the streets of Mogadishu. In Kosovo, NATO pilots, failing to halt the depredations of a Yugoslav Army engaged in ethnic cleansing, resorted instead to hammering Belgrade. For months on end, in the skies over Iraq, American airmen have been conducting an air campaign that kills and injures Iraqis for no conceivable purpose.

However much David Russell might wish otherwise, it is not the job of soldiers to untangle the moral snares inherent in these conflicts. It never has been their job to do so. Even the most justifiable of conflicts have not placed American soldiers in a position to relieve politicians of *their* responsibility to grapple with the tension between morality and expediency in war. Soldiers have, after all, their own war-induced demons with which they are obliged to wrestle. On his own journey of self-discovery at Gettysburg, Chamberlain himself, as portrayed by Shaara, confronts this disconcerting fact. Preparing to address the mutineers of the 2nd Maine, Chamberlain assured himself that "the American fights for mankind, for freedom, for the people not the land." Yet in the course of the battle that follows, Chamberlain finds that no cause can adequately explain the ferocity with which the two armies collide. Above all, no cause can explain the abandon with which he himself has fought and the profound exhilaration that he derives from his own intimate encounter with killing and death on a field of almost incomprehensible slaughter.

After Appomattox, the real Chamberlain returned to Maine and lived a long life as his state's most honored and revered citizen. The liberating army in which he had served dispersed, almost overnight. In short order, the former slaves, for whose freedom that army had ostensibly fought, returned to quasi-bondage at the hands of Southern white supremacists. The cause of freedom, to the extent that it had ever actually mattered, was forgotten.

To imagine that in the present age American soldiers can help the United States steer clear of comparable moral failures is to impose on them an unfair burden. For a nation that aspires to political and cultural hegemony on a global scale, it is also a dangerous illusion. □

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NATO and Kosovo

Ivo H. Daalder takes issue with Layne and Schwarz:

DURING the early weeks of the Kosovo war, critics of the Clinton administration were appalled by NATO's lack of planning. NATO, after all, had gone to war for the ostensible purpose of protecting the Kosovar Albanians, only to see 1.5 million of them being forced from their homes. With the benefit of hindsight, however, it ought to be evident to these critics that their conclusions about the administration's fallibility were premature. While the diplomatic and military strategies hardly proved optimal, there can be little doubt that NATO won the war. Having myself been one of the critics, I have no compunction admitting that this is the case. Not so Christopher Layne and Benjamin Schwarz, who recently argued in these pages that the Clinton administration bears primary responsibility for the humanitarian crisis in Kosovo ("For the Record", Fall 1999).

Layne and Schwarz's contention is based on three arguments. First, the conflict in Kosovo was essentially one that pitted a radicalized and violent Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), bent on independence, against a Belgrade government that sought to defend the status quo. Second, the humanitarian calamity that befell the Kosovar Albanians (who constituted 90 percent of Kosovo's population) was the result not of what Serb military, paramilitary and police forces did, but of NATO's decision to bomb Serbia. Third, the people of Kosovo today are worse off because NATO intervened.

In essence, Layne and Schwarz blame the victims for the crimes inflicted on them and then compound that error by confusing those who sought, however ineptly, to prevent the crimes with those who perpetrated them. But even a cursory examination of the evidence suggests Serb responsibility for the conflict. What is more, NATO's intervention in the end created a situation that is infinitely preferable for individual Kosovars to the one in which they found themselves before the war. Indeed, their life is better and their future more promising than would have been the case under the Rambouillet agreement, the rejection of which by Slobodan Milosevic was the reason for NATO's intervention.

LAYNE and Schwarz rightly contend that the "historical background of the Kosovo crisis is complex", but they then proceed to ignore even the most basic historical facts of the conflict. This is unfortunate, since such facts might help explain why Serb and Albanian aims proved irreconcilable. For example, it might be useful to acknowledge that Milosevic rose to power in Serbia partly on the backs of the Kosovar Albanians. In 1989 he stripped away the constitutional autonomy Kosovo had enjoyed during the previous fifteen years. In its stead emerged a

Ivo H. Daalder is a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, and co-author of *Kosovo: Anatomy of a Crisis* (Brookings Institution Press, forthcoming).

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highly repressive Serb regime that denied Albanians any authority in running day-to-day life in the province. It is equally important to recall that for eight years after autonomy was taken from them, the Albanian people resisted Serb repression without violence. Instead, they contented themselves with setting up parallel state structures—organizing elections for a "presidency" and "parliament", providing Albanian-language education for their young, and seeking in many other ways to circumvent Serb authority.

Yet, eight years of non-violent resistance proved incapable of either denting Serb control or gaining international sympathy. As a result, some Kosovars came to believe that violence offered a better prospect for success. Indeed, the Dayton Accord that ended the war in neighboring Bosnia suggested that the most effective means of attracting international attention was through violence rather than peaceful resistance. This helps to explain the emergence of the KLA—a small, ideologically diverse group that initially consisted of no more than a few hundred fighters.

Rather than dealing with the problem posed by the KLA in a proportionate manner, Serb authorities decided to show the Kosovars who was boss. By the summer of 1998, some 30,000 Serb interior police and army forces were engaged in a systematic campaign to eradicate the KLA. At times, their actions proved particularly brutal, as when Serb forces raided the village of Gornji Obrinje in late September, massacring 34 people, including 21 women, children and elderly ranging in age from 4 to 95. By early fall, some 450,000 Kosovar Albanians—*25 percent of those living in Kosovo*—had been expelled from or fled their homes. Of these, about 50,000 huddled in the mountains with neither food nor shelter—facing the prospect of a strong winter above and marauding Serb forces below.

This, then, was the kind of counterinsurgency that Serb forces conducted during 1998. Contrary to Layne and Schwarz's contention that this was a normal or even an effective way of dealing with the KLA, Serb actions proved to be not only brutal but counterproductive. The KLA grew rapidly in size and support; the Albanian population became radicalized; and the international community was galvanized to act—hardly the textbook outcome of a successful counterinsurgency campaign. This was not just a conflict pitting two irreconcilable sides against one another. It was a fight between a government bent on wreaking havoc and a defenseless population looking for protection from what had started out as little more than a ragtag band of rebels.

WHEN NATO bombing commenced on March 24, 1999, Serb forces accelerated their campaign against the Kosovar Albanians by forcibly expelling as many of them as possible from Kosovo. Layne and Schwarz pin the blame for this development squarely on NATO: "not until NATO began its bombing did Belgrade's objective in Kosovo change from counterinsurgency to a deliberate campaign to expel the province's ethnic Albanians." This confuses pace with intent. What changed was the pace with which Serb forces acted, not their purpose, which remained unchanged.

There is no doubt that the NATO bombing led to an acceleration of atrocities against the Kosovar Albanian population. Prior to the commencement of the air campaign, Serb forces had paced themselves in the belief that, as one Serb diplomat reportedly put it, "a village a day keeps NATO away."[1] However, once the bombing started and the prospect of using NATO ground troops had been publicly ruled out, the constraint on Serb actions was lifted. NATO's mistake, as Layne and Schwarz rightly argue, was in believing that the bombing would force Belgrade to the negotiating table and in failing to prepare for the possibility that Milosevic might instead accelerate his campaign against the Kosovar Albanians.

This was a major, indeed, a tragic failure on NATO's part. But that is a far cry from blaming NATO for what the Serbs did. The

[1]Barton Gellman, *Washington Post*, April 18, 1999.

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self-described Serb campaign of "ethnic cleansing" in Kosovo was neither novel nor somehow out of character. Much the same had happened in large parts of Croatia in 1991 and Bosnia in 1992-95. The world had already witnessed Vukovar, Prijedor and, of course, Srebrenica. To these could now be added similar horrors—from the methodical emptying of Djakovica to the wiping out of Suva Reka to the destruction of Belanica.

None of this was accidental, or suddenly and spasmodically decided the day NATO bombed. This was a methodical, well-planned and ruthlessly executed campaign. As John Kifner has shown (*New York Times*, May 29, 1999), its purpose was twofold: first, to remove the KLA's "base of support and cover", and second, to depopulate Kosovo in an effort to defuse a "demographic time bomb." Belgrade developed a specific plan for this very purpose—Operation Horseshoe. In early 1999 Serbia steadily increased the strength of its army and interior police forces in and around Kosovo to 42,000 troops, adding 1,000 heavy weapons to their arsenal, and began recruiting irregular and paramilitary forces to conduct the heinous crimes that would become an intricate part of the campaign.[2] These were the carefully planned steps necessary to prepare for what a senior Serb army general in January 1999 referred to as the "hot spring", in which "the problem of Kosovo and Metohija will be definitely solved."[3] This was not some contingency plan, as Layne and Schwarz assert. Rather, it was a systematic plan to alter Kosovo's ethnic balance that Belgrade began to implement on March 19, 1999—five days before the first NATO bombs were dropped.

The results of the plan's rapid execution are well known. One and a half million Kosovar Albanians were forced from their homes—*85 percent of the entire population.* More than 10,000 people were killed, many mutilated or burned in more than 200 mass graves. Thousands of women were raped. In short, not one Kosovar Albanian remained untouched by this brutality—a brutality for which no one other than the Serb perpetrators was responsible.

LAYNE and Schwarz are strangely silent about the outcome of the war. Could this be because NATO's success nullifies their thesis? There can be little doubt that, in the end, NATO achieved its main objective: to create a safe and secure environment for the Kosovars. These requirements were met when NATO and the Serb military signed their agreement on June 10, spelling out how and when the Serbs would depart and NATO would move into Kosovo. Moreover, contrary to other arguments, this outcome was better than would have been the case if the Rambouillet plan had been accepted. Under that plan, 5,000 Serb security forces would have remained in Kosovo; today there are none. Kosovo is effectively an international protectorate, one run by the United Nations and NATO, and shorn of Serb sovereignty in all but name.

Within one month of NATO forces entering Kosovo, 750,000 refugees returned. That is a remarkable testament to the success of U.S. and NATO policy. It stands in marked contrast to the fears all of us shared just a few months ago—fears of permanent exile for nearly a million people, and of starvation and death for many hundreds of thousands.

Of course, daily life in Kosovo is far from normal—adequate housing remains sparse, the economy is in ruins, and no administrative infrastructure exists. Moreover, while nearly all Albanians have returned, there has been a large exodus of Serbs. And in the chaos and confusion that accompanied the end of the war, a few hundred Serbs and Albanians have

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[2]R. Jeffrey Smith and William Drozdiak, *Washington Post*, April 11, 1999; and James M. Dorsey, *Wall Street Journal*, September 1, 1999.

[3]"Briefing of SACEUR General Wesley Clark" (Brussels: NATO Headquarters, April 13, 1999), available at www.nato.int/pictures/1999/ 990413/b990413c.jpg.

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been killed. Though tragic, it is important to put these developments in perspective. The killings after the war have occurred at a rate that is still well below the murder rate in many U.S. cities. And while many Serbs left precipitously in fear of returning Kosovar Albanians, this cannot be compared to the systematic and forced expulsion of the province's Albanian population prior to and during the war.

The Kosovo war was a tragedy. It is clear that NATO did not adopt the best strategy either for dealing with the conflict or for conducting the war. It is therefore certainly legitimate to ask whether an alternative strategy would have had a greater chance of success at preventing Milosevic from inflicting terrible depredations against the Kosovar people. But it should be equally clear that NATO's intervention made a difference for the better. Compare Kosovo to Bosnia, where at least 100,000 died while NATO stood on the sidelines. Although NATO acted too late in Kosovo to prevent a major tragedy, it intervened early enough to avoid a repeat of Bosnia. And that, in the end, is no small achievement. □

Christopher Layne and Benjamin Schwarz reply:

IVO DAALDER, a former Clinton administration NSC staffer, understandably seeks to whitewash the administration's dismal record of failure in Kosovo. But measured by its own declared objective, the administration's strategy was disastrous. It triggered the very humanitarian crisis it ostensibly intervened to prevent; created a KLA-dominated Kosovo that threatens long-term Balkan stability; and makes a mockery of the notion that Kosovo will be transformed into a multi-ethnic democracy.

Dr. Daalder deals with unpleasant facts in characteristically Clintonesque fashion. All accounts of what happened in Kosovo agree on the fundamental point: whatever plans the Serbs may have had to expand the conflict, until March 24 the war in Kosovo was a counterinsurgency. The Serbs decided to pursue the objective of depopulating Kosovo of its ethnic Albanian population only after the bombing started.

No doubt, the Serbs' pre-bombing counterinsurgency was brutal—although the actual scale of that brutality remains an open question. (The bodies found thus far after diligent search suggest that the number of ethnic Albanians killed was far less than the 10,000 claimed by NATO.) In any event, counterinsurgencies are always brutal: civilians inescapably become targets of violence, because the insurgents draw their manpower and political support from the population in whose name they fight. In any guerrilla war, the line distinguishing fighters from noncombatants evaporates. Dr. Daalder excoriates the Serbs because their pre-bombing counterinsurgency created a refugee problem. He should learn more about military history.

The ferocity of the war between the Serbs and the KLA in Kosovo is explained by the conflict's historical roots. On this point, Dr. Daalder's argument is disingenuous. He says he recognizes the origins of Kosovo's ethnic conflict, but for him they extend back only as far as 1989, when Belgrade revoked Kosovo's autonomy. If Dr. Daalder went further back, he would have discovered that the Serbs had legitimate grievances, having been systematically discriminated against during Kosovo's period of autonomy. Going even further back, few Serbs have forgotten that many ethnic

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Albanians sided with Nazi Germany after Yugoslavia was invaded in 1941, and some fought in Nazi SS formations. Our point is not that the Serbs are the good guys. In Kosovo there are no good guys—just a history of mutual repression and retribution that negates the idea that right or justice lies clearly on one side or the other.

Events in postwar Kosovo confirm this. Dr. Daalder tosses off the repression perpetrated against the province's remaining Serbs by claiming that the postwar death rate in Kosovo is lower than in many U.S. cities. A more relevant yardstick is that since the war ended, ethnic Serbs in Kosovo have been killed at nearly the same rate at which ethnic Albanians were being killed from the beginning of 1998 until the bombing commenced in March 1999. In short, Kosovo's ethnic Albanians are no more prepared to live in peace with Serbs than the Serbs were with them.

Dr. Daalder thinks the Kosovo war ended in success, but his is a strange definition of victory. NATO's intervention all but guaranteed the KLA's accession to power. The KLA has made clear that it has no interest in a democratic or multi-ethnic Kosovo. The KLA is committed to independence and a "Greater Albania", a goal inconsistent with any reasonable notion of Balkan stability. Now, the Clinton administration has reportedly resigned itself to Kosovo's independence, notwithstanding its previous recognition that this would be a dangerous outcome. If "peace" prevails in Kosovo and Bosnia, it is only because the United States and NATO have undertaken the task of maintaining a major military presence of indefinite duration. Perhaps that is "success"—but, if so, it is success of a peculiar kind. □

China's Military, Take 3

Gill and O'Hanlon hit back:

LET US BEGIN BY thanking Ambassador James Lilley and Carl Ford for driving home an important point in their article, "China's Military: A Second Opinion" (Fall 1999): any conflict over Taiwan would be of the utmost seriousness regardless of what one thinks of the conventional military balance in the region. No one who read our article ("China's Hollow Military", Summer 1999) should be led to believe otherwise. The potential for enormous losses in Taiwan and southeastern coastal China; the lasting geopolitical harm resulting from the embitterment and ostracization of the world's most populous state after such a war; and the slight but real risk of nuclear escalation are all extremely worrisome, even if the People's Republic of China (PRC) were to prove unsuccessful in invading or blockading Taiwan.

Lilley and Ford are also right to emphasize that China has been trying to improve its problem-plagued military. And they are surely correct that PRC forces need not equal the capabilities of the U.S. military to pose a significant risk to American interests in East Asia. We made these points too, but it is worthwhile to have them reinforced. On a

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number of other points, however, Lilley and Ford plainly misrepresent our argument. On others, they overstate China's military prowess, or commit precisely the error we warned against: equating Beijing's aspirations with its actual capabilities.

BEGINNING with budgetary matters, Lilley and Ford imply that we understate China's true level of defense spending. But, while they note that most Western estimates put the PRC's annual expenditures between $28 billion and $50 billion, we had put the range between $35 billion and $65 billion. The authors make a great deal of China's revenues from arms sales and the possibility that these could help the PRC modernize its military capability "off-budget." But recent analysis by the Congressional Research Service puts the gross revenues of such sales at no more than a few hundred million dollars per year. Moreover, independent research in books edited by Ambassador Lilley himself shows that little, if any, of the net profit from these sales is reinvested in PLA modernization.

Our essay went on to note that China's defense expenditures, while fairly impressive in aggregate, translate into a low level of spending per troop. China has provided particularly few resources in areas that soldiers know to be critical in warfighting—such as logistics, maintenance and training. Hence the title of our article, "China's Hollow Military"—with its implication that while the PRC's armed forces may be impressive on paper, their quality is mediocre and their fighting abilities limited.

Employing quantitative measures, we point out just how badly China's military equipment lags behind that of the United States. As Lilley and Ford rightly emphasize, China need not approach parity with American armed forces to cause serious trouble in a crisis or war. However, China trails the United States by a factor of well over 10 in its inventory of modern defense equipment, by that same 10:1 ratio in defense research and engineering, and by as much as 50:1 in areas like modern fighter aircraft. In addition, major U.S. friends and allies in East Asia—Japan, South Korea and Taiwan—all possess much more modern militaries than does the PRC. Notably, from 1991 to 1998 alone, Taiwan outspent China in foreign weapons purchases by a factor of nearly 4:1; if we factor in foreign weapons currently in the pipeline, the ratio increases to about 7:1. Unfortunately, Lilley and Ford's essay did not get into such levels of detail.

Lilley and Ford did spend a fair amount of time discussing how well China's military could defend its own territory. We agree, and fail to see the danger in that. In fact, we were trying to highlight the difference between the total of China's armed forces—2.8 million strong, roughly twice as large as those of the United States—and the number that could operate abroad in places such as Taiwan. The latter number is, and will remain, far lower.

In that regard, Lilley and Ford demonstrate a surprising reluctance to engage in analytical exchange. We stated that China would have great difficulty transporting more than 20,000 troops at a time across the Taiwan Strait—many of whom would probably be sunk or shot down en route—and that they would face an active duty Taiwanese force of 250,000, backed by 1.5 million reservists, once they arrived. Which, if any, of these numbers do Lilley and Ford contest? Which do they consider irrelevant? And what historical analogies, or analytical arguments, can they invoke to assert that a force lacking air superiority can assault a small beachfront when its well-armed opponent knows it is coming? To claim that because China is a bigger country it must ultimately prevail seems at best simplistic.

Then, too, while China's old but large air force, and growing missile force, might hit some key fixed targets in Taiwan and intimidate civilian populations, they cannot alter the basic nature of these troop-strength

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comparisons. As was demonstrated by the Iran-Iraq War of the Cities, Iraqi missile strikes during Desert Storm, and the Battle of Britain, ballistic missile attacks may terrorize but they generally cannot subjugate. (That is not to say that we necessarily oppose Taiwanese acquisition of U.S. missile defense systems, should China continue its destabilizing missile build-up on its southeastern coast.)

It is worth recalling that in the great amphibious assaults of World War II—such as Normandy, Iwo Jima and Okinawa—invading allied forces typically possessed local advantages of at least 2:1 in troop strength. They also had sufficient control of the skies to prevent the enemy from reinforcing and to batter the enemy's beached forces with preparatory gunfire. But in any attempted PRC crossing of the Taiwan Strait, it is Taiwan that would enjoy the manpower advantage. While it might not enjoy air dominance, it would probably not cede it to China either—and it would know a great deal about when and where Chinese forces intended to come ashore.

Lilley and Ford ask why we accept a good deal of the evidence presented in two Pentagon reports, yet challenge those same reports on the question of Taiwan's defensibility. We believe the Pentagon did a good job in acquiring data and reaching narrow military judgments, but erred in its overall assessment. Put simply, it got the trees right, but missed the forest. The Defense Department often relies on opaque models to assess military engagements, models that are typically far less reliable than the data entered into them. We were all reminded of this in Desert Storm, a case in which the Pentagon's models proved to be further off the mark in predicting casualties than most independent estimates performed by scholars armed only with hand calculators.

Lilley and Ford are on firmer ground in their discussion of the blockade scenario. In this case, as we noted, Taiwan might well require U.S. help. We think they are wrong to assume that the United States would simply stand by and watch Taiwan be blockaded, but one can still ask if the United States *should* adopt such an arms-length policy. What, for instance, are the pros and cons of current policy versus that of selling Taiwan all the arms it seeks—and possibly acquiescing in Taiwan's acquisition of at least a latent nuclear weapons capability—while declaring that the United States would never fight on Taiwan's behalf? In short, what is the case for allowing Taiwan to become, in effect, an Asian Israel? We think that this policy option, however attractive on the surface, would increase rather than decrease the risk of war between China and Taiwan.

So let us close where we began—by acknowledging the danger of a war between the PRC and Taiwan. We doubt seriously that China would use nuclear weapons against the United States should it participate in such a war, given the logic of deterrence and the overwhelming power of the American nuclear arsenal, but acknowledge that this would be the most serious standoff between nuclear powers since the Cuban Missile Crisis. However much we might fear such a scenario, China would have at least as much to dread. And the United States does not have a history of backing down, or of deserting friends and allies, in the face of possible nuclear threats.

Lilley and Ford are correct that conflict between nuclear powers is a dangerous prospect. But they are wrong to suggest that the nuclear danger trumps China's overwhelming conventional disadvantages. If and when the PRC considers its options for taking Taiwan, those conventional military disadvantages will weigh heavily in its thinking, and that, in the end, is a very comforting thought. □

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

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Books

The Arithmetic of Atrocity

Peter Rutland

Stéphane Courtois et al., *The Black Book of Communism: Crimes, Terror, Repression*, trans. Jonathan Murphy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), 1120 pp., $37.50.

TWO YEARS AGO a group of French intellectuals published *The Black Book of Communism*, an 860-page indictment of the bloody swathe that communism cut across the twentieth century. The book, timed to coincide with the eightieth anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution, sold 150,000 copies and produced a storm of controversy, whose waves reached the shores of Cambridge and Manhattan.

Editor Stéphane Courtois argued in his introduction that there was a moral equivalence between Stalinism and Nazism, that Stalin's "class genocide" paralleled Hitler's destruction of the Jews. Indeed, communism was even worse, because it lasted longer, spread to more countries, and thus killed more people: nearly 100 million, versus 25 million for the Nazis.

The Black Book is now available in English from Harvard University Press. Books about communism and atrocities sell well: they are the thinking person's equivalent of the horror movie. But the book's impact in the United States is likely to be more muted than in France. The political context of anti-communism in the two countries is radically different; and the scholarly merits of the book, while significant, do not substantially add to the picture presented in the earlier works of Robert Conquest and others.

In France there are still plenty of people willing to believe that communism has some redeeming features. At the time of the book's publication there were three communist ministers in the French government, and some of the book's eleven authors were themselves recovering Maoists and Trotskyites. The Russian Revolution was modeled after its French predecessor, after all; and French society had signally failed to deal with the Vichy regime's collaboration with the Nazis. This meant that French Leftists were willing to turn a blind eye to communism's failings. Things only started to change with the publication of Alexander Solzhenitsyn's *Gulag Archipelago* in the mid-1970s, and with the contemporaneous news of the Cambodian genocide.

In contrast, since the 1940s communist ideas have made minimal inroads into American society, even among American intellectuals. Indeed, what French intellectuals were shocked to discover in the 1980s (that communism was bad news) had long been conventional wisdom for ordinary Americans—for

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anyone who subscribed to *Reader's Digest* or read George Orwell's *1984* in high school. That did not stop most American reviewers of the French edition of *The Black Book* from praising it for its willingness to confront the legacy of Stalinism.

Grappling With the Beast

THE BLACK BOOK sets out to provide a comprehensive and definitive account of communism's "crimes, terror and repression" worldwide, drawing upon the latest available archival materials and secondary research. It also seeks to furnish an explanation for why and how these crimes occurred. Unfortunately, due to unevenness in the quality of the written chapters, the book does not quite deliver on either of these two goals. It is more successful with respect to the first (description) than the second (explanation).

The geographical sweep of the book is impressive, encompassing not only Russia and Eastern Europe, China and Cambodia, but also the minor-league players and wannabes: from Afghanistan, North Korea and Cuba down to Peru's Sendero Luminoso and even Carlos the Jackal. Unfortunately, in practice the book's coverage is rather lopsided.

The first third is rightly devoted to the mother ship of communism, the Soviet Union. However, author Nicholas Werth devotes 220 pages to a detailed historical study of the first 35 years of Soviet power, leaving only 10 pages for the next 40 years. Certainly it is important to document the years of high Stalinism, and to show that repression began as soon as Lenin took power. But surely any catalogue of communism should include a thorough account of the stultifying decades of the Soviet Union after 1953: the persecution of dissidents; the oppression of workers (such as the shooting of dozens of protestors in the city of Novocherkassk in June 1962, which is not mentioned); and the reckless and near-suicidal nuclear arms race with the West.

Also excluded from Werth's analysis is the Soviet collapse, a regrettable omission. Gorbachev's efforts to confront the Stalinist legacy led to the speedy demise of all the communist states in Europe, including the break-up of the Soviet state itself. But the repression continued, on a lower scale, even during the Gorbachev years. One can learn a great deal about how an organism worked by studying how it died. The ability of the Russian state to escape its Stalinist past is still an open and urgent question (especially now, with bombs once more falling on Chechnya).

In contrast to Werth, the other chapters take history right up to the present. Karel Bartosek contributes a brilliant chapter in which the entire sweep of communist rule in Eastern and Central Europe and the Balkans is surveyed in a mere sixty pages. He covers the Stalinist terror, the long decades of "normalization", and the final collapse. Provocatively, he suggests that the purges of the early 1950s may in part have been intended to prepare for an all-out war with the West. Poland gets a whole chapter to itself, a fine dissection of the mechanics of repression by Andrzej Paczkowski. Curiously, East Germany is ignored, and that most striking icon of the evil of communism, the Berlin Wall, is mentioned in only two sentences. (A special chapter on East Germany was added for the German edition.) A whole sixty-page chapter is devoted to the machinations of the Comintern, and another to the Spanish Civil War. The sacrifice of international socialism on the altar of Soviet national interests is not news, nor was it particularly evil. (Would it have been better if Stalin had been a true internationalist?) The most damaging action of the Comintern—its refusal to work with the socialists to block Hitler's rise—is discussed in a single paragraph.

Jean-Louis Margolin contributes three chapters. His pieces on China and Cambodia are superb examples of the historian's craft: concise yet comprehensive, replete with analytical insight and graphic detail. In contrast, his chapter on Vietnam and Laos is a cursory

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eleven pages, with only one sentence each on the 1968 Hue massacre and the tragedy of the Boat People. Pierre Rigoulot's chapter on North Korea gives some sense of that curious regime, but lack of information hinders a full analysis (one suspects a South Korean scholar would have had more to say). The final section of the book tries to cover Cuba, Nicaragua, Peru, Afro-communism and Afghanistan in just seventy-five pages. This leaves room for little more than capsule histories and quick estimates of country-by-country death tolls.

Chasing After Numbers

THE BLACK BOOK's guiding principle, as laid down by its editor, is to count the victims of communist regimes. Much of the debate sparked by the French edition revolved around Courtois' claim that communism's death toll approached 100 million. Leftists countered with death lists of the victims of imperialism and global capitalism. (This year saw the publication of *Le Livre Noir du Capitalisme*.) Some of the authors openly resisted the pressure to define victimization in terms of death estimates. Margolin and Werth accused Courtois of being obsessed with arriving at a total of 100 million.

This whole approach is misguided, not least because the data regarding victims are not systematically and carefully presented. Courtois provides a "rough approximation" table which adds up to 95 million, but his list of specific campaigns leaves out any numbers for deaths in the Soviet Gulag or in Maoist China.

The country authors note that death estimates vary widely and definitive figures are not available. Werth, for example, points out that estimates of Polish deportations in 1940 range from 381,000 (the official NKVD figure) to 1 million (Polish estimates). Margolin's estimates for Chinese deaths in the famine caused by the Great Leap Forward (1959-62) range from 20 to 43 million. Given such variations, any attempt to come up with aggregate figures is bound to be shaky, and is a sick echo of Stalin's warning against "chasing after numbers" during the collectivization drive. The really big numbers of dead come from the famines in 1921, 1932 and 1959-62. The second-largest source is deaths during deportations and the attrition of daily life in the camps. Death rates of 5-10 percent a year were common, with average internments in peak years of 5 and 10 million in Soviet and Chinese camps respectively.

Courtois' obsession with the body count draws attention away from "the immense sea of suffering" of communism's living victims, who outnumber the dead. Bartosek warns of pursuing "the myth of the number of victims", in which "the figure becomes a key symbol, a mathematical truth. . . . it transforms mass deaths into a kind of sacrament." The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia killed "only" 90 people, and "only" 3,000 died during the suppression of the Hungarian Revolution in 1956 (followed by 100,000 arrests). But these displays of force were sufficient to terrorize tens of millions of people into obedience for decades to come. The Soviets used 6,300 tanks to invade Czechoslovakia—twice as many as Hitler used to attack Russia. Similarly, Margolin notes that the Cultural Revolution was not particularly bloody by the standards of previous years. Perhaps 100,000 were killed by the Red Guards, and another million in the army's crackdown. Still, this proved sufficient to paralyze society. "What use was killing, when the leaders could terrorize so effectively?", he writes. And since then, the system has learned how to function without mass killing, as did Russia after 1953.

The communists' ability to strip their subjects of their freedom, their dignity, and their ability to control their own lives is just as important a part of the communist legacy as the sheer number of dead. It was the communists' ability to use fear as an instrument of rule, not their ability to kill large numbers of people, that kept them in power for decades. This is where they differ from the Nazis, who only ruled for thirteen bloody years.

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The Reason Why

THE FACT THAT *The Black Book* starts out as a body counting exercise diminishes its value as a work of historical inquiry. Courtois devotes a final chapter to the question "Why?", but fails to come up with a clear answer.

The general argument seems to be as follows. In the beginning was the Idea—that of a communist utopia—which served to legitimate the ruthless seizure of power. Lenin and the Bolsheviks began in Petrograd in 1917 and expanded outwards, city by city, province by province, country by country. Communism spread around the globe like a virus. The model is an evolutionary one, except this is survival of the unfittest, of an Idea that Kills. The communist idea seems to have sprung up independently in Hunan in 1928, with the first peasant communes under Peng Pai. Echoing the debate over the African origins of Homo sapiens, Homo Stalinus appeared simultaneously in Europe and Asia. Courtois does not explain why this Idea arose or why Leninist believers were so amazingly successful, grabbing 40 percent of the planet's surface in a single generation.

The book is on firmer ground when it comes to explaining the mechanics of Terror: the how rather than the why. Leninism was the triumph of means over ends, the application of physical force unchecked by law or morality. Key techniques were assassination, execution, imprisonment, deportation, hostage-taking and famine. Wherever communists took power, food quickly disappeared (Russia, Cuba, Ethiopia). Men with guns controlled the food supply, and through food, controlled the people. It is numbing to read how a similar apparatus of purges and prisons was created in country after country.

Still, many questions remain, questions which cannot be answered within Courtois' moralistic model of an Evil Idea triggering an apparatus of repression. Why was communism so successful in gaining power? How were the communists able to recruit the 20,000-50,000 men required to initiate and maintain their terror program? Why were rebellions so unsuccessful? One can see that the Red Terror of 1918-21, and even the collectivization of 1930-32, were useful in consolidating the power of the Stalinist regime. But what purpose was served by the Great Purge of 1936? What was the relation between communism and nationalism? Did communists share technologies of power with fascists—or for that matter imperialists? (The book fails to note that concentration camps were invented by the British during the Boer War.)

Merely listing the crimes of communism will not necessarily help us to understand why they occurred. The focus on crimes is unidimensional and leads to a distorted sense of history. Paczkowski notes that, "Looking at the past only from the point of view of repression risks a somewhat deformed assessment of the communist system, since even in the most repressive periods the system did have other functions." The book pays remarkably little attention to the role of propaganda, economics and foreign relations. These were vital aspects of the communist system in general and of the camps in particular. Developments in international relations, for example, often triggered waves of repression. Purge victims were frequently accused of collaboration with foreign countries, and this was the excuse Stalin used to deport entire peoples. Indeed, the Stalinist system cannot be understood in isolation from its global context.

Treating communism as an absolute evil leads to an ahistorical approach in which complicating and contextual factors are downplayed. Differences between countries are not systematically addressed; rather, the assumption is that the countries are variations on a single theme. Perhaps it was not accidental that Stalinism happened in Russia?

One should note that many of the authors try to break out of the book's framework and stress culture-specific fac-

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tors. Margolin stresses that communism in Asia is a "national affair", differing from country to country. Ideology played a pivotal role in the Maoist system, which stemmed in part from China's Confucian tradition. Cambodia, where communism turned into genocide, was not touched by Confucianism, although Pol Pot did take from China the idea of a Great Leap Forward, with murderous results.

How Good a Documentary Record?

IF *THE BLACK BOOK* does not break new ground in explaining the phenomenon of communism, then its main value should be as a documentary record. Regrettably, there are some lapses from scholarly propriety that inhibit its contribution.

Scattered through the Soviet chapters are fascinating new documents from the archives, such as the correspondence between Stalin and Mikhail Sholokhov about the torture of peasants during collectivization; a 1937 note from Ezhov ordering the liquidation of Polish communists; a letter from Beria to Stalin, in which he reports ordering 25,700 Polish officers killed in 1940; and a 1941 Gulag commandant report. Strangely, no citation is given for the source of these documents. There is no reason to believe that they are fake, but it would have been nice to know where they came from.

The use of sources is erratic. While some authors provide scrupulous documentation, others litter the text with figures and quotations seemingly plucked from thin air. Thus, for example, we learn that 70 percent of respondents in the 1937 Soviet census said they believed in God; or that there were 2,044 Soviet military advisers in Spain "according to one Soviet source"—but no source is assigned in either case. A whole paragraph of data is presented without sources on postwar expulsions of Greeks. Chapter one has no footnotes at all. Estimates for deaths in Chinese purges are said to range from 81,000 to 770,000 in 1954 and from 400,000 to 700,000 in 1957—again without any citations provided.

Inevitably, some important atrocities are left out. There is a cryptic sentence on page 323: "This survey would not be complete without mention of the 900,000 Japanese soldiers taken prisoner in Manchuria" (in 1945). But that is all the reader will learn of their fate. The deportation of 400,000 Japanese civilians from Sakhalin, which also took place in 1945, is not mentioned. Surely if a shootout in the Norwegian communist offices in 1949 rates a paragraph, one could give a couple of sentences to 1.3 million Japanese? The Soviet takeover of Mongolia and the systematic destruction of its culture is not included, nor is the devastating effect of the purges on the Kazakhs. Kazakh intellectuals claim Stalin killed one-third of the Kazakh population, a level of suffering close to that of the Tibetans. *The Black Book* merely mentions that some Kazakhs fled to China. The Kuropaty graves, where thousands of slain Belarusians were buried, are not discussed. They are significant because they were the first mass graves uncovered in the Gorbachev era.

The Black Book can also be faulted for failing to systematically explain how its findings differ from the work of earlier authors. Werth's chapters are the only ones that are based on serious new archival research. He adds much interesting detail, particularly regarding the severity of repression during the early years of Bolshevism, and again during World War II. But it is not clear that he decisively advances our understanding beyond the work of Conquest or Solzhenitsyn. He writes, "Current research seems to negate many of the conclusions previously drawn by Sovietologists", and "Some of [Conquest's] extrapolations about the power structures and number of victims involved have subsequently been disproved." Maddeningly, he does not back up these statements with any specific examples. Werth makes only one reference to the Smolensk archive, a vast cache of documents captured by the Nazis that were mined by Fainsod, Conquest and others.

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Werth concentrates on archival material and provides only one eyewitness report in 260 pages of narrative. This is regrettable since the victims' experiences are at least as valuable as the bureaucratic paper trail. (Margolin and Bartosek include some excellent victim accounts in their chapters.)

In requiem

THERE IS MUCH to learn from this tombstone of a book. However many accounts one has read of the Soviet Gulag and Chinese *laogai*, there is always some new detail that takes one by surprise. One learns, for example, that in Romania prisoners were trained to torture each other; that some Chinese swapped their children in order to eat them; and that Kim Il Sung ordered the liquidation of dwarves. It is impossible to *imagine* the extent of man's capacity for cruelty—one has to read it to believe it possible.

But it is doubtful whether the contemplation of evil is best done through a tabulation of victims. As the saying goes, "a single death is a tragedy, a million deaths is a statistic." The best way to comprehend the evil of communism is through individual victims' memoirs.[1] And the best way to understand communism as a historical phenomenon is through the traditional historian's craft, including the consideration of all variables and the weighing of rival hypotheses. □

[1]Fine examples include Slavomir Rawicz, *The Long Walk* (New York: Lyons Press, 1997); and Zhiang Liang, *Grass Soup* (Boston: David Godine, 1995).

Peter Rutland is professor of government at Wesleyan University.

Skunk à la mode

That great historian Edward Gibbon could praise a 'bigoted' analyst as nevertheless full of 'diligence, veracity and scrupulous minuteness.' That fine historian G.M. Trevelyan saw that 'dispassionateness' was overvalued as against 'the really indispensable qualities of accuracy and good faith.' Neutrality toward the Soviet regime—like neutrality toward the Nazis—is a committed position. Yet one of our best scholars in the field, Vladimir Brovkin, was damagingly attacked a few months ago in confidential assessments by his academic colleagues not for any intellectual deficiency, but merely for being too 'anticommunist.'

It can be argued that the absurdities of academe have little direct effect on the mind of the ordinary intelligent citizen, any more than the sub-Marxist absurdities of the English departments affect his reading of literature. But now we are told, and not only by odd academics, that to describe the Soviet record is a sign of a Cold War mentality and, again on the basis of being terrifically objective, that there was not much to choose between the West and the Communists in that confrontation. Thus we get the proposition that the West was as bad as, or as much to blame as, the Communists, or nearly so. Nor, of course, are we allowed to be glad that we prevailed—that would be 'triumphalism.'

Triumphalism was specifically forbidden in Ted Turner's instructions to the producers of the CNN series 'Cold War.' This production has been defended on the grounds that much of it is effective and true. But this is rather like a restaurant saying, 'The first three courses were all right, so you can't object to our serving skunk for dessert.'

—Robert Conquest, *Wall Street Journal*, March 4, 1999

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Leaders Count

David M. Lampton

Patrick Tyler, *A Great Wall: Six Presidents and China, An Investigative History* (New York: Public Affairs, 1999), 476 pp., $27.50.

MY LARGELY favorable assessment of *A Great Wall* is not one to which I was initially predisposed, having first read excerpts of the book's chapter on the Carter administration in *Foreign Affairs*. But those excerpts left out the more substantive and balanced portions of that chapter, choosing instead to concentrate almost exclusively on the well-known conflict between Secretary of State Cyrus Vance (aided by his assistant secretary, Richard Holbrooke) and National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski. While it is true that Tyler does greatly overemphasize the significance of the Vance-Brzezinski friction in the normalization of relations between China and the United States, the book's treatment is more balanced than the truncated *Foreign Affairs* presentation conveys. Indeed, parts of it—such as the portions that deal with the role of Leonard Woodcock as American ambassador to Beijing—are excellent.

A Great Wall is not about the U.S.-China relationship as a whole, except in abbreviated fashion in the book's short last chapter. Rather, as the dust jacket states, it is about "Six Presidents and China"—Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford, Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan, George Bush and Bill Clinton. It is a survey of the political and geostrategic dimensions of America's dealings with China over the last thirty years, with less attention paid to the Bush-Clinton era than to its predecessors. *A Great Wall*, then, is the White House view of a relationship critical to America's future. As such, while the volume is important, it necessarily leaves largely unexamined two critical dimensions.

Vertically, the book only examines the tip of the iceberg that is the U.S.-China relationship. The reader is not seriously apprised of how ties have deepened, broadened and multiplied over the years, whether measured in terms of economic links, the presence of nearly 50,000 Chinese students and scholars in American higher education institutions at any given time, or the scale and breadth of private sector exchanges. This, in short, is a book about how the commanding heights of the executive branch have dealt with the People's Republic of China (PRC), rather than a book about the relationship between two societies and how that relationship has influenced government policy. One looks in vain for a sophisticated or thorough description of lobbying in Washington (not to mention Beijing). Left unmentioned, too, are the ties between localities in the two nations or those between philanthropic and civic organizations. There is a difference between foreign policy (government) and foreign relations (government and society). This is a book about the former.

Even within the U.S. government, the volume focuses on the White House, State Department and Pentagon, mentioning Congress only glancingly and largely ignoring other important executive branch actors such as the Treasury Department and United States Trade Representative. There is no index entry for the Asian financial crisis and no reference to the significant cooperation between the Treasury Department and Beijing during that downturn. Indeed, Tyler gives the economic dimension of the U.S.-China relationship scant treatment,

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except when business interests are brought in as an explanation for presidential behavior, as in his discussion of the Clinton administration.

Horizontally, the book is not about the U.S.-China relationship either, because it directs little attention to the Chinese side of the equation. The reader will wait in vain to learn much about the internal social and political forces driving the Chinese in their interaction with the Americans—or about the background and personalities of Chinese leaders, the perceptions and history that shape their proclivities, and the domestic political and social challenges and forces (including public opinion) that animate them.

Apart from the concluding chapter, the volume does not detail the scope of the transformation under way in China, and what that metamorphosis means for the world and, specifically, for America. China's modernization, whether it succeeds or fails, could well be the single most important event of the first quarter of the twenty-first century. By focusing so exclusively on personalities, rivalries, turf battles and foibles, Tyler inadvertently trivializes the importance of what has occurred and what is at stake in the future management of the U.S.-China relationship. For all the bitterness in the Vance-Brzezinski discord of the Carter years, for example, there was a serious argument behind it: would a move toward China in 1978 undermine or improve the prospects for meaningful strategic arms control agreements and a more stable relationship with a nuclear superpower? This was an issue worthy of vigorous debate, albeit perhaps not one conducted in such an unseemly manner.

Even the informed reader is frequently hard-pressed to sort fact from speculation in Tyler's treatment, particularly when he slides from descriptions of behavior to the attribution of motives. No documentation is provided to validate the assertion concerning the 1971 Indo-Pakistani war and the Nixon-Kissinger "tilt" toward Pakistan: that "for Kissinger, the conflict in East Pakistan could be exploited to get Nixon's attention again." Likewise, Tyler has George Bush readily accepting his 1974 assignment to Beijing because he "was trying to get as far as he could from Watergate"; in fact, and as Bush's contemporaneous correspondence shows, he was ambivalent about the "isolation" from Washington politics that his assignment to China would impose, while at the same time he was glad to be removed from what he called the "incivility" of Washington politics. Indeed, Tyler's portrayal of individuals often possesses a stick figure quality, with undocumented caricatures that reflect popular cynicism rather than the complexity of real people. The picture of Assistant Secretary of State Winston Lord, for example, ascribes motives of ambition and duplicity that indisputably enliven the prose but nonetheless do injustice to the person.

There are also errors of fact and inaccurate assertions. President Clinton is said to have banned television coverage of his first major speech on China policy in 1997 to avoid domestic political repercussions. Not true—World Net television and many others were there. Marshall Lin Biao is said to have been leader of the Chinese "volunteers" in Korea—in fact, it was General Peng Dehuai. Most surprising is the assertion that "the Tiananmen massacre stands as one of the greatest tragedies that has befallen China in the twentieth century." Tragic and unnecessary as the June 4, 1989, violence was, even the highest estimate of casualties there pales in comparison to the man-made calamities of Chiang Kai-shek blasting the Yellow River dikes in mid-1938 to stop the advance of the Japanese imperial army, Mao Zedong's Great Leap Forward, in which 20-30 million perished in a policy-induced famine during the late 1950s and early 1960s, or the senseless factional violence of the Cultural Revolution of 1966-76, in which countless numbers were unjustly jailed, killed or forced into internal exile or suicide.

In the policy domain, too, there are serious oversimplifications, bordering on errors.

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Thus, at the very beginning of the book we are told that "the United States has *accepted* since 1972 that there is only one China and that Taiwan is a part of it [emphasis added]." In fact, the United States has not accepted this; instead, it has adopted a series of locutions designed to keep the point somewhat ambiguous. Similarly, in describing U.S. security obligations toward Taiwan, Tyler understates the ambiguities built into American policy, most particularly in the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979. In essence, the U.S. government is obligated to be "gravely concerned", to make available to Taiwan defensive weaponry, and to maintain U.S. regional military capabilities to respond to a breakdown of peace. But Washington has not written Taiwan a blank check.

THAT SAID, Patrick Tyler's book is a great read and I recommend it as such. The strongest elements of *A Great Wall* are as important as its blemishes. No reader is likely to avoid concluding—rightly—that, from the days when normalized relations with the PRC were simply a gleam in Richard Nixon's eyes to the twilight of the Clinton administration, Taiwan has proved the single most dangerous and important locus of contention between Beijing and Washington. Twice, the United States has sought to halt nascent efforts by Taiwan to develop nuclear weapons. The potential for armed conflict has never been (and is not now) entirely absent. In the early 1970s, Mao Zedong, as Tyler records, declared that while the Taiwan issue might remain on the margins of the Sino-American relationship for perhaps a hundred years, eventually China would fight for it against the United States. As Deng Xiaoping explained to President Ford in 1975, "I think it is clear that the Chairman's meaning was that even in 100 years, a peaceful transition [reunification with Taiwan] would be impossible." In exquisite detail Tyler records how each administration has tried to maintain the contradictions and ambiguities of policy concerning Taiwan. This issue can be productively managed only with restraint in Beijing, Washington and Taipei; but domestic politics in all three capitals often render such restraint difficult, sometimes impossible.

In his discussion of Taiwan, as in much of the book, Tyler rarely ventures from description to analysis. For example, he accurately and interestingly recounts the sequence of events beginning with the State Department's 1994 refusal to grant Taiwan's President Lee Teng-hui overnight privileges in Hawaii; proceeding through the provocative issuance of a visa to Lee in 1995; the ensuing crisis in the Taiwan Strait a year later; Bill Clinton's articulation of the "Three No's" to mollify Beijing in 1998; and Lee's July 1999 incendiary call for "special state-to-state" relations across the Taiwan Strait. However, Tyler fails to analyze the larger dilemma confronting Washington. For each time the United States seeks to reassure Beijing that it does not wish to promote the separation of Taiwan from the mainland, it creates anxieties and resentment in Taipei, where a distinct identity from the PRC grows stronger every day. And when Washington does try to take the sensibilities of a democratic Taiwan into account, it inflames Beijing. Washington, therefore, is forced to tread a very thin line.

The second conclusion one takes from Tyler's book is that political leadership counts, that a willingness to take risks is not only essential, but more often than not has brought political dividends to those American politicians willing to do so. The presidents who have advanced U.S. interests *vis-à-vis* China furthest have been those who moved beyond their own initial bases of parochial support to consider the larger national interest. And in doing well for America, they have generally done well for themselves. This is a lesson that the next president could well learn. □

David M. Lampton is director of China Studies at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies and The Nixon Center. He is completing a book on U.S.-China relations after the Cold War.

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Getting It Right

Francis Fukuyama

Daniel Bell, *The Coming of Post-Industrial Society: A Venture in Social Forecasting*, Special Anniversary Edition (New York: Basic Books, 1999), 544 pp., $17.50.

LIKE THE TERM "post-Cold War era", the phrase "postindustrial society", coined by Daniel Bell over twenty-five years ago, was for many years more notable for defining an age in terms of what it was *not* rather than what it was. Back in 1973, when the first edition of *The Coming of Post-Industrial Society* was published, people had a sense that the industrial world in which they had grown up was undergoing profound change, that giant factories, manufacturing and labor unions were becoming passé, and that the class antagonism that such an economy produced was no longer the defining issue in politics. Bell's book was enormously influential in helping people understand that these changes were not small ones at the margin; rather, they represented the shifting of an entire economic paradigm.

Today we can define this new era in positive rather than negative terms: we speak of living in an "information society" rather than an industrial one. Indeed, futurist Alvin Toffler holds that this transition is as consequential as the shift from agriculture to industry. It is a mark of Daniel Bell's great insight about the age that was just passing, and his prescience about the one to come, that we can now fill in many of the details that he sketched out. It is therefore quite appropriate that Basic Books has brought out a third edition of Bell's famous book, together with a long new preface by the author that picks up where the second edition left off in 1976. Rereading the book in 1999 makes one realize just how right Bell was in his social forecasting.

BELL'S NEW preface begins by noting that many of the trends evident back in 1973 have continued apace. Manufacturing constitutes only 15 percent of the labor force in the United States, compared to 26 percent a generation ago. Occupations have shifted: today, more than 74 million people, or 60 percent of the U.S. labor force, are either professionals, managers or else in lower skill, white-collar jobs. Educational levels have risen dramatically: 81 percent of the population today has completed high school, compared to only 41 percent in 1960, while nearly a quarter of the population has graduated from college (against 7.7 percent in 1960).

What is driving these changes is ultimately technology. What it means to live in an information society is not simply that there is now an information technology sector and a personal computer on every desktop. The phenomenon is much broader and refers to the marginal substitution of information for material product in every sector of the economy: today's low-skill worker no longer breaks rocks in an open-pit mine, but operates a sophisticated rock crushing machine or passes a package of Pampers over a bar code reader at Wal-Mart. This has important consequences for social stratification: increasingly, the rewards go to the smart, educated designer of the rock crushing equipment or bar code reader rather than to the worker who operates them. Cognitive ability and education have become the keys to social mobility.

Much of the new introduction to *Post-Industrial Society* is devoted to bringing this story up to date. Bell is better at describing the forest than the trees, and gets some of the

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details wrong: he confuses bits and bytes, and credits Netscape with the invention of the web browser. But it is clear that he got the essence of the story right twenty-six years ago. Information technology, and behind it information itself, has become ubiquitous. This has drastically reduced the importance of geography, decreased the value of natural resources, and unified the world into a single market for capital, goods and services that we today label the "global economy." The old struggle between capitalists and the industrial proletariat that spawned communism and ultimately the Cold War has been made irrelevant by the "death of class"—the division of society into large blocks based on shared economic interest. There are too few workers to sustain a proletarian movement; all of the occupations comprising what is generically labeled the service economy, from clerical workers and teachers to bankers and software engineers, have few common interests and relate to one another via a myriad of complex and ever-changing identities. In the meantime, Bell notes, there is an increasing division of the political, economic and cultural into separate spheres.

Some of the hopes and fears entertained twenty-six years ago have proven to be unfounded. Bell recounts that predictions of technology producing an end of scarcity failed to take account of the fact that people often covet positional rather than distributional goods—i.e., relative status in a rat race that can never end. On the other hand, some of the fears expressed by Joseph Schumpeter, and by Bell himself in *The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism* (1976), namely, that postindustrial societies would produce elites hostile to the very economic sources of their existence, have so far not panned out in the manner expected. Though Bell does not quite put it this way, the Reagan-Thatcher revolution has left its mark: the elites who are likely to pierce body parts or seek medical benefits for their same-sex partners also spend a great deal of time these days worrying about their stock portfolios and day-trading on the Internet. Outside an increasingly small working class, *economic* hostility to capitalism has all but disappeared in the United States; what remains is a *cultural* contempt for traditional values.

It is on this issue of culture that Bell's updating of *Post-Industrial Society* leaves a curious gap. He spends some time rehashing his earlier complaints against Irving Kristol's concept of a "new class"—liberal elites locked in a perpetual "adversary culture"—on the somewhat narrow, semantic grounds that this group does not constitute an economic class in a dictionary sense. But Kristol was clearly onto something: while the inhabitants of postindustrial society have by now reconciled themselves to capitalism, they are far from coming to terms with what used to be called "bourgeois values."

A very important part of the story of the postindustrial era concerns the breakdown of virtually all of the sources of moral authority that prevailed in the middle of the twentieth century: organized religion, large social institutions like corporations or labor unions, neighborhoods, families, and the nation itself, which after Vietnam became the object of considerable scorn. Social identities have become more complex, shifting, and perhaps even more numerous, but they have also gotten incontrovertibly shallower in a process of moral miniaturization. Between the first and third editions of Bell's book, there was a huge run-up (and then subsequent decline) in crime rates; the divorce rate increased 20 percent; births to single mothers went from 13 to 33 percent of all American children; and levels of trust in the U.S. government and other institutions plummeted.

Since similar changes were going on in other societies making the transition to postindustrialism in this period, one suspected that they might have been related to the broader socioeconomic changes that were occurring at the same time. And indeed they were. The kind of political and economic freedom that is required to produce a postindustrial economic order brings in its wake demands for similar freedom in the moral sphere.

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Individualism and a willingness to break rules, which is celebrated when practiced by Steve Jobs inventing the Apple computer, is less benign when practiced by your local mugger or drug addict. While economic freedom produces prosperity and technological innovation, moral freedom undermines community and detaches individuals from one another.

SO THE STORY about the shift to postindustrial society is not simply a story about personal empowerment and the steady climbing of the hierarchy of needs by increasingly prosperous individuals. It is also the story of social disorder, disrupted neighborhoods, growing poverty, loneliness and broken families. These stories are particularly common in those communities that used to constitute the heart of the old industrial order, but which after the 1970s were devastated by the loss of low-skill manufacturing jobs—Gary, Cleveland, Chicago, Los Angeles and New York—and whose inner cities turned into hellholes.

There is another thread to the postindustrial story that is given somewhat short shrift in the new edition, which is the role of women. Bell spends only one page noting the degree to which women have entered the work force, which according to him is "one of the most remarkable features of change in American society in the past quarter century." I would say that this was *the* most important social transformation that occurred, and one that goes directly to the heart of the postindustrial order. For what does an information society mean, other than the substitution of mental for physical labor? In a world in which one gets ahead by patiently going to school and learning "symbolic manipulation" in front of a computer keyboard, it is only natural that female labor force participation should have increased dramatically. Medical technology—an aspect of technology that gets less attention than computers—was also critical in separating sex and reproduction (through birth control) and in enabling a vast expansion of human longevity. These changes made feminism all but inevitable by opening up large portions of a woman's life that would be free of family commitments, and had the paradoxical effect of liberating men from the constraints that kept them bound to families.

This shift in the role of women has had huge spillover effects in other social realms. It put paid to the traditional nuclear family, which was based on a sex-based division of labor, and put women in direct competition with men in the work place (where they often performed better). While women have been liberated from oppressive home lives, the increase in the number of households headed by single women has also accelerated the ongoing skewing of income distribution. Poverty and an increase in income inequality, in turn, have contributed to other social ills, like crime and low educational achievement, that worsened as the transition to postindustrialism was unfolding.

Important as these discontents of the transition to the postindustrial age were, they are, precisely, transitory in nature and should not detract from the book's importance to our contemporary self-understanding. Postindustrial society has arrived, as advertised. The kinds of ideas that Daniel Bell advanced as speculative propositions back in 1973 have now been accepted as the conventional wisdom of the information age. To his great credit, Bell was the Ur-information technology guru who saw wholesale social change being driven by technology a good twenty years before anyone in America knew what the Internet was. The fact that many of his predictions have proven to be much more accurate than anyone imagined at the publication of the first edition of his book is testimony to the power of social forecasting done right. □

Francis Fukuyama is Hirst Professor of Public Policy at George Mason University, and author of *The Great Disruption: Human Nature and the Reconstitution of Social Order* (Free Press, 1999).

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You Had To Be There

Walter Laqueur

Frances Stonor Saunders, *Who Paid the Piper? The CIA and the Cultural Cold War* (London: Granta Books, 1999), 509 pp., £20.

THE CONGRESS for Cultural Freedom (CCF) was founded at a big public meeting of intellectuals in Berlin, in the summer of 1950. Appropriately, the event coincided exactly with the outbreak of the Korean War—appropriately, because its establishment was the American response to an earlier Soviet initiative—in Wroclaw, Poland—to mobilize European writers, artists and intellectuals in its Cold War effort. (It was at Wroclaw on that occasion that the Stalinist apparatchik, Alexander Fadeyev, displaying his credentials as a literary critic, observed that if hyenas and jackals could write they would do so in the style of T.S. Eliot and Jean-Paul Sartre.) Given the political circumstances of the time, the sense of an urgent need for such a response was widespread: most of Eastern Europe had just been folded into the Soviet empire, the communists had triumphed in China, there were huge communist parties in France and Italy, and a large segment of Western intellectual opinion—perhaps the preponderant part—either favored the Soviet position or was neutral between it and the American one.

The Congress for Cultural Freedom was to exist for seventeen years, and some of the journals it sponsored continued to appear well after that. With its headquarters in Paris and its dozen or so periodicals, its frequent conferences and seminars, the Congress was supported by the CIA as part of that organization's covert activities, money being channeled through several existing foundations. This was kept a secret at the time, and it is doubtful whether anyone but Michael Josselson, the secretary-general of the CCF and a covert CIA operative, and possibly one or two others within the organization, knew about it. Not that it would have been considered a matter of paramount concern by the key figures in the organization had they known, because at the time the sense of freedom under attack was so strong that help would have been accepted from just about any quarter. It was an unfortunate arrangement, bound to backfire sooner or later, but there was no alternative at hand. There was no American agency dealing with cultural activities abroad on the lines of the British Council or the Alliance Française, and there was not a ghost of a chance that the U.S. Congress would have passed legislation for a project over which, by necessity, it would not have had control.

THESE FACTS, in broad outline, have been known since the mid-1960s. Why, then, should the CCF still attract the attention of writers in various countries to this very day? The brief answer is that at the height of its influence, in the 1950s and early 1960s, the CCF was a huge success. Its outreach was considerable and it played a notable role in the "war of ideas", which to a large extent was what the Cold War amounted to. While the financial cost involved was small by any standard, the journals the Congress published were among the best of their time, and the conferences and seminars it organized were influential. Together, they contributed, among other things, to changing the Labour Party in Britain and the Social Democratic Party in Germany from organizations with a narrow class base to truly popular parties, capable of holding their own (and governing) in the modern world. By now, it should also be clear that the political orientation of the

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CCF, not only with regard to the Soviet Union and the future of communism but generally, was a sound one—while the fashionable neutralist ideologies of the time were just as clearly wrong. Thus, books and articles about the CCF continue to be published, some admiring, others evidently unwilling to forgive it for having been prematurely right.

Frances Stonor Saunders, an Oxford-educated television producer, belongs to the latter camp. She has invested much effort in studying the archival evidence and interviewing some of the surviving CIA officials involved. She depends heavily on information supplied by Josselson's widow and Natasha Spender, the wife of the late Stephen Spender, poet and joint editor of *Encounter*. She presents interesting stories in the best (and worst) tradition of investigative journalism—uncovering, for instance, vital evidence that George Orwell's widow, Sonia, agreed to give Hollywood the film rights for *Animal Farm* only after she had been promised an assignation with Clark Gable. If true, it is a good story, even if it has nothing to do with the Congress for Cultural Freedom. But once we pass from the realm of entertainment to matters of substance, Saunders proves to be less than a reliable guide.

Consider, to begin with, the choice of the title: *Who Paid the Piper?* It is unlikely that she, or anyone else holding views similar to hers, would have given such a title to a history of the Russian Revolution, despite the fact that Lenin received a great deal of German money and was only able to take command of the event after being transported from Zurich to St. Petersburg courtesy of the German army. But she has no hesitation imputing complete political dependence on its source of funds in the case of the Congress, even though it is clear from the body of her book that poor Michael Josselson in Paris and the CIA in Langley, Virginia, found it impossible to control the intellectuals of the CCF in a dozen capitals. In fact they did not seriously try to do so. Instructions were seldom issued, and on the few occasions when an attempt was made in that direction, it was almost always ignored. This state of semi-anarchy may have quite literally shortened Josselson's life.

Saunders believes that the Cold War was not real but a "fabricated reality"—fabricated mainly by George Kennan, who apparently wanted to impose a Pax Americana on the rest of the world! She has only a vague idea as to the identity and the views of other *dramatis personae*. Thus Franz Borkenau, one of the fiercest anti-communists of his day, becomes the official historian of the Communist International. Richard Crossman, the British Labour member of parliament and later minister, is introduced as secretary-general of the Labour Party, a position that never existed and one that Crossman, for most of his career a maverick intellectual rather than an organization man, would have been the last person elected to fill had it existed. Raymond Aron, a key figure in Congress affairs especially in the later years, is hardly ever mentioned, and the author clearly prefers his antagonist, Jean-Paul Sartre, even though politically Sartre was consistently wrong while Aron was almost always right. It was said at the time in Paris that it was better to be wrong with Sartre than to be right with Aron; in the light of subsequent events, few people still cling to that position, but Saunders is evidently one of them.

READERS OF her book might reasonably expect to be told about the nature of Congress activities, the character of its magazines, the agenda of its seminars and conferences: Who wrote for and participated in them? What was their intellectual level? Were they interesting or boring? Did they matter and have an impact? But these deeper and basic issues are not raised, for Saunders' interest in ideas and policies seems to be strictly limited: she is after sensation and scandal, how the petty cash was spent and how individuals quarreled. She seems to have read with great attention the financial accounts of the CCF, but it is not clear on the evidence provided whether she read any of its publications. True, she refers to two articles submitted to

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Encounter (one of which was never published), but there is no reference to the contents, even briefly, of the other magazines. One is left uneasy, too, by her few references to important books, and a description of Koestler's *Darkness at Noon* as being about "Soviet cruelty" simply raises doubts as to whether she has ever read it.

In short, the diligent work she undertook in the archives and in her interviews is more than offset by political bias and primitive moralizing, unencumbered by knowledge of and interest in the historico-political context of the organization. It is as if the Congress for Cultural Freedom, an organization that more than most was the product of a particular time and milieu, had existed in a political vacuum. In some ways such a bitter attack many years after the event may be seen as a compliment to the achievements of the Congress, for ineffectual dead horses are seldom flogged.

It should be mentioned that shortly before the present book appeared in Britain, an academic study on the same subject by Michael Hochgeschwender was published in Germany.[1] It is about twice as long as Saunders' book, has ten times as many footnotes, and is a hundred times more reliable. It deals in ideas, not scandal, and Clark Gable does not make an appearance. Alas, chances are that it will never be translated.

Why is it that in Germany, France and Italy there is a more objective and relaxed attitude toward the Congress than there is either in the United States or in Britain? It was not always thus, certainly not in France, where American "cultural imperialism" was bitterly denounced at the time—and by Gaullists as much as by communists. But in France, the gospel according to Jean-Paul Sartre was buried even while the man himself was still alive, and Raymond Aron belatedly received the kudos due to him; *Preuves*, the French organ of the Congress, was not much of a success in terms of circulation while it was being published, but ironically its issues have been reprinted long after it ceased to appear.

Could it be, perhaps, that the special animus against the Congress and *Encounter* that permeates the Saunders book has in the end less to do with politics and ideology than with wounded national pride? *Encounter*, published in London, certainly was the most interesting political-literary journal of its day, but its influence was always greater outside Britain than inside. During its lifetime, its two principal editors were first Irving Kristol and then Melvin Lasky, two New Yorkers. In England there was resentment—in influential circles of the Right as much as of the far Left, and not least in the academic world—that foreigners (and especially New Yorkers of a certain ethnic provenance) should arrogate to themselves the right to publish a magazine that was more interesting than the existing ones (and, one should add, the ones that came after).

At a time when historians are still unable to see eye to eye on the French Revolution, it may be unrealistic to expect unanimity on events that happened only a few decades ago. If Saunders believes that, even in retrospect, Sartre and the neutralists of the 1950s were right and that one should have been less beastly to Stalin and his successors, she is of course entitled to her opinion. But the activities of the Congress for Cultural Freedom still deserve to be taken more seriously than they are in this book, with an emphasis on ideas rather than scandal and petty cash. Perhaps a Russian or East European historian should be asked to write such a history; he or she would be likely to show greater political understanding, detachment and sense of what was at stake during the early years of the Cold War. □

[1]Hochgeschwender, *Freiheit in der Offensive? der Kongress für Kulturelle Freiheit und die Deutschen* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1998).

Walter Laqueur is co-chairman of the Research Council at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC.

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

Charles E. Tauber, Editor-in-Chief
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Letters

North Korea:

Nicholas Eberstadt's article ("The Most Dangerous Country", Fall 1999) should have been required reading for former Secretary of Defense William Perry and his team before they issued their *Report on United States Policy Toward North Korea*, a set of recommendations that had been prepared at the request of the President. As one would expect from Dr. Perry, his report is a thoughtful and carefully constructed analysis. And now it has apparently become the guide for the administration's new approach to the Korean dictatorship. The Perry report recommends a path that "would lead to a stable security situation on the Korean Peninsula, creating the conditions for a more durable and lasting peace in the long run and ending the Cold War in East Asia." But it rejects trying "to undermine" the North Korean regime.

A reader of Eberstadt's penetrating analysis must come to the conclusion that this goal of the Perry policy seeks to square the circle. "Stable security" and "conditions for a lasting peace" on the peninsula cannot coexist with the North Korean dictatorship. Kim Jong Il's abominable dictatorship *is* the Cold War in East Asia. We cannot end one without ending the other, much as we could not end the larger Cold War so long as Stalin ruled the Soviet Union.

As Eberstadt makes clear, North Korea is interested in an economic relationship with the United States not to deepen commercial ties, but to collect tribute—that is, "aid on terms established by the recipient, not the donor." This feat requires leverage, and Washington over the last several years has inadvertently taught North Korea how best to employ that leverage against the United States; namely, by refusing nuclear inspections and threatening to build nuclear weapons, then promising not to do so in exchange for a U.S. commitment to provide massive long-term aid. Next, build tunnels that might hide a new nuclear weapons program; then grudgingly allow U.S. inspectors into these empty tunnels in exchange for more tribute. Next, test long-range missiles and threaten further tests; then promise to halt testing in exchange for still more tribute. And so on.

With North Korea, Eberstadt explains, "there is every reason to believe that the world community is dealing with an insatiable state." Why, then, do we keep appeasing this state? Eberstadt believes it is because of the weaknesses of all the governments involved—Moscow, Seoul, Tokyo and, of course, Washington. For Washington, appeasement is obviously not the result of military weakness but of a lack of self-confidence and a fear of war. Indeed, North Korea has proved so successful in extracting tribute precisely because Washington believes it might otherwise launch a war. That was, of course, Hitler's strong card at Munich, too.

FRED C. IKLÉ
Bethesda, MD

Nationalism:

Michael Mandelbaum sets out a plausible matrix of solutions to twentieth-century problems: popular rule trumps dynasty, and democracy trumps totalitarianism ("The Future of Nationalism", Fall 1999). The very neatness of the scheme provokes reduction.

For one thing, democracy *is* popular rule; so that the same principle has apparently triumphed over both dynasty and totalitarianism. That leaves as the central issue the nationalist question: who, for these purposes, constitute the people? Mandelbaum is no doubt correct in arguing that the two conflicting solutions to this problem—that of national self-determination and that of the

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inviolability of existing borders—will be with us for a long time to come. What he seems less fully to grasp is that the underlying issue in all three of his basic questions is the contrast between ordering from the top and from the bottom. The basic distinction, in other words, is between democratic and oligarchic tendencies in the distribution of power.

Mandelbaum's thesis about the decline of the sovereign state, with its corollary that in the very long term "the national question will have vanished", needs to be judged in this context. There are two basic areas in which this point would affect his conclusions. The first is that the supposed obsolescence of the nation-state is merely a transfer of power to organizations even more remote from the people than the nation-state itself. The second area is that of nationalist movements themselves. In the past, they depended on great surges of popular feeling that expressed a shared sense of identity. Increasingly, however, nationalist movements have come to be dominated by tight and often brutal structures of political manipulation, and often, indeed, of gangsterism.

Nationalist issues will thus be settled according to convenience—that of the international community (which Mandelbaum rightly recognizes as a cartel) or that of the manipulators of nationalist symbols. "Popular rule" will have less and less to do with it.

KENNETH MINOGUE
Liberty Fund

Humanitarian War:

Charles Krauthammer's piece on Kosovo ("The Future of Humanitarian War", Fall 1999) may be the first intelligent thing said about the criteria for humanitarian intervention since the debate on the subject began after the Gulf War. . . .

If there is a problem with the article, it arises from his argument that the experience of Kosovo ensures that humanitarian wars will no longer be fought. If analysis and common sense prevailed, he would be right. The problem is that these commodities have had declining purchase in post-Gulf War policymaking. That is not to say that our political leaders will not continue to get advice like Krauthammer's, but that they may not listen.

A great many people, including usually liberal and loyal members of the U.S. Foreign Service, would acknowledge Krauthammer's depiction of the facts regarding Kosovo. And they would shake their heads about it. Indeed, more than one of them has used the phrase "amateur night" in describing U.S. foreign policy at the moment. Others have said, variously, "but we don't have the means to do this sort of thing", "they got way ahead of themselves on this one", etc. . . .

What must be understood is that rhetoric, not action, has become virtually all of what U.S. (and, perhaps, Western) foreign policy is now about. If reality can no longer challenge rhetoric, then how will the real experience of Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia and Kosovo bring about the end of humanitarian war? . . .

Avoiding humanitarian war, then, is not a matter of persuading would-be political leaders to embrace Krauthammer's sensibilities. It is, rather, a matter of persuading would-be political leaders, first, of the need for modesty in speech on matters of foreign policy (and the proper measuring of means and ends), and second, to resist the temptation to make such speeches grist for overnight polling data. I would be hard pressed to think of anything more difficult to do in America today.

KEN JENSEN
The American Committees on Foreign Relations

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For an alleged realist and a man who gave us the phrase "the unipolar moment", Charles Krauthammer's analysis of the war in Kosovo is puzzling. Kosovo, like Bosnia before it, was not really a humanitarian war. The Clinton administration's conduct of the war was feckless and frivolous, but that hardly means that the security interests at stake were not real ones.

True, the extension of the American security perimeter into the Balkans and into southeastern Europe more generally does not involve a clash of great powers. Yet it is a reasonable, low-cost, even necessary step for preserving the peace we have created in Europe. If this move were propelled by purely humanitarian motives, to retreat would be easy and cheap—as Krauthammer cor-

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rectly observes about the American missions in Somalia and Haiti. But retreating from the Balkans will prove difficult. Thus, the American military is clearly settling in for the long haul in Bosnia and Kosovo, and it takes little imagination to foresee further expansion of its mission in the region.

While the current Pax Americana would endure longer with someone other than Bill Clinton at the helm, taking an overly narrow view of U.S. security interests is no better policy. The "unipolar moment" has lasted a decade already, and there is no rival great power on the near horizon. Policing the American perimeter in Europe, the Persian Gulf and East Asia will provide the main mission for U.S. armed forces for decades to come, and it is as important and legitimate an exercise in great power management as punishing regional rogues or containing the rise of China.

TOM DONNELLY
Project for the New American Century

Asian Values:

As he has often done before, Nathan Glazer has written an eminently sensible and useful article on the current state of the "Asian values" issue ("Two Cheers for 'Asian Values'", Fall 1999). He effectively counters those who, mostly with great glee, have used the recent economic difficulties in East Asia to argue (as they had believed all along) that values have nothing to do with economic success or failure.

To be sure, alleged "Asian values" have been cited as legitimations of authoritarian rule by the so-called Singapore School and others. But to go from this evident fact to the conclusion that the previous economic achievements in East Asia bore no relation to the culture of those countries is a case of throwing out the baby with the bath water. Corruption and crony capitalism can be observed in Italy and in Arkansas, from which facts one cannot draw general conclusions about Western values (Protestant as well as Catholic). Also, as Glazer makes clear, one must distinguish between values expressed in the macro-institutions of a society (one may recall here the erstwhile enthusiasm for MITI and the Japanese model of government/business relations) and the values that inspire ordinary people in their everyday lives (Robert Bellah has coined the apt term "bourgeois Confucianism" to refer to these). In this and in other matters, it is important to make sharp distinctions before one generalizes.

Having said all this, I will allow myself two mildly critical observations. Although Glazer concedes that family means different things in different cultures, he proposes that the vaunted "Asian values" are really not much different from the family ethos that is "the almost uniform brick and mortar of all traditional societies." That is a very questionable proposition. The family in traditional Italy is not like the family in traditional England, and traditional Japan is very different from traditional India in this respect. When it comes to Confucianism, the fierce commitment of families to education common to all East Asian societies is very distinctive indeed and almost certainly relevant to their economic performance.

Second, Glazer implies that in the long run Western culture will triumph everywhere—East Asian societies supposedly differ only in having a *slower rate* of Westernization. This too is doubtful. I think that when weighing the evidence now available, one is likely to conclude that cultural globalization is a more complex process. There exists indeed a Western-inspired global culture (aptly called "the Hellenistic phase of Anglo-American civilization" by Claudio Véliz). But this global culture meets with strong resistance (notably in the Islamic world), it confronts globalizing phenomena that originate outside the West (for example, the spread of New Age beliefs and practices), and, most important, it undergoes a variety of indigenizing modifications almost everywhere. It is a safe bet that the societies of East Asia will be recognizably distinctive far into the future.

PETER BERGER
Boston University

Global Warming:

Despite the title of their article ("Staying Cool About

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Global Warming", Fall 1999), Henry S. Rowen and John P. Weyant are actually quite anxious about climate change. Although they show quite convincingly that the measures proposed in the Kyoto Protocol would have little impact on the global climate and a devastating impact on the global economy, they still want to do something, because "an eminent group of atmospheric scientists asserted that [man-made warming] had probably been detected." Hence, they propose modest steps such as trading emission rights, technology investments and a small carbon tax.

But even their Kyoto-lite approach will have an economic impact and unintended consequences, for which there is in fact little justification. Below the surface of the "eminent" scientists' assertion about detecting a human fingerprint on the climate are computer models that cannot be configured properly to replicate past climates, let alone future ones. . . .

It is time to abandon the canard, perpetuated here by Rowen and Weyant, that the experts agree that human-induced global climate change is a major environmental problem. In 1995 the "eminent group of atmospheric scientists" referred to by the authors agreed that global temperatures might increase during the next century by somewhere between 1 and 3.5 degrees Celsius. These same experts would agree that 1 degree Celsius is probably nothing to worry about, while 3.5 degrees Celsius is a concern. In other words, the scientific consensus supporting Kyoto and lesser steps to curb global warming comes down to this: human-induced climate change may or may not be a problem.

So we need to move beyond Kyoto and computer models. A good first step, then, would be to fund research on forces that actually influence the climate.

JEFFREY SALMON
George C. Marshall Institute

Rowen and Weyant reply:

Experts do not agree that human-induced climate change is or will become a major environmental problem, but most agree that it *could* have a potentially catastrophic impact at some point during the next century. Hence, we believe that buying insurance for such a contingency is prudent public policy. Putting all of our research dollars into resolving scientific uncertainties and none into the potentially harmful consequences of climate change would not only be bad decision-making, it would be irresponsible. □

Letters to the Editor

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A Year of Debating China

Owen Harries

IT IS NOW widely believed that the most serious challenge to America's primacy will come from China. If indeed this turns out to be right, there is some cause for concern, for over the years Americans have had great difficulty thinking rationally about China. They have tended to oscillate violently between romanticizing and demonizing that country and its people. Thinking has largely been dominated by stereotypes: China as Treasure, in the form of insatiable market or investment opportunity; China as Paragon, the source of a superior wisdom, either ancient and Confucian or from a little red book; China as Sick Patient, needing Christian or Western democratic understanding, care and cures; China as Ingrate, insufficiently responsive to and grateful for our ministrations; and, of course, China as Threat—at one time Yellow Peril, at another Red Menace, and now, in the eyes of some very vocal and not uninfluential Americans, as rival, malevolent superpower.

Given this background, if indeed China should emerge as America's serious rival, the chances of a cool, sensible American reaction cannot be rated particularly high. Recent evidence of the way the issue is being debated bears this out. That debate has been structured as a sharp and clear choice between two options, usually labeled "engagement" and "containment." While this in itself amounts to a considerable oversimplification, it has been made worse by the fact that each side has tended to distort not only its opponents' position but its own. Thus "engagement" has been caricatured by its opponents as "appeasement", and by many of its advocates, including the Clinton administration itself, whose policy it is, as "strategic partnership." A realistic engagement would need to recognize that differences and friction—sometimes of quite a serious kind—are going to be unavoidable between two such different countries. The realistic objective should not be the creation of anything as ambitious as partnership, but the more modest one of the avoidance of enmity.

On the other side, many of the advocates of "containment" seem to proceed on the assumption that if China is finally getting its act together and emerging as an authentic major power, there is no option but to treat it as an enemy, starting from now. This kind of anticipatory enmity is evident in much of the strident rhetoric. Thus, the Chinese system is still routinely characterized as "totalitarian" by supposedly responsible commentators, though the regime's writ no longer runs very effectively in many parts of the country—and even in those parts where its will does prevail, the degree of authoritarianism has more in common with the

Owen Harries is editor of *The National Interest*.

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Habsburg or Romanov empires in a bad week than it has with the tight grip and savage repression of Stalin's Russia or Hitler's Germany.

But there it is: belief in the virtual inevitability of a clash is widespread.

During 1999 the China debate has been particularly animated and bitter. It has been fueled by five issues: first, the continuing repercussions of Chinese interference in the U.S. election process, in the form of illegal contributions during the 1996 campaign; second, the accusations of Chinese spying on U.S. defense secrets, given special prominence by the release of the Cox report in May; third, the troubled negotiation over Chinese membership of the World Trade Organization (WTO); fourth, the American bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in May; and finally, and most serious, the issue of the status of Taiwan, made highly controversial once again by the statement of Taiwan's President Lee in July that in future Taiwan intends to conduct its relations with the mainland on a state-to-state basis. The cumulative effect of these five issues—working on already existing concerns—has been great. What can be said concerning their merits and the way they have been debated?

Interference in the U.S. Election Process

THAT THERE WAS some interference in the U.S. election process, in the form of illegal campaign contributions by a number of sleazy characters, some of whom were connected to the Chinese military, is not in dispute. In considering how much moral outrage, shock and anger is appropriate, however—and how much it should influence policy toward China—we might take three things into consideration:

First, though the Chinese contributions apparently ran into some hundreds of thousands of dollars, in a campaign that was awash in money its overall impact could only have been very modest indeed.

Second, insofar as it took place, this violation of U.S. electoral laws depended much more on the insatiable appetite of American politicians for money—or, to be more pointed, in this instance on the political greed of the President and the Vice President, and the indiscretion resulting from it—than it did on any exceptional villainy or cunning on the part of Beijing.

Third, indignation and a sense of outrage might be tempered by reflecting that, with the possible exception of the Soviet Union, no country has tampered more with the electoral processes of other countries in the last fifty years than has the United States itself. Indeed, half a century before, Washington famously intervened, massively and effectively, to buy an election for the Christian Democrats in Italy, in order to keep the Communist Party out. In the same period, and for the same reason, it interfered very forcefully in French politics. In later years it did so in a variety of other countries, including Greece, Chile, the Philippines and, only yesterday, Russia. So in a sense what happened to the United States with the Chinese intervention in its electoral politics was only a case of the biter bit, and bit rather gently at that. It is true, of course, that in most of these cases American motives were of the highest, but that is not exactly the point.

Chinese Spying

THE SECOND, and in some ways related, issue is that of China spying on the United States' most sensitive military technology, which again raises the question of unwarranted and illegitimate interference in America's internal affairs.

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It should be noted that there is considerable confusion and disagreement concerning how successful and serious the spying has been. The congressional Cox report presented one, very grave, view; the Rudman Panel's report, drawing on the views of various intelligence sources, drew a much more sanguine conclusion. At various times the security offices of the Energy Department, the FBI and the CIA have expressed differing views concerning the scope of the spying and the identity of the spies. They have differed as well on the questions of how much of the technology transfer that has taken place was the result of spying, and how much was given gratis in the form of published material and generous access to laboratories.

But assuming that serious spying has taken place, to what extent should this be considered grounds for condemnation of China? Here again we run into the *tu quoque* problem—that is, one's own vulnerability to the charge that one is leveling against others. For *all* the major countries of the world spy on each other. Just as the Chinese spy on the United States, so does the United States spy on China—and on France, and Germany, and Japan. At least one hopes so. Indeed, as recently as October the German government requested the withdrawal of three CIA agents stationed in Germany because of their alleged activities in industrial espionage. Nothing shocking about this, it is the way the world works. If the Chinese have been particularly successful at it lately, that is not a reason for treating their behavior as something particularly dastardly, to be condemned and punished. Rather, it is a reason for punishing those who allowed them to get away with it, and for plugging the leaks.

Why is this so difficult to grasp? Why are we outraged that others behave toward us in the same way as we behave toward them? Clearly there is a double standard at work. The way this double standard is applied, I believe, often involves judging others by their actions but ourselves by our motives. Thus, for example, China's military build-up is *ipso facto* condemned as sinister and threatening, while any inclination of the Chinese, or others, to regard the much, much bigger U.S. military as threatening is dismissed as absurd, if not paranoid. Again, China's relatively modest arms sales are condemned as clear evidence of trouble-making and as dangerous to the world's peace and stability, but the huge U.S. arms sales are regarded as normal business. While this way of carrying on is perfectly understandable among lay people, it hardly carries conviction as serious analysis.

Membership of the WTO

THE THIRD OF the five episodes concerns the negotiation over China's membership of the World Trade Organization. The WTO came into existence in 1995, succeeding the old GATT. Its function is to make and enforce the rules of international trade; its purpose is to enhance that trade by making it more free. China has been trying to become a member of these organizations for years. It has been blocked by the United States, on the ground that its trade practices have not met the required norms of free and fair trade.

In April Chinese Prime Minister Zhu Rongji came to Washington. Zhu is the most pragmatic and reform-minded of the Chinese leaders. In Washington, as the culmination of prolonged negotiations, he made sweeping concessions to the United States, agreeing not only to slash tariffs on farm imports but to open China's telecommunications and service industries—including insurance, banking,

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accounting and entertainment—to foreign competition. In doing so, Zhu was taking a huge gamble and exposing himself to attack from conservatives at home.

At the last minute, and despite his being on recent record that it would be an "inexplicable mistake" to turn China down, President Clinton did just that, leaving a humiliated Zhu to return home empty-handed. Why did he do this? Two reasons were advanced: first, that on the advice of some officials he was holding out for even more concessions; second, that against the background of controversy over Chinese spying and election contributions, already taking flack for his Kosovo policy, and with Republican and Democratic opposition to the deal, he was not prepared to bear the political costs involved.

In any case, it was a strange state of affairs—a "surreal" role reversal thought the *Wall Street Journal*: "The world watched a communist leader trying to persuade an American President of the benefits of free trade between the two nations." And a Chinese trade negotiator was reported as saying, "Trade is the one area where our two interests are really in line. So if we don't even agree on trade, the outlook is not so good."

There are two grounds for opposing Chinese membership of the WTO, one good, one bad. The good one is that the Chinese have a poor record of keeping promises they make in trade agreements, and that in all likelihood they would cheat once allowed in. At the very least, that is a reason for insisting on serious pledges to comply, tough enforcement measures, and provisions for significant penalties for noncompliance.

The bad argument for opposing China's entry to the WTO is that membership should be treated as a kind of reward—and exclusion as a punishment—for good or bad behavior in other areas, with human rights usually the one emphasized. It is bad because the spread of free trade is desirable—is a major U.S. national interest—in its own right, not a favor to hold or bestow. And to quote the *Wall Street Journal* again, it is likely—not certain, but likely—that "a China that is much more open to trade will become a more responsible citizen in the community of nations."

Hopes that the matter would be rectified during the September APEC meeting in New Zealand were disappointed. But after protracted negotiations an agreement was reached in mid-November, on somewhat worse terms than Clinton had rejected in April. Getting Congress to accept the agreement is likely to take up much of the administration's energy over coming months.

The Embassy Bombing

ALMOST immediately in the wake of the April WTO fiasco, and while the spying issue was still in the headlines, the fourth episode occurred: the bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade. Of all the buildings in that city that might have been hit by accident, the fact that this most politically sensitive of structures was the one struck seemed bizarrely against the odds. To make things even more weird, it was reported that this was the one occasion when the CIA had intervened in the process of target selection. And to add improbability to improbability, not only was the building bombed, but with uncanny precision the exact floor on which the Chinese intelligence operations were functioning was the one hit.

The U.S. government immediately pronounced the bombing an accident and apologized. Virtually all Americans accepted that explanation, and when the Chinese subsequently allowed demonstrations and attacks on the U.S. embassy in Beijing to take place, American public

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embarrassment quickly gave way to anger and impatience at what was seen as the unreasonable refusal of the Chinese to put the matter promptly behind them.

When I passed through Hong Kong in early July, I had a clearer sense of why they would not. I did not meet a person there—either Chinese or Western—who accepted the accident thesis. They just maintained that the odds against such a thing happening by chance were too great. As well, one of them asked me to consider what the American reaction, popular and governmental, would have been had it been the other way around—had the Chinese destroyed a U.S. embassy and called it an accident. Would such a claim and an apology have been accepted as sufficient reason to put the matter to rest? In asking the question, he reminded me that when not so long ago U.S. embassies had been destroyed in Africa, Washington immediately responded by bombing targets in two countries—Afghanistan and Sudan—with which it was not at war. I pointed out that the two cases were not the same; he smiled.

In any case, the bombing took place in the context of American-led military intervention in the internal affairs of a sovereign state; an intervention, moreover, that served to emphasize dramatically the military and political dominance of the United States. Whatever one's opinion on the Kosovo war, for obvious reasons it set a profoundly disturbing precedent for China. This, in turn, was part of the background for the fifth and most serious episode.

Taiwan and the "One China" Policy

IN JULY Taiwan's President Lee Teng-hui announced that his government now considered that its relations with Beijing should be conducted on a state-to-state basis—i.e., on the basis of one independent entity dealing with another independent entity. This amounted to a repudiation of the "one China"—or the "one China, peacefully achieved"—formula that had hitherto provided a satisfactorily ambiguous and workable basis for handling the Taiwan issue. Most commentators concluded that Lee had made his statement for domestic political reasons, with a presidential election coming up in March of next year. It may be, too, that he was encouraged to do so by the deterioration in U.S.-China relations that had already occurred during the year. In any case, China reacted with fury, the U.S. government with disapproval. But a large segment of U.S. elite opinion, both conservative and liberal, responded by supporting Lee's declaration and condemning both Beijing and Washington for their reactions.

Apart from denouncing China for its human rights record and as a totalitarian government, an important component of the criticism was that Lee was merely stating the obvious, recognizing reality. Thus a *Wall Street Journal* editorial maintained that, "Taiwan is doing little more than stating some obvious facts"; Jim Hoagland in the *Washington Post* wrote that, "Lee uttered an obvious but inconvenient truth" for which "he deserves praise, not verbal spanking"; and the *Weekly Standard* editorialized that all that Lee had done was to strip away "the absurd fictions of the 'one-China' policy."

The trouble is that this appeal to the facts is very selective and ignores some other, rather vital, facts. Because another truth is that the "absurd fiction" of the one China policy has served the three parties very well, providing a fruitful status quo for nearly three decades. It has given the United States the stability it wanted in the region, and an opportunity to develop a constructive relationship with China. It has allowed China to make enormous strides in developing its economy and has coincided with a very signifi-

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cant loosening up politically—for, even allowing for the awful Tiananmen Square episode, the China of today is enormously more open and relaxed than the China of two decades ago.

But the biggest benefactor of all has undoubtedly been Taiwan. The status quo represented by the "absurd fiction" has allowed it to move peacefully from dictatorship to democracy. Its economy has made fantastic progress: two decades ago Taiwan's GNP per capita was $1,450; by 1997 it was $13,467—almost a ninefold increase. And just how unoppressive this "absurd fiction" has been to Taiwan is indicated by the fact that 40,000 Taiwanese firms now have more than $40 billion invested in the PRC. *De facto*, Taiwan *is* an independent state in all respects other than membership of international organizations.

True, it does not have *de jure* independence: it does not have membership in the UN, and its diplomatic relations with most other countries have to be lightly disguised; and true, its dignity is affronted by these limitations. The crucial question, surely, is whether the dignity of the Taiwanese, the conversion from *de facto* to *de jure* independence, is worth the destabilization of the region, a massive deterioration in Sino-American relations, and, quite possibly, a serious war and the blood of American soldiers. Or put in another way: Should the United States cede decisions over whether to go to war with another major power to a client state that is suffering virtually nothing in the way of hardship and whose interests it has protected for the last fifty years? To me it seems that the obvious answer to both these questions is a resounding "no."

Some would pose a different question: Should not the United States shape its policy on this issue in terms of its concern for human rights and democracy? My answer to that would also be "no"—partly because what the United States can do directly to influence the internal life of China is very limited and many of such efforts could be counterproductive; partly because there are other very important political, strategic and economic considerations—ones which also have an important moral content—that must take precedence; and partly because the most effective way available to us of promoting respect for human rights and democracy in China is by pursuing policies that will increase the wealth and raise the living standards of the country. The correlation between rising incomes and democratization is a very strong one, as Henry Rowen has pointed out in these pages.

THE CHOICE between engagement on the one hand and containment and isolation on the other is not one that has to be decided entirely in terms of abstract argument. There is historical experience to draw on.

For more than two decades—from 1949 to the early 1970s—the United States tried containing and, within its means, isolating China. That period was one of the most disastrous not only in Chinese history but in all of human history: a ruthless tyranny prevailed, millions of Chinese were killed by the regime or died because of its insane policies, obscurantism ruled, the economy was reduced to a shambles. Internationally, China actively supported subversion and insurrection throughout its region, fought a war against India, and even tried its hand at intervention in Africa.

For the last three decades the United States has opted for engagement. During that period the political system in China has changed from a ruthless and irrational tyranny to—and, again, I haven't forgotten Tiananmen—a progressively milder form of authoritarianism. While some intellectuals, Christians and ethnic minorities are still given a very hard

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time, most Chinese live their lives with comparatively little interference from the state. Human rights abuses, which still exist, have become less widespread and extreme, and there is greater personal freedom. The living standards of ordinary Chinese have improved greatly. The international behavior of China has become unexceptionable—to the extent that its critics have to put great emphasis on the occupation of one uninhabited reef in the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea, and have to ignore the awkward fact that in recent years China has used force in the pursuit of its foreign policy much less frequently than has the United States itself. (This does not prevent other serious people from using terms like "appeasement" and "Munich" whenever a proposal for a compromise with China over any issue is put forward. A suggestion: anyone resorting to the term "Munich" should be obliged to identify the Hitler actor—that is, the insatiable expansionist—in the situation under discussion.)

In short, if one looks back over the last one hundred and fifty years, the last twenty of them stand out as easily the best ones that China and the Chinese people have enjoyed during that period.

One cannot, of course, draw a simple causal connection between the shift of American policy and the changing fortunes of China. More things were involved in determining the latter. Still, American policy was certainly a major variable, and it will remain so in the years to come. So my vote goes to engagement—an illusionless engagement that does not mistake itself for partnership, that is tough-minded and alert to abuse of the relationship by Beijing—but, nevertheless, engagement. □

Molded by Kosovo

For Americans, the irony is that they may have done a lot to set the mood for Russia's current attitude toward Chechnya. Conflict there may have been unavoidable; Islamic militants effectively gave the Kremlin and its armies a choice of fighting or losing both territory and Russia's honor. But both the rules of the battle and the mentality of its leaders have been molded by NATO's relentless bombing of Yugoslavia last spring—opening an East-West rift that American diplomats then predicted would soon be papered over, but that has only yawned wider in the intervening months.

In Russia, the Kosovo war is remembered as a conflict NATO launched in utter disregard of Moscow's emotional pleas and warnings of disaster. This time around, Moscow has returned the cold shoulder, ignoring Western pleas to mediate and even to closely observe the conflict.

Now, in Russian eyes, Moscow's day-and-night bombardment of Chechen targets mirrors NATO's round-the-clock raids, save the smart bombs and accurate missiles that minimized civilian Yugoslav deaths.

Then, Russia denounced as war crimes the civilian deaths that did occur, from errant NATO missiles or bombs that hit refugee sites. Now those same horrors have become justification for ignoring complaints about Chechen civilian casualties.

—Michael Wines, *New York Times*, November 21, 1999

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

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"THOSE WHO LIKE to cast American foreign policy as an unhealthy mix of ignorance, isolationism and trigger-happy cowboy diplomacy are often thinking about the Jacksonian populist tradition. But for anyone wishing to anticipate the course of American policy, an understanding of the structure of Jacksonian beliefs and values is essential."

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